The choice and effects of governance mechanisms for regulating client-contractor relationships in large construction projects by Bani Hashemi Chaharom, Seyed Yaser
Copyright and use of this thesis
This thesis must be used in accordance with the 
provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.
Reproduction of material protected by copyright 
may be an infringement of copyright and 
copyright owners may be entitled to take 
legal action against persons who infringe their 
copyright.
Section 51 (2) of the Copyright Act permits 
an authorized officer of a university library or 
archives to provide a copy (by communication 
or otherwise) of an unpublished thesis kept in 
the library or archives, to a person who satisfies 
the authorized officer that he or she requires 
the reproduction for the purposes of research 
or study. 
The Copyright Act grants the creator of a work 
a number of moral rights, specifically the right of 
attribution, the right against false attribution and 
the right of integrity. 
You may infringe the author’s moral rights if you:
-  fail to acknowledge the author of this thesis if 
you quote sections from the work 
- attribute this thesis to another author 
-  subject this thesis to derogatory treatment 
which may prejudice the author’s reputation
For further information contact the University’s 
Director of Copyright Services
sydney.edu.au/copyright
 The Choice and Effects of Governance Mechanisms for Regulating  
Client-Contractor Relationships in Large Construction Projects 
 
By 
Seyed Yaser Bani Hashemi Chaharom 
B.Sc. (Civil Engineering), M.Sc. (Project & Construction Management) 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Construction Management Department 
School of Civil Engineering 
The University of Sydney 
 
Sydney, Australia 
March, 2015 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
Poor project governance is the main cause of project failure for complex projects. 
Historically, formal contracting has been the mainstay of project governance for 
outsourced projects, but in practice, the adversarial and ‘incomplete’ nature of contractual 
arrangements has shifted the attentions to the use of alternative governance mechanisms 
to contracts—relational governance mechanisms. Subsequently, researchers began to 
study the conditions surrounding the choice and effects of contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms as well as the interactions between them. Despite the progresses 
made, there exist gaps in the literature on project governance.  
First, the definition of relational governance and its roles in exchange relationships 
are still vague which contributes to inconsistent research findings. While some studies 
refer to prior ties, shared norms, and trust as relational mechanisms, others consider these 
factors as antecedents for the choice between formal contracting and relational contracting 
in exchange relationships. Furthermore, some studies do not differentiate between the 
social assets that are embedded within partners’ social ties, and joint actions that are 
implemented through their transactions. These varied interpretations and measurements of 
the same construct have led to inconsistent findings (e.g., substitutability versus 
complementarity of relational mechanisms and formal contracts). Drawing upon social 
capital theory and social exchange theory, this thesis conceptualizes social capital (e.g., 
prior ties, shared norms, and trust) as ex-ante relational governance mechanism, and 
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collaboration between partners (e.g., information exchange, joint actions) as ex-post 
relational governance mechanism to investigate their effects on project performance.  
Second, while the ability of partners to observe project team behavior and measure 
their achievements, and while their knowledge of task organization and resource allocation 
are considered to be the predicting factors for the choice and effects of governance 
mechanisms, the impact of governance mechanisms on development of these control 
capabilities as well as the intervening effect of these developed capabilities on the efficacy 
of governance mechanisms are unknown. Borrowing from control theory, this study 
conceptualizes ‘project control capability’ as a new construct and posits that ‘project 
control capability’ not only is affected and enhanced by the use of governance 
mechanisms, but also plays a mediating role on the way through which governance 
mechanisms impact on exchange performance. 
Finally, despite calls to examine the contingent effect of cultural and legal conditions 
on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms, few empirical studies have addressed 
this concern. Drawing on institutional theory, this thesis studies the impact of 
individualistic/collectivistic culture and low/high contract enforceability on the efficacy of 
governance mechanisms by conducting a comparative research in two culturally and 
legally contrasting contexts: Iran and Australia.  
A questionnaire survey was designed and implemented targeting executive/project 
managers of large construction companies in Iran and Australia to study the choice and 
effects of governance mechanisms in regulating client-contractor relationships in large 
construction projects. Data collected from 73 Iranian and 38 Australian client-contractor 
partnerships were then analyzed using the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation 
Modeling (PLS-SEM) method to test the research hypotheses and validate the research 
model.  
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The contributions of this study are threefold; first, it contributes to social capital 
theory and social exchange theory by revealing that social capital and collaboration play 
different roles in regulating exchange relationships; for example, the results showed that 
where there is no substitutive or complementary relationship between social capital and 
formal contract, collaboration and formal contract complement each other. Second, it 
contributes to the inter-organizational relationships (IORs) and project management 
literature by introducing a new construct of ‘project control capability’ and showing the 
importance of its role in transaction performance; for example, the findings showed that if 
collaboration is not effectively implemented to enhance ‘project control capability’, its 
impact on project performance will disappear. Third, this thesis enriches the IORs 
literature by identifying and elaborating how culture and contract enforceability influence 
the choice and effects of governance mechanisms. For instance, the findings showed that 
while collaboration is the main contributor to relationship satisfaction in Australia as an 
individualistic country with high contract enforceability, social capital is the main 
motivator for relationship satisfaction in Iran with its collectivistic culture and low contract 
enforceability. Together, this study provides important theoretical and managerial insights 
and opens the way for more research within IORs context, particularly with regard to 
complex conditions in large construction projects. 
Keywords: formal contract, social capital, collaboration, project control capability, 
individualism, contract enforceability.   
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1.1 Background  
Client-contractor relationships in large construction projects have never been simple as 
what is being delivered is a complex capital asset that will be used over many years (Roehrich 
& Lewis, 2010). These complex transactions have usually been subject to adversarial 
relationships and consequently have called for deploying inter-organizational governance 
mechanisms as remedies for mitigating the adverse consequences (Latham, 1994; Ling, Ning, 
Ke, & Kumaraswamy, 2013; Ng, Rose, Mak, & Chen, 2002). Detailed formal contracting has 
been considered as one of the regular solutions through clarifying the legally binding rights 
and responsibilities of both parties in the relationship (Roehrich & Lewis, 2010), however 
subsequent studies found that reliance on formal contracting typically results in adversarial 
relationships between clients and contractors in large construction projects, which exacerbates 
chances of project failure by thwarting exchange of information, hindering collaboration, and 
increasing hostility between the parties (Rahman & Kumaraswamy, 2002, 2004). Moreover, 
the lack of institutionalized structures needed to enforce the contract may undermine the 
usefulness of formal contracts and high levels of uncertainty and complexity in practice can 
make it impossible or excessively expensive to construct ‘complete’ contracts upfront (Lyons 
& Mehta, 1997; Tuuli, Rowlinson, & Koh, 2010). Consequently, relational governance 
mechanisms have been proposed as an effective alternative in such situations (Rahman & 
Kumaraswamy, 2005).  
Scholars adopted different theoretical lenses to explain the significance of contractual 
and relational governance mechanisms in safeguarding exchange relationships, integrating 
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exchange interactions, or creating value for exchange partners. As such, IORs governance 
literature explained how formal contracts and relational mechanisms can be used to guard 
against common transaction hazards such as behavioral uncertainty, environmental 
uncertainty, or task uncertainty which could render the transactions ineffective (Eisenhardt, 
1985; Heide, 1994; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Luo, Liu, Zhang, & Huang, 2011), or to enhance 
coordination and facilitate cooperation between parties and mitigate performance risks 
(Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), or to facilitate value 
creation through providing access to knowledge (e.g., J. J. Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2010; Lui, 
2009), creating competitive advantage (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998), or promoting long-term 
orientations within IORs (e.g., Yang, Zhou, & Jiang, 2011).  
Apart from discussions about the utility of governance mechanisms, a substantial body 
of literature investigated the conditions that would affect the choice and effects of these 
mechanisms (e.g., Jap & Ganesan, 2000; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). While some studies focused 
on transactional conditions (e.g., asset type, asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, 
behavioral uncertainty, expected future, buyer lock-in) (e.g., D. Chen, Park, & Newburry, 
2009; Rhee, Kim, & Lee, 2014), others examined relational conditions (e.g., prior ties, shared 
norms, trust) (e.g., Y. Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009; Zhang, Wan, Jia, & Gu, 2009) or institutional 
conditions (e.g., informal institutions, formal institutions) (e.g., Yuan Li, Xie, Teo, & Peng, 
2010; Zhou & Poppo, 2010). Despite the great strides taken by previous scholars to explain 
the efficacy of different governance mechanisms under various conditions, the findings are 
inconsistent. Whilst some studies found contractual and relational governance mechanisms to 
be complementary (e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002), others indicated that they are substitutes 
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(e.g., L. Wang, Yeung, & Zhang, 2011). Recent research suggest that their complementarity 
or substitutability is contingent on various transactional or environmental conditions (e.g., 
Abdi & Aulakh, 2014; Rhee et al., 2014), but these conditions have not been fully understood. 
Moreover, there are ambiguities in the literature that may impact on consistency of findings, 
and therefore need more clarification. 
First, the definition of relational governance is still ambiguous and there are varied ways 
of measuring this construct. While some studies referred to prior ties and social embeddeness 
or pre-existing shared norms and/or trust among partners as relational governance 
mechanisms (e.g., Y. Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009; Lui & Ngo, 2004; Yu, Liao, & Lin, 2006), 
others regarded these as contingent factors and antecedents for the choice of contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms (e.g., Luo, 2002; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). Further, some 
studies considered joint actions and collaborations during exchange relationships as relational 
governance mechanisms and measured accordingly (e.g., Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach, 2000; 
e.g., Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009). With the measurement of the relational governance 
construct, some used first-order constructs (e.g., Abdi & Aulakh, 2014; Poppo & Zenger, 
2002), while others treated it as a second-order construct (e.g., Arranz & Arroyabe, 2012; Y. 
Liu et al., 2009). These inconsistencies in the definition and measurement could be the source 
of inconsistent findings on the interactions between contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms. 
Second, previous studies in project management domain showed that complex processes 
and various uncertainties in this context should be controlled by project partners and the ability 
of the partners to apply various types of governance mechanisms will contribute to the 
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partnership outcomes (Naoum, 2003; Rahman & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Turner & Simister, 
2001). In other words, even if the best governance mechanisms are selected, it does not 
guarantee satisfactory outcomes if the partners lack experience and/or understanding of the 
mechanisms. However, it is not clear how project control capability of partners interacts with 
governance mechanisms to impact on project performance.  
Third, given the importance of the choice of appropriate governance mechanisms, it is 
important to know whether the efficacy of contractual and relational governance mechanisms 
is constant in different cultural and legal contexts. Prior studies referred to the culture and 
contract enforceability as ‘shifting parameters’ and suggested that these factors are likely to 
have a noticeable impact on the efficacy of different governance mechanisms (e.g., Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002; Yang et al., 2011). Despite the calls for examining the contingent effect of 
cultural and legal conditions on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms, few 
empirical studies acknowledged this concern. 
1.2 Research purpose 
This research aimed to add to the long-lasting debate on the choice and effects of 
governance mechanisms in regulating exchange relationships in complex transactions. To 
fulfill this purpose, an extensive review of literature was undertaken and three gaps were 
identified:  
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(1) ambiguous definition of relational governance mechanisms and inconsistent 
findings on the interactions between relational governance and formal contracts in 
explaining exchange performance; 
(2) how project control capability of partners interacts with governance mechanisms 
and jointly impacts on exchange performance;  
(3) how culture and contract enforceability can influence the choice and effects of 
governance mechanisms in explaining exchange performance. 
To address the first gap, this study differentiates between ex-ante and ex-post relational 
governance mechanisms. One of the main criteria for conceptualizing and measuring 
relational governance mechanisms can be the nature of the mechanisms. As such, 
differentiating between the social bonds, norms and trust developed prior to the collaboration, 
and information exchange, joint actions and social exchanges that take place during the new 
exchange relationships can be helpful. Drawing upon social capital theory and social exchange 
theory, this thesis conceptualizes social capital (e.g., prior ties, shared norms, and trust) as ex-
ante relational governance mechanism, and collaboration (e.g., information exchange, joint 
actions) as ex-post relational governance mechanism to investigate the joint effects of the two 
on exchange performance.  
Addressing the second gap, this study borrows from control theory to conceptualize 
‘project control capability’ as a new construct. I submit that to achieve the expected results 
from exercising governance mechanisms, the project partners must have enough ‘project 
control capability’ and this capability can be improved by the use of governance mechanisms. 
In other words, ‘project control capability’ plays a mediating role in the relationship between 
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governance mechanisms and performance, that is, even though governance mechanisms have 
been appropriately selected, if they cannot enhance the partners’ ‘project control capability’, 
they will lose their efficacy.  
Finally, this study adopts institutional view to examine the contingent effect of culture 
as informal institution and the legal system as formal institution on the choice and effects of 
governance mechanisms. According to the institutional theory, established formal and 
informal institutions can constrain human behavior and structure inter-personal and inter-
organizational behavior by increasing the actors’ costs in various ways, including economic 
costs (e.g., increasing risk), cognitive cost (e.g., requiring more thought), and social cost (e.g., 
reducing legitimacy) (Y. Li et al., 2010; North, 1990; M. W.  Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 
2009; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004). Thus, individualism/collectivism and contract 
enforceability were selected as representative dimensions of culture and legal system, 
respectively, to examine their impact on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms. 
1.3 Research questions  
According to the identified gaps in the literature, the following research questions are 
recommended: 
1. By conceptualizing the prior ties, shared norms, and trust as ex-ante relational 
governance while collaboration as ex-post relational governance, what are the joint 
effects of the two on performance? 
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2. How does ‘project control capability’ interact with governance mechanisms to 
impact on performance?  
3. How do the culture and the contract enforceability impact the choice and effects of 
governance mechanisms? 
1.4 Research design  
To answer the research questions and test the research hypotheses, cross-cultural 
questionnaire survey was conducted. Since one of the objectives of this research was to 
examine the impact of individualistic/collectivistic cultures and contract enforceability on the 
choice and effects of governance mechanisms, this study analyzed the contributions made by 
various governance mechanisms on exchange performance in two culturally and legally 
diverse environments; Iran and Australia.  
Since this study set out to analyze the choice and effects of governance mechanisms in 
regulating client-contractor relationships in large construction projects, the client-contractor 
relationships embedded in projects were chosen as the units of analysis. In this study large 
construction projects were treated as sets of transactions (Pryke & Pearson, 2006) to identify 
the effects of governance mechanisms on project performance. To collect data 
executive/project managers working in large construction contractors were surveyed. From 
365 and 241 questionnaires sent to Iranian and Australian companies, 84 and 41 were received 
in valid and complete form. After removing questionnaires that contained outliers, 73 Iranian 
and 38 Australian client-contractor partnerships were then analyzed using partial least square 
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structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) method to test the research hypotheses and validate 
the research model.  
1.5 Research findings and contributions 
The main purpose of this study was to develop the IORs literature on the choice and 
effects of governance mechanisms in the project context. The findings of this study make 
multiple contributions to the IORs governance and project management literature. First, 
drawing on social capital and social exchange theories, this study differentiated between social 
capital (e.g., prior ties, shared norms, and trust) as ex-ante relational governance and 
collaboration (e.g., information exchange, joint actions) as ex-post-relational governance and 
investigated the distinct roles of these relational mechanisms in regulating exchange 
relationships. The results confirmed that social capital and collaboration act differently in their 
interactions with formal contract and also in explaining project performance. For example, the 
research results showed that while social capital and formal contract have no substitutive or 
complementary relationship, the relationship between collaboration and formal contract is 
complementary.  
Second, borrowing from inter-organizational control theory, ‘project control capability’ 
was defined as a new construct to examine the mediating effect of control capability of the 
project partners on the efficacy of governance mechanisms in explaining project performance. 
The research findings confirmed the importance of project control capability in successful 
exercise of governance mechanisms. For example, the results showed that project control 
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capability mediates the relationship between collaboration and project (time&cost) 
performance and relationship satisfaction in different contexts. 
Third, this study grounded its theoretical framing on Williamson (2000)'s social system 
model to examine the contingent effect of individualistic/collectivistic culture and high/low 
contract enforceability on the efficacy of governance mechanisms in regulating exchange 
relationships in different contexts. The results contribute to IORs governance literature and 
support Williamson (2000)'s assertion that the institutional environment—formal and 
informal institutions—impacts the comparative effectiveness of governance mechanisms. The 
findings showed that in collectivistic cultures with low contract enforceability social capital 
is a key enabler of project (time&cost) performance and relationship satisfaction and effective 
collaboration impacts indirectly on relationship satisfaction enabled by ‘project control 
capability’. In contrast, in individualistic cultures with high contract enforceability effective 
collaboration enabled by ‘project control capability’ has a pivotal role in the relationship 
between social capital, formal contract, and project (time&cost) performance. It was also 
found that in this context working with trusted partners motivates collaboration which in turn 
leads to relationship satisfaction and also formal contract impacts indirectly on relationship 
satisfaction through collaboration. Finally, the results indicated that project (time&cost) 
performance is an important contributor to relationship satisfaction in both contexts.  
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1.6 Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 2 reviews the concept of governance and its application in IORs and provides 
an overview of prior studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their 
interactions to identify the gaps in the literature and develop the research questions. To address 
these questions, Chapter 3 develops research hypotheses and a theoretical framework, and in 
Chapter 4, research design for implementing the study is explained. Chapter 5 describes the 
data analysis process, followed by Chapter 6 that presents the research results and discusses 
the findings. Finally, the main findings of this thesis are summarized, conclusions are drawn 
and theoretical and practical implications are presented in Chapter 7, along with the research 
limitations and avenues for future work.  
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the relevant literature on the contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms and their theoretical background, as well as a review of findings from major 
empirical studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions 
under different transactional and contextual conditions. From this review, three gaps in the 
literature are highlighted and discussed, from which a research agenda is proposed and the 
research questions, theoretical framework, and research hypotheses are developed.   
2.2 Governance definition 
The term ‘governance’ originates from the Greek word ‘kubernan’ or Latin word 
‘gubernare’, meaning ‘to steer’ (Muller, 2009; Renz, 2007). The Oxford dictionary defines 
‘governance’ as the “action or manner of governing a state, organization, etc”, where ‘to 
govern’ is described as “to conduct the policy, actions, and affairs of (a state, organization, or 
people) with authority”, and “to control, influence, or regulate (a person, action, or course of 
events)”. As the definition shows, ‘direction and control’ and ‘checks and balances’ are the 
main concerns of governance arrangements (Renz, 2007). In other words, governance 
arrangements provide a framework through which not only ownership and control of tasks 
become clearly distinguished, but also the boundaries for management actions are specifically 
defined (Muller, 2009). As defined by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (UN-ESCAP), governance is the process of decision making and the 
process by which decisions are implemented. According to UN-ESCAP, there are eight main 
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characteristics of good governance including participation, rule of law, transparency, 
responsiveness, consensus oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, 
and accountability (Abednego & Ogunlana, 2006).  
While the governance terminology was originally applied to describe the government 
of countries, its meaning and application have expanded through various domains during the 
past decades, such that nowadays governance is ultimately concerned with creating the 
conditions for ordered rule and collective actions, not only at government level, but also within 
organizational and inter-organizational contexts (Muller, 2009; Stoker, 1998). Since the focus 
of this research is to study the role of governance mechanisms in client-contractor 
relationships, the literature on inter-organizational relationships (IORs) governance is 
reviewed in the following section. 
2.3 Governance of inter-organizational relationships (IORs) 
Although traditional form of conducting a business was through either discrete market 
transactions—where faceless buyers and sellers exchanged standardized goods or services at 
a competitive price—or internal hierarchical arrangements—where highly specific structures 
were tailored to the special needs of the transactions—a growing number of firms over the 
past decades have been using various new forms of IORs (e.g., strategic alliances, 
partnerships, coalitions, joint ventures, franchises, research consortia) as hybrid forms of 
governance structures which fall on a continuum between market and hierarchy (Ring & Van 
de Ven, 1994; Williamson, 1979). Since then, the performance of IORs governance 
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mechanisms has become one of the main success factors for business firms (Palmatier, Dant, 
& Grewal, 2007), and consequently, the subject of research for academics (Ruuska, Ahola, 
Artto, Locatelli, & Mancini, 2011).  
According to the IORs literature, inter-organizational exchanges are subject to two main 
issues: safeguarding and integration (Gulati, Lawrence, & Puranam, 2005; Hoetker & 
Mellewigt, 2009; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). Safeguarding means mitigating 
opportunistic behavior of engaged parties in an exchange relationship, whereas, integration 
concerns about integrating dispersed activities and resources as well as aligning sometimes 
contradictory interests and goals which are critical to the successful implementation of a 
project (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009). Thus, IORs governance mechanisms can be used to 
guard against common transaction hazards such as behavioral uncertainty, environmental 
uncertainty, or task uncertainty which could render the transactions ineffective (Eisenhardt, 
1985; Heide, 1994; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Luo et al., 2011), or to enhance coordination and 
facilitate cooperation between parties and mitigate performance risks (Gundlach et al., 1995; 
Ring & Van de Ven, 1992).   
Recently, IORs governance literature has referred to value creation as another concern 
that must be addressed by governance design. In this context, scholars would consider the role 
of governance mechanisms in accessing/acquiring knowledge (e.g., J. J. Li et al., 2010; Lui, 
2009), creating competitive advantage (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998), or promoting long-term 
orientations within IORs (e.g., Yang et al., 2011).  
Due to the complex forms of IORs in terms of inter-firm exchanges (e.g. engineering, 
procurement, finance, construction, and operation) in construction projects, and also the 
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fragmented nature of these projects that causes problems with communication and 
coordination, client-contractor relationships have also been subjected to the same governance 
problems (W. T. Chen & Chen, 2007) that have been regarded as the main causes of project 
failure (Ling et al., 2013; Ng et al., 2002). Subsequently, various governance mechanisms 
have been introduced as solutions, and they are described in the following section.   
2.4 IORs governance mechanisms 
Literature on IORs governance generally categorizes governance mechanisms into two 
types—contractual and relational governance mechanisms—that are being defined in the 
following sections.  
2.4.1 Contractual governance mechanisms 
Detailed formal contracting is regarded as one of the regular solutions for addressing 
IORs governance concerns (Roehrich & Lewis, 2010). Contractual governance mechanisms, 
also referred to as formal governance, formal control, formal contract, explicit contract, hard 
contract, and written contract, focus mostly on the formal and prescribed part of control and 
utilize more tangible instruments to regulate the IORs. As mentioned in the previous section, 
IORs governance literature has identified a variety of functions (e.g., safeguarding, 
integration, and value creation) for each type of governance mechanisms, each of which was 
established on various theoretical grounds that will be analyzed in this section. 
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2.4.1.1 Safeguarding approach  
In this approach, control is the main function of formal contract. Such perspective 
assumes control as “a mode of organizing transactions” (Williamson, 1979) or “a mechanism 
of structuring and regulating the conduct of parties in an exchange” (Mohr, Fisher, & Nevin, 
1996) to safeguard their interests (Luo et al., 2011) against market hazards such as partner 
opportunism, market uncertainty, goal heterogeneity, site conditions, and contractual 
incompleteness (Eisenhardt, 1985; Heide, 1994; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Luo et al., 2011). 
Transaction cost economics (TCE), agency theory, and control theory are three underlying 
theories for explaining this perspective. TCE relies on two behavioral assumptions—bounded 
rationality and opportunism. Further, TCE’s basic unit of analysis is transaction which has 
three key attributes: asset specificity (the type and degree of specificity of different assets in 
the transactions), uncertainty (the level of environmental and behavioral uncertainties the 
transactions are associated with), and frequency (the chance of frequent transactions in the 
future) (Williamson, 1991). Based on TCE, formal contracts with sufficient elaboration and 
detailedness can serve as a mechanism for controlling the problems of adaptation, 
performance, and safeguarding caused by uncertainty, bounded rationality, and the risk of 
opportunistic behavior (Arranz & Arroyabe, 2012; Ferguson, Paulin, & Bergeron, 2005; 
Williamson, 1985). That is, explicitly stating how various situations will be handled and how 
disputes will be resolved will reduce the relational risk in the project (Tarun K Das & Teng, 
1998; Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007). 
On the other hand, agency theory characterizes these exchanges as relationships 
between principals and agents, where agents perform some tasks on behalf of the principals 
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(Bergen, Dutta, & Walker Jr, 1992).  In addition to considering bounded rationality and 
opportunism in TCE, the agency perspective accepts another human assumption of risk 
aversion that arises when principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk. It is also 
assumed that exchange parties have goal incongruence and there is information asymmetry 
between them. Furthermore, agency theory sees information as a commodity that is 
purchasable. According to these assumptions, agency theory contends that each principal-
agent relationship is subject to the problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and risk 
sharing that should be addressed by including efficient incentives and rules in the contract 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Another theory that has been used to explain safeguarding problems in the IORs context 
is control theory, where the main question is to decide whether the contracting orientation will 
be: (1) a behavior-oriented contract, or (2) an outcome-oriented contract (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Ouchi, 1979). While the focus of behavior-oriented contract is to regulate people’s behavior 
by specifying and enforcing desired behaviors and processes, outcome-oriented contract puts 
the emphasis on outcomes by setting output targets, measuring and evaluating outputs, and 
rewarding/penalizing the people who are in charge (Aulakh & Gencturk, 2000; Badenfelt, 
2010; D. Chen et al., 2009; Tuuli et al., 2010).  
2.4.1.2 Integration approach 
The second view considers formal arrangements not only as mechanisms for enforcing 
negotiated agreements and alleviating conflicts, but also as facilitating tools for improving 
coordination and cooperation among exchange parties (Gulati et al., 2005; Hoetker & 
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Mellewigt, 2009; L. Li & Ng, 2002; Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011; Reuer & Ariño, 2007). 
Despite the fact that coordination and cooperation have been used interchangeably in IORs 
literature, they reflect two different concerns about integration in collaborative exchanges. 
While the former refers to the problem of the alignment of actions among exchange parties, 
the latter addresses the alignment of interests (Gulati et al., 2005).  
Regarding coordination concern, the TCE perspective contends that exchanges with 
high idiosyncratic (specific) assets or complex tasks raise coordination concerns that should 
be addressed by applying appropriate governance mechanisms (Luo, 2002). Additionally, 
ambiguous environments exacerbate coordination problems due to the possibility of different 
interpretations about desired actions under different conditions which may dampen integrated 
responses to changed circumstances (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967).  
Resource-based view (RBV) posits that coordinating the resources in the IORs context 
is a necessary condition for pooling the resources and realizing the values associated with 
IORs (Mellewigt et al., 2007). Advocates of the coordination approach posit that specified 
rights and obligations of both parties as well as defined procedures and guidelines provided 
by the formal contracts can clarify the scope of actions, facilitate interactions, and pave the 
ways for negotiations, that will ultimately improve coordination among partners (Carson et 
al., 2006; Jap & Ganesan, 2000; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Contracts 
also reduce the monitoring and coordination costs of transactions by providing clear 
statements about the roles and responsibilities of exchange parties and by defining the 
monitoring process (Lui & Ngo, 2004; Reuer & Ariño, 2002).  
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As discussed above, the other aspect of concerns about integration within IORs refers 
to cooperation between exchange partners arising from conflicts of interests. Such a 
perspective considers that cooperation or mutual collaboration between parties in allocating 
and exploiting resources is necessary to maximize joint benefits in recurring exchanges under 
uncertain conditions (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Luo et al., 2011; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Song, Di 
Benedetto, & Zhao, 2008). Stakeholder theory is primarily utilized to explain the influence of 
formalization in promoting coordination in IORs. Based on stakeholder theory, the main threat 
to inter-firm exchanges is the imbalance of interests between stakeholders that may affect their 
cooperation, and which may damage the exchange performance (Clarke, 1998; Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). Accordingly, formalization can enhance cooperation between project 
stakeholders by aligning their objectives and interests (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). 
Similarly, trust perspective examines the role of trust in promoting coordination and 
cooperation in IORs and argues that formal arrangements fulfill this purpose by increasing 
transparency in the exchange relationships and modifying the perceptions of the partners about 
the situation (Tarun K Das & Teng, 1998; Lui & Ngo, 2004; Mellewigt et al., 2007).  
2.4.1.3 Value creation approach 
Unlike previous approaches that reflect operational concerns regarding IORs and 
attempt to improve the exchange efficiency by applying the most appropriate governance 
mechanisms, the value creation approach primarily focuses on the strategic advantages of 
IORs and examines the effectiveness of alternative combinations of governance mechanisms. 
Based on this perspective, a good governance system should not only provide safeguards to 
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exchanges and promote integration among partners during a current relationship it should also 
contribute to the partners’ strategic goals. Accordingly, value creation is the main motivation 
for the choice of governance mechanisms, which is why researchers have referred to the 
variety of benefits associated with inter-firm exchanges, such as learning, commitment, or 
pooling of resources (e.g., Arranz & Arroyabe, 2012; C. Chen, Zhu, Ao, & Cai, 2013; J. J. Li 
et al., 2010; Lui, 2009; Lui & Ngo, 2004; Yang et al., 2011) and argued about how different 
governance mechanisms will achieve the expected values. The resource-based view and inter-
organizational learning theory are the most popular theories for describing this perspective. 
Drawing upon resource-based view, some studies referred to IORs as carriers for accessing 
valuable resources (Mellewigt et al., 2007). For example, Dyer and Singh (1998) argued that 
IORs can be an excellent source for organizations to develop their competitive advantage by 
collaborating on relationship-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, or complementary 
resources/capabilities. In this perspective, resources are categorized into two general types of 
property-based (tangible) and knowledge-based (intangible) resources (Tushar K Das & Teng, 
2000). Through the lens of a resource-based view, previous studies found that formal contract 
is a useful apparatus for exchanges where property-based resources are more dominant (D. 
Chen et al., 2009; Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009).  
By differentiating knowledge access and knowledge acquisition, relationship learning 
theory posits that formal contracts are suitable mechanisms for knowledge acquisition (e.g., 
Lui, 2009), whereas some studies within relationship learning found that contractual 
governance mechanisms can help transfer explicit knowledge by specifying formal operating 
procedures and codifying performance metrics (e.g., J. J. Li et al., 2010).  
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Table 2-1 shows a summary of theoretical perspectives towards contractual governance 
mechanisms. Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical 
studies for measuring contractual mechanisms are also presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 2-1 : Theoretical perspectives towards contractual governance mechanisms 
Performance domain Description  Representative theory 
Safeguarding 
 
 Reduces behavioral uncertainty and incongruence through providing binding rules and 
procedures, and crystallizing partners’ expectations about project scope and objectives;  
 Decreases environmental uncertainty by stating how unexpected future events will be 
handled and how disputes will be resolved;  
 Protects the relationship against opportunistic behavior by establishing sanctions for breach 
of contract. 
 Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
 Agency theory 
 Control theory 
 
 
Integration  Enhances cooperative and collaborative atmosphere in the project environment by aligning 
partners’ objectives and interests;  
 Promotes coordination among project partners by clarifying the rights and responsibilities 
of both parties and providing appropriate linkages between two different and 
interdependent task units;  
 Facilitates coordination by increasing the predictability of each party’s actions and 
structuring communication channels; 
 Reduces monitoring cost by improving the relationship’s transparency and specifying 
monitoring objects. 
 TCE 
 Resource-based view  
 Stakeholder theory  
 Theory of trust 
 
Value creation  Contributes to the transfer of explicit knowledge among partners, and consequently, 
increases partners’ competencies and provides more value for project parties; 
 Facilitates knowledge exchange and collaborative innovation by reducing the associated 
costs and risks through providing conflict resolution provisions. 
 Resource-based view 
 Inter-organizational learning theory 
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2.4.2 Relational governance mechanisms 
Despite the positive aspects of formal contracting discussed above, a reliance on formal 
contracting could lead to adversarial relationships between the contracting parties when both 
sides delve into the legalistic aspects (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Studies have found that 
adversarial relationships often cause project failures (Ling et al., 2013; Ng et al., 2002). 
Relational governance can be an alternative governance choice to formal contracting by 
providing more flexibility and mitigating unexpected disturbances throughout the project 
(Yang et al., 2011). Relational governance mechanisms are also referred to as social 
governance, relational control, social control, informal control, informal contracts, or social 
embeddedness, and primarily focus on deploying informal means to regulate the IORs. As 
with contractual governance, the literature on relational governance mechanisms applied 
different theoretical lenses to explain different functions of relational mechanisms, such as: 
(1) safeguarding, (2) integration, and (3) value creation.  
2.4.2.1 Safeguarding approach 
This approach refers to relational governance mechanisms as informal arrangements for 
safeguarding exchange parties against exchange hazards (e.g., bounded rationality, 
opportunism, behavioral uncertainty, environmental uncertainty). Relational contracting, 
theory of trust, social network theory, institutional theory and control theory have been cited 
by previous studies as underlying theories for this perspective. Unlike TCE which has a ‘uni-
time’ view towards agreement between exchange partners by assuming the original agreement 
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as the reference point for adaptation, relational contracting theory assumes that the contract 
has expanded through the entire relationship phase (Ferguson et al., 2005; Macneil, 1978), 
that is, exchanges and adaptations take place from the beginning to the end of a relationship 
through the exchange of relational norms (Macneil, 1980). Relational contracting theory 
argues that working together through long term interactions and deploying different social 
means may help partners to create a shared culture and shared norms, and subsequently, to 
reduce the goal and preference incongruence while increasing commitment, mutuality, 
solidarity and flexibility (Kohtamäki, Vesalainen, Varamäki, & Vuorinen, 2006; Patzelt & 
Shepherd, 2008; Poppo, Zhou, & Zenger, 2008; E. T. Wang & Wei, 2007). As noted by Jap 
and Ganesan (2000), relational bonds can promote solidarity that shifts the partners’ views 
from self-centered behavior to ‘we-ness’ feeling. Exchanging information, on the other hand, 
reduces asymmetries through communication that leads to harmonizing the conflict and 
honesty in the project. Additionally, by reducing the rigidity of formal contracts, relational 
mechanisms provide more flexibility in adapting to environmental uncertainty (Ferguson et 
al., 2005).   
By extending the reasoning for the safeguarding function of relational mechanisms, the 
theory of trust examines the impact of various forms of trust on mitigating opportunism and 
reducing uncertainty in IORs. The literature has identified three general forms of trust, 
including competence trust, calculative trust, and benevolent trust (Doney & Cannon, 1997; 
Lui & Ngo, 2004; Yu et al., 2006). Competence trust is primarily based on the shared 
confidence among partners about each other’s capabilities to fulfill their roles and is usually 
measured by estimating the partner’s resources and reputation. Shared competence trust 
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among exchange partners can mitigate the performance risk (Lui & Ngo, 2004). On the other 
hand, calculative trust is more rational and is primarily affected by the chance of future 
collaborations among partners (Yu et al., 2006). In this sense, calculative trust can remove 
incentives for opportunistic behavior by promising future work and introducing sanctions in 
the form of the loss of future business (Carson et al., 2006; Heide & Miner, 1992). Finally, 
goodwill (benevolent) trust refers to the degree to which one party is confident that the other 
party will not behave opportunistically in an uncertain condition (Tarun K Das & Teng, 1998; 
Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Yang et al., 2011). 
As the duration of successful relationships increases, the benevolent trust becomes greater and 
deeper between partners, and as a result, the chance of opportunistic behavior will decrease 
(Dyer & Chu, 2000; Yu et al., 2006).  
Based on social network theory, the structure and the quality of the social relations 
between partners can affect their economic actions (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). For 
example, Uzzi (1997) showed that social embeddedness—historical and structural 
embeddedness of social relations—can reduce behavioral and environmental uncertainties and 
safeguard the IORs against opportunism. Similarly, Mike W Peng and Heath (1996) found 
that social interactions play a significant role in alleviating uncertainties in emerging 
economies such as China.   
In the same way, institutional theory assumes that recurrent interactions between 
organizations leads to institutionalized norms that are no longer based on individuals, but are 
embedded at the organizational level. When IORs reach this level of institutionalization, the 
shared norms act as control mechanisms by increasing the costs of opportunistic behavior. 
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These deviation costs may be exercised in different ways including economic costs (increasing 
risk), cognitive costs (requiring more thought), or social costs (reducing legitimacy)(Y. Li et 
al., 2010; Mike, Sunny, Brian, & Hao, 2009). 
Finally, control theory defines clan control as a social mechanism which is based on 
congruent goals and shared norms between partners (Ouchi, 1979, 1980). When the level of 
agreement between partners is wide and deep, clan control can be exercised, because the clan 
type relationship between partners can exert proper behavior through tradition, implicit 
knowledge, and embedded work processes that guarantee a high level of commitment to those 
socially prescribed behaviors (Kirsch, Ko, & Haney, 2010; Ouchi, 1979, 1980). Clan control 
can motivate the desired behavior by rewarding those members whose behavior is consistent 
with group expectations, norms, and values (Fortado, 1994), and also restrain deviations from 
accepted codes of conducts by sanctioning the offenders (Westphal & Khanna, 2003). 
2.4.2.2 Integration approach 
As discussed before, this approach focuses primarily on coordination and cooperation 
concerns in exchange relationships. Relational contracting theory, theory of trust, social 
network theory, social exchange theory, and control theory are the underlying theories used 
to explain the integrative role of relational governance mechanisms. For example, relational 
contracting theory posits that the development of relational norms such as solidarity, 
participation, and information exchange may provide the parties with a degree of confidence 
through which coordination will be facilitated and a cooperative atmosphere will be enhanced 
(Hatten, James, Fink, & Keeler, 2012; Macneil, 1978). Similarly, the trust perspective holds 
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that trustful relationships facilitate joint actions (Claro, Hagelaar, & Omta, 2003) by ensuring 
the partners about capabilities of the exchange partner (competence trust) and its goodwill 
(benevolent trust). By adopting the lens of social network theory, Sohn (1994) contended that 
embedded social knowledge enhances coordination between exchange parties by making the 
partner’s behavior both foreseeable and understandable, while control theory posits that when 
clan culture is developed through socialization and recurrent interaction, it would lead to 
shared values and shared objectives which would consequently promote coordination and 
cooperation among partners (Kirsch et al., 2010; Ouchi, 1979). However, social exchange 
theory views partner’s behavior in terms of exchanges of resources and claims that a lack of 
resources encourages parties to engage with each other to obtain valuable inputs (Tushar K 
Das & Teng, 2002). Social exchange theorists argue that the formation and continuation of 
social exchanges based on reciprocated behavior may promote commitment between 
exchange parties, and thereby facilitate integration and increase the probability of future 
collaboration (Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999; Yu et al., 2006). 
2.4.2.3 Value creation approach 
As mentioned before, in this approach the ultimate goal of arranging an IORs 
governance system is to create more value for exchange partners. The resource-based view, 
inter-organizational learning theory, and social capital theory are the primary theories that can 
be used to explain the role of relational governance mechanisms in the value creation process. 
The resource-based view posits that relational mechanisms can increase the capability of 
exchange partners by providing unique opportunities for sharing resources and inter-
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organizational learning (J. J. Li et al., 2010). According to past empirical studies, relational 
governance mechanisms are the primary mechanisms that were used to exploit knowledge-
based resources (D. Chen et al., 2009; Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009). Based on inter-
organizational learning theory, relational governance mechanisms can facilitate the transfer 
of tacit knowledge and know-how by strengthening the social bonds and enhancing the level 
of interactions between partners (J. J. Li et al., 2010). On the other hand, social capital theory 
considers shared norms and trust as forms of capital which are embedded within IORs through 
recurrent interactions. Based on this assumption, social capital theory posits that social 
embeddedness which is the product of a long history of collaborations between partners 
provides a fertile ground for more investment, and thereby contributes to the value creation 
process (Adler & Kwon, 2002). For instance, Yu et al. (2006) argues that the existence of trust 
in IORs helps stabilizing a partnership and ensuring that the partners will form committed 
relationships. 
Table 2-2 summarizes the theoretical perspectives of relational governance 
mechanisms. Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical 
studies for measuring relational mechanisms are also presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 2-2 : Theoretical perspectives towards relational governance mechanisms 
Performance domain Description  Representative theory 
Safeguarding 
 
 Reduces goal and preference incongruence by creating shared culture and shared norms and 
increasing commitment, mutuality, solidarity and flexibility;   
 Provides more flexibility in controlling environmental uncertainty by reducing the rigidity of 
formal contracts;  
 Enhances competence trust among exchange partners that mitigates the performance risk; 
 Promotes calculative trust by raising the expectations about future works that removes 
incentives for opportunistic behavior; 
 Boosts benevolent trust, and as a result, decreases the chance of opportunistic behavior;  
 Fortifies social embeddeness and institutionalizes the norms of behavior in a clan-type 
relationship through recurrent interactions which can reduce behavioral and environmental 
uncertainties and safeguard the IORs against opportunism. 
 Relational contracting theory  
 Theory of trust  
 Social network theory  
 Institutional theory  
 Control theory 
 
 
 
 
Integration  Provides the parties with a degree of confidence through which the cooperative atmosphere 
will be enhanced;  
 Facilitates joint actions by ensuring the partners about capabilities of the exchange partner 
and its goodwill; 
 Enhances coordination between exchange parties by making the partner’s behavior more 
foreseeable and understandable; 
 Creates clan culture (e.g., shared values, shared objectives) through socializations and 
recurrent interactions which promotes coordination and cooperation among partners;   
 Facilitates social exchanges based on reciprocal arrangements which leads to higher levels 
of commitment and more integrative relationships. 
 Relational contracting theory  
 Theory of trust  
 Social network theory  
 Social exchange theory 
 Control theory 
Value creation  Expedites capability development of exchange partners by providing unique opportunities 
for resource sharing and inter-organizational learning;  
 Facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge and know-how by strengthening the social bonds 
and enhancing the level of interactions between partners; 
 Facilitates the exploitation of knowledge-based resources by providing the opportunities for 
open discussions and open information exchange and spreading the common language;  
 Accelerates the partnership stabilization process by providing a trustful atmosphere. 
 Resource-based view  
 Inter-organizational learning theory 
 Social capital theory 
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2.5 The choice and effects of governance mechanisms  
Given the definition of contractual and relational governance mechanisms and their 
associated theoretical perspectives, this section reviews the literature on the choice and effects 
of these governance mechanisms and their interactions under different transactional and 
contextual conditions to identify the gaps in the literature and specify the scope of this 
research.  
The choice and effects of contractual and relational governance mechanisms and their 
interactions have been the focus of a substantial body of literature but the findings are 
inconsistent. Whilst some studies found these two types of mechanisms to be complementary 
(e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002), others indicated that they are substitutes (e.g., L. Wang et al., 
2011). However, recent research suggest that their complementarity or substitutability is 
contingent on various transactional or environmental conditions (e.g., Abdi & Aulakh, 2014; 
Rhee et al., 2014). A summary of the findings of the major empirical studies are presented in 
Table 2-3.  
It is worthwhile noting that the conditions under which the interactions between 
governance mechanisms have been studied can be categorized into three main groups: (1) 
transactional conditions (e.g., asset type, asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, 
behavioral uncertainty, expected future, buyer lock-in), (2) relational conditions (e.g., prior 
ties, shared norms, trust), and (3) institutional conditions (e.g., informal institutions, formal 
institutions).  
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The first group includes conditions that are characterized by the types of transactions 
that take place in an exchange relationship. As described in the previous section, RBV 
assumes that the asset type (e.g., knowledge-based assets, property-based assets) is a strong 
predictor of the efficacy of governance mechanisms (D. Chen et al., 2009). It was also 
discussed that from TCE perspective, transactional factors such as asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and expected future (frequency) are the main antecedents for the choice of 
governance mechanisms. Further, TCE assumes that buyer lock-in—the difficulty that a buyer 
faces in replacing the supplier—affects the transaction performance by increasing the 
switching costs for the buyer and enhancing the chances for supplier’s opportunistic behavior 
(Rhee et al., 2014; Williamson, 1985).  
The second group describes the characteristics of the relationships between exchange 
partners including the history of relationships between partners, the extent to which they share 
goals and values, and the level of trust between them. These factors have been suggested by 
sociologists as complementary conditions to transactional conditions and are assumed to have 
an impact on the choice of governance mechanisms (Granovetter, 1985; Y. Liu et al., 2009; 
Zhang et al., 2009).  
Finally, the institutional group is concerned about the role of informal institutions—the 
culture of the society—and formal institutions—the legal system—on the efficacy of different 
governance mechanisms (Williamson, 2000).    
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Table 2-3 : Selected empirical studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions  
No. Study Country Type of exchange Industry 
Contractual 
elements 
Relational 
elements 
Conditions for 
substitutability 
Conditions for 
complementarity 
1 Cannon et al. 
(2000)  
US Buyer-supplier  Not specified Legal bonds Cooperative 
norms 
Low uncertainty 
(environmental and 
task): Cooperative norms 
are redundant. 
High uncertainty 
(environmental and task): 
Cooperative norms 
moderate the impact of 
formal contract on 
performance 
2 Jap and 
Ganesan 
(2000) 
US Retailer-supplier  Chemical 
products 
Explicit 
contract 
Relational 
norms:  
Information 
exchange; 
Solidarity; 
Participation 
- Exploration phase: 
Supplier’s TSIs 
substitute explicit 
contract and relational 
norms. 
- Maturity phase: 
Relational norms are 
redundant. 
- Build-up phase: 
Relational norms 
moderate the impact of 
TSIs and explicit 
contracts on 
performance. 
- Decay phase: Both 
explicit contracts and 
relational norms are 
necessary. 
3 Poppo and 
Zenger (2002) 
US Buyer-supplier  Not specified Contractual 
complexity 
Relational 
governance 
- - In early years of 
relationships: Focus is on 
formal contracts. 
- At the maturity phase: 
Focus is on relational 
governance. 
- High uncertainty 
(environmental): Focus is 
on relational governance. 
- High asset specificity: 
Focus is on formal 
contracts. 
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Table 2-3 : Selected empirical studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions (Cont.) 
No. Study Country Type of exchange Industry 
Contractual 
elements 
Relational 
elements 
Conditions for 
substitutability 
Conditions for 
complementarity 
4 Luo (2002) China IJV members Wide range 
of equity 
manufacturi
ng joint 
ventures 
Contract: 
Term 
specificity; 
Contingency 
adaptability 
Cooperation -  - Long history of 
cooperation: The focus 
will be on contingency 
adaptability. 
- High contingency 
adaptability: Cooperation 
will be increased. 
- High term specificity and 
contingency adaptability: 
The impact of cooperation 
on performance will be 
increased 
5 Lui and Ngo 
(2004) 
Hong Kong Architect-
contractor  
Construction Contractual 
safeguards 
Trust: 
Goodwill 
trust; 
Competence 
trust 
- High goodwill trust: 
Detailed contractual 
safeguards are 
redundant. 
- Detailed contract: 
Goodwill trust is 
redundant. 
- High competence trust: 
Greater contractual 
safeguards are needed. 
- Detailed contract: Focus 
must be on competence 
trust. 
6 Wuyts and 
Geyskens 
(2005) 
Netherlands Buyer-
supplier 
Machinery 
and 
computer 
equipment; 
Electronic 
and 
electrical 
equipment 
Detailed 
Contract 
Close partner 
selection 
- Long history of 
relationships: The impact 
of detailed contract on 
controlling opportunistic 
behavior will be 
decreased. 
- Short history of 
relationships: The impact 
of detailed contract on 
controlling opportunistic 
behavior will be enhanced. 
- Very high levels of 
closeness increase the 
chance of opportunistic 
behavior. 
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Table 2-3 : Selected empirical studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions (Cont.) 
No. Study Country Type of exchange Industry 
Contractual 
elements 
Relational 
elements 
Conditions for 
substitutability 
Conditions for 
complementarity 
7 Ferguson et al. 
(2005) 
US, Canada, 
Mexico 
Client-
account 
manager  
Commercial  Contractual 
governance 
Relational 
governance 
- In established 
exchanges: Focus is on 
relational governance. 
8 Lee and 
Cavusgil 
(2006) 
US Alliance 
members 
Not 
specified 
Contractual-
based 
governance 
Relational-
based 
governance 
- In terms of 
strengthening the 
alliance: Contractual 
governance has 
negative effect. 
- In terms of stabilizing 
the alliance: 
Contractual governance 
is redundant.  
- In terms of knowledge 
transfer: Contractual 
governance has 
negative effect. 
- In initial stages of 
alliance formation: 
Focus is on relational 
governance. 
9 Yu et al. 
(2006) 
China, 
Taiwan 
Buyer-
supplier 
Wide range 
of industries 
Formal 
governance 
Trust:  
Calculative 
trust; 
Benevolent 
trust (Assist-
giving routines 
and Length of 
relationships)
- High calculative trust: 
Reliance on formal 
governance is 
decreased. 
- Low benevolent trust 
in terms of history of 
relationships: Focus is 
on formal governance.  
10 Carson et al. 
(2006) 
US R&D Client-
sponsor 
Wide range 
of industries 
Fixed price 
contract; 
Negotiable 
price contract 
Reputation; 
Continuity; 
Trust; History 
of 
relationships 
- Low volatility 
(environmental 
uncertainty) and low 
ambiguity (perception 
of environmental 
uncertainty): Either 
mechanism is usable. 
- High volatility: Focus 
is on relational 
contracting. 
- High ambiguity: Focus 
is on Formal contracts. 
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Table 2-3 : Selected empirical studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions (Cont.) 
No. Study Country Type of exchange Industry 
Contractual 
elements 
Relational 
elements 
Conditions for 
substitutability Conditions for complementarity 
11 Mellewigt et 
al. (2007) 
Germany Company-
HR vendor 
Not 
specified 
Contractual 
complexity 
Trust  Low trust: Contractual 
complexity plays dual 
roles of control and 
coordination.  
High trust: Contractual complexity 
plays coordination role. 
12 Y. Chen and 
Bharadwaj 
(2009) 
US Client-
vendor 
IT Monitoring; 
Property 
rights 
protection; 
Dispute 
resolution; 
Contingency; 
Contract 
extensiveness 
Prior 
interactions 
- High level of past interactions: 
Except property rights provisions, 
other parts of contracts become 
more detailed. 
13 Şengün and 
Wasti 
(2009) 
Turkey Pharmacy-
drug 
wholesaler 
Medical  Output 
control 
Trust; Social 
control 
- High trust: Output 
control is destructive. 
- High social control: 
Output control is 
destructive. 
- Trust moderates the negative 
impact of output control on 
performance.  
- Trust enhances social control. 
14 Lui (2009) Hong 
Kong 
Buyer-
supplier 
Toy 
trading 
Formal 
contract 
Competence 
trust; History 
or 
relationships; 
Expected 
future 
- - Knowledge accessing: Focus is 
on competence trust. 
- Knowledge acquisition: Focus is 
on formal contract. 
- Long history: The impact of 
formal control and competence 
trust on knowledge acquisition is 
increased. 
- Long history: While the impact 
of competence trust on knowledge 
accessing is increased, the impact 
of formal control is decreased. 
- Short expected future: The 
impact of competence trust on 
knowledge accessing is increased. 
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Table 2-3 : Selected empirical studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions (Cont.) 
No. Study Country Type of exchange Industry 
Contractual 
elements 
Relational 
elements 
Conditions for 
substitutability 
Conditions for 
complementarity 
15 Zhang et al. 
(2009) 
China  PPP members Medical  Formal contract Informal 
contract; Shared 
values; Prior ties 
- - Prior ties and shared values 
enhance informal contract. 
- Long history and high level 
of shared values: Focus is on 
informal contracts. 
- Formal contracts are more 
useful for achieving explicit 
outcomes (direct effects) 
- Informal contracts are more 
useful for achieving implicit 
outcomes (knowledge 
creation and social effects) 
16 Hoetker and 
Mellewigt 
(2009) 
Germany  Alliance 
members 
Telecom Formal 
governance 
Relational 
governance 
- - Knowledge-based assets 
are prevalent: Focus is on 
relational governance. 
- Property-based assets are 
prevalent: Focus is on formal 
governance. 
17 D. Chen et 
al. (2009) 
China  Parent 
organizations
-IJV 
Wide range 
of industries 
Formal control: 
Output control; 
Process control 
Social control - - Knowledge-based 
resources: Focus is on 
process control and social 
control. 
- Property-based resources: 
Focus is on output control 
and process control. 
18 Y. Liu et al. 
(2009) 
China  Manufacturer
-distributer 
Household 
appliance 
Transactional 
mechanisms: 
Contract; 
Transaction-
specific 
investment 
Relational 
mechanisms: 
relational norms; 
trust 
- - Opportunism is the main 
concern: Focus is on 
transactional governance 
mechanisms. 
- Relationship performance 
is the main concern: Focus is 
on relational governance 
mechanisms. 
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Table 2-3 : Selected empirical studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions (Cont.) 
No. Study Country Type of exchange Industry 
Contractual 
elements Relational elements 
Conditions for 
substitutability 
Conditions for 
complementarity 
19 Zhou and 
Poppo 
(2010) 
China  Buyer-supplier Wide 
range of 
industries 
Explicit 
contracts 
Relational 
reliability 
 - Strong perception of legal 
enforceability: Focus is on 
explicit contracts. 
- Weak perception of legal 
enforceability: Focus is on 
relational reliability. 
20 J. J. Li et 
al. (2010) 
China  Local firm-
foreign 
subsidiary 
Not 
specified 
Formal 
contract 
Relational 
mechanisms: 
Brokered access; 
Shared goals; Trust 
 - For acquiring tacit 
knowledge: Focus is on trust. 
- For acquiring explicit 
knowledge: Focus is on formal 
contract. 
- For acquiring both explicit 
and tacit knowledge: Focus is 
on shared goals. 
- High Formal contract: 
Increases the impact of trust 
and shared goals on acquiring 
tacit and explicit knowledge. 
21 Y. Li et al. 
(2010) 
China  Local firm-
foreign 
supplier 
Not 
specified 
Formal 
control 
Social control; 
Length of 
cooperation; 
Institutionalizatiion 
- In domestic 
partnerships: formal 
control and social 
control are substitutes. 
- Long history of relationships: 
More social control is applied 
in international partnerships. 
- Long history of relationships: 
More formal control is used in 
domestic partnerships. 
- High institutionalization: 
Promotes the use of formal and 
social control mechanisms in 
both domestic and 
international partnerships. 
In international partnerships: 
Formal control and social 
control are complement. 
  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
40 
 
Table 2-3 : Selected empirical studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions (Cont.) 
No. Study Country Type of exchange Industry 
Contractual 
elements 
Relational 
elements Conditions for substitutability 
Conditions for 
complementarity 
22 Zhao and 
Wang 
(2011) 
China  Manufacturer-
distributer 
Not 
specified 
Formal 
contract 
Relational 
trust; 
Relationship 
learning 
- - Knowledge-based assets: 
Focus is on relational trust and 
relationship learning. 
- Property-based assets: Focus 
is on formal contract. 
- High relational trust: 
Declines the impact of 
relationship learning on 
relationship performance. 
- High market uncertainty and 
regulatory variability: Focus is 
on relational mechanisms. 
23 Yang et 
al. 
(2011) 
China  Manufacturer-
distributer 
Wide 
range of 
industries 
Formal 
control 
Trust; Social 
ties strength 
- Strong social ties: Formal 
control decreases trust. 
- Strong social ties: While 
trust promotes long-term 
orientation, formal control 
decreases long-term 
orientation. 
- Strong social ties: While 
trust reduces opportunism, 
formal control doesn’t have 
significant effect on 
controlling opportunistic 
behavior. 
- Weak social ties: Formal 
control enhances trust. 
- Weak social ties: Both formal 
control and trust increase long-
term orientation. 
- Weak social ties:  
Both formal control and trust 
curb opportunism. 
24 L. Wang 
et al. 
(2011) 
China Manufacturer-
supplier  
Wide 
range of 
manufactu
ring 
industries 
Contract  Trust  - For high innovation 
performance: Trust will be 
preferred.  
- High environmental 
uncertainty: Contract will be 
redundant and the impact of 
trust on innovation 
performance will be increased. 
- 
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Table 2-3 : Selected empirical studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions (Cont.) 
No. Study Country Type of exchange Industry 
Contractual 
elements 
Relational 
elements 
Conditions for 
substitutability 
Conditions for 
complementarity 
25 Arranz 
and 
Arroyabe 
(2012) 
Europe  R&D partners Bio-tech  Formal 
contract 
Relational 
mechanisms: 
Relational 
norms; Trust 
- - High level of ambiguity (e.g., 
exploration projects): The 
focus will be on relational 
governance. 
- High level of volatility (e.g., 
exploitation projects): The 
focus will be on formal 
contracts. 
26 Wallenb
urg and 
Schäffler 
(2014) 
Germany  Alliance 
between 
logistics 
service 
providers  
Not 
specified 
Output 
control; 
Process 
control 
 
Ex-ante joint 
action; Ex-
post joint 
action  
- In ex-ante performance 
measurement process 
(PMP): Joint action has its 
strongest direct effect on 
reducing opportunism and 
substitutes formal control. 
- In ex-post performance 
measurement process (PMP): 
Joint action complements 
formal control.  
27 Rhee et 
al. 
(2014) 
Korea SME’s 
partnerships 
Wide range 
of industries 
Formal 
control: 
Transactional 
provision; 
Relational 
provision 
Social 
control; Prior 
ties 
- High environmental 
uncertainty: Using 
transactional contract 
provisions with social 
control is harmful to the 
relationship quality. 
- High environmental 
uncertainty: relational contract 
provisions and social control 
complement each other. 
- Buyer lock-in (monopoly): 
Transactional contract 
provisions and social control 
complement each other. 
28 L. Chen 
and 
Manley 
(2014) 
Australia  Client-
contractor  
Construction Formal 
mechanisms: 
Risk and 
reward sharing 
regime; 
Collective cost 
estimation; 
Risk sharing of 
service 
providers 
Informal 
mechanisms: 
Leadership; 
Team 
workshops; 
Relationship 
manager; 
Communicati
on systems; 
Design 
integration 
- - Informal mechanisms are 
greater predictor of project 
performance. 
- The relationship between 
formal governance and project 
performance is mediated by 
informal governance 
mechanisms. 
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Table 2-3 : Selected empirical studies on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions (Cont.) 
No. Study Country Type of exchange Industry 
Contractual 
elements 
Relational 
elements 
Conditions for 
substitutability 
Conditions for 
complementarity 
29 Ping, 
Shuping, 
Lamei, 
Ping, and 
Xiaoyan 
(2014) 
China  Client-
contractor 
Construction  Contractual 
governance: 
Fundamental 
elements; 
Change 
elements; 
Governance 
elements 
Relational 
governance: 
Trust; 
Relational 
norms 
- - Contractual governance is 
more important for improving 
project performance.  
- Relational governance is 
more useful for mitigating 
opportunism.  
30 Abdi and 
Aulakh 
(2014) 
US Foreign 
market entry 
partnership 
Not specified Contractual 
governance 
Relational 
governance 
- High level of 
environmental uncertainty: 
More formal contracting 
and relational governance 
mechanisms move toward 
a mutually weakening 
relationship. 
- High level of behavioral 
uncertainty: More formal 
contracting and relational 
governance mechanisms 
move toward a mutually 
strengthening relationship.  
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Considering the types of resources used in the exchange, Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009) 
studied the efficacy of formal and relational governance mechanisms in exploiting 
knowledge-based and property-based assets in German alliance partnerships and showed that 
while formal governance was more useful in alliances with great extent of property-based 
assets, relational mechanisms were preferred in alliances where most of the assets were 
knowledge-based. Interestingly, the same results were found by D. Chen et al. (2009) and 
Zhao and Wang (2011) who investigated Chinese parent-IJVs relationships and manufacturer-
distributer relationships, respectively. Likewise, Arranz and Arroyabe (2012) studied 
European R&D partnerships and showed that while a formal contract was more reliable in 
exploiting projects which were more explicit and predictable, relational governance was more 
effective in exploring projects which were more ambiguous.  
With regard to asset specificity, Poppo and Zenger (2002) found that in exchanges with 
a high degree of asset specificity, formal contract was the primary mechanism for regulating 
the buyer-supplier relationships in US.  
In terms of environmental uncertainty, the contingent effects of volatility and ambiguity 
were investigated. For example, Cannon et al. (2000) found that in buyer-supplier exchanges 
with a high level of task and environmental uncertainty, cooperative norms would moderate 
the impact of formal contract on performance. However, when uncertainty was low, 
cooperative norms were redundant, which shows how formal contract has a substitutive effect 
on cooperative norms. Similarly, Poppo and Zenger (2002) showed the complementary 
interactions between relational governance mechanisms and formal contracts in conditions of 
high uncertainty, with an emphasis on relational mechanisms. Although these findings were 
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supported by some other studies (Carson et al., 2006; Zhao & Wang, 2011), some 
contradictory results were also reported. For example, L. Wang et al. (2011) indicated that in 
highly volatile conditions, while trust promoted innovative performance, contract were 
destructive, and as a result, was redundant. Similarly, Abdi and Aulakh (2014) showed that as 
environmental uncertainty increased, formal contracting and relational governance 
mechanisms moved towards a mutually weakening relationship. However, Rhee et al. (2014) 
distinguished between transactional and relational contract provisions and reconciled the 
substitutive and complementary perspectives by showing the substitutive and complementary 
effects of transactional and relational contract provisions on social control, respectively. 
Carson et al. (2006) showed that when environmental uncertainty was high, contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms complemented each other, however, formal contracts 
seemed to be preferred choice under such conditions. 
Behavior uncertainty was another contextual factor which Abdi and Aulakh (2014) 
found to be effective when the study investigated the partnerships between US companies and 
other foreign companies and showed that behavioral uncertainty encouraged contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms.  
Regarding the role of expected future in knowledge accessing and knowledge 
acquisition, Lui (2009) investigated the buyer-supplier relationships in Hong Kong and found 
that when the chance of future transactions was low, competence trust became very critical in 
knowledge accessing, but it did not have significant impact on knowledge acquisition.  
As shown in Table 2-3, buyer lock-in is another factor that received attention by Rhee 
et al. (2014) who analyzed the small business enterprise (SME) partnerships in Korea. The 
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results showed that in markets with a high degree of buyer lock-in, transactional contract 
provisions not only replace relational contract provisions, but also complement social control 
mechanisms.  
As discussed before, some scholars referred to the history of relationships between 
partners as an antecedent for the interactions between governance mechanisms. For example, 
Luo (2002) found that the history of cooperation between partners determined the focus of a 
contract, that is, a longer history of interactions turned the focus of contract from term 
specificity to contingency adaptability. Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) reported that a detailed 
contract was substituted by close partner selection when the partners shared a long history of 
cooperation, however, the impact of formal contract on controlling opportunistic behavior was 
enhanced in short-term partnerships. In contract, (Y. Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009) showed that 
in IT client-vendor partnerships with a long history of collaborations the contracts, except 
property rights provisions, were typically very detailed. Lui (2009) considered interactions 
between formal contract and competence trust and then suggested that longer buyer-supplier 
relationships in Hong Kong increased the reliance of partners on formal control and 
competence trust for knowledge acquisition. However, the study also found that formal 
contract was not effective for knowledge accessing. Zhang et al. (2009) also showed that PPP 
members with a long history of prior interactions mainly relied on informal contracts. 
However, in a comparative study of domestic and international partnerships in China, Y. Li 
et al. (2010) found that while longer history of collaborations reinforced the reliance on social 
control mechanisms in international partnerships, it facilitated the use of formal contracts in 
domestic IORs. 
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The relationship phase has also been considered as another factor for analyzing the 
impact of prior ties on the choice of governance mechanisms; for example, Jap and Ganesan 
(2000) divided the history of relationships between partners into four phases: the build-up 
phase, the exploration phase, the maturity phase, and the decay phase. At the first stage, 
transaction-specific investments (TSIs) and explicit contract bounded partners’ commitments 
while the relational norms moderated their impact on relationship performance. In the 
exploration phase, however, neither explicit contract nor relational norms were reliable and 
TSIs were primarily used to promote commitment among parties. The maturity phase was 
primarily governed by accumulated shared norms, which meant trying to promote relational 
norms was redundant. Finally, in the decay phase, both explicit contract and relational norms 
were essential for keeping the partners committed to the relationship. Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) divided the relationship background into the early years of relationships and the 
maturity phase, and showed that while formal contract was the main focus of governance in 
the early years, relational norms were more effective in the maturity phase. Ferguson et al. 
(2005) also supported the primary reliance on relational governance mechanisms in 
established exchanges, however, the results from Lee and Cavusgil (2006) challenged Poppo 
and Zenger (2002)'s findings by stating that the initial stages of forming an alliance were 
primarily governed with relational governance mechanisms. Another study conducted by 
Yang et al. (2011) showed that when the social ties among partners were weak, formal control 
enhanced trust and jointly promoted long-term orientation. However, with strong ties, formal 
control decreased trust and while trust promoted long-term orientation, formal control was 
destructive. Wallenburg and Schäffler (2014) applied another form of categorization by 
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dividing the performance measurement process (PMP) in horizontal alliances into ex-ante 
PMP and ex-post PMP phases. The study of German alliances showed that in an ex-ante PMP 
phase, joint action reduced opportunism directly and substituted formal control, whereas in an 
ex-post PMP phase, joint action and formal control were complementary.  
The contingent effect of shared norms on the choice and effects of governance 
mechanisms has also been explored in some empirical studies. For example, Zhang et al. 
(2009) showed that the high level of shared values between partners enhanced the use of 
informal contract, while in another study, Y. Li et al. (2010) found that institutionalized shared 
norms promoted the use of formal and social control mechanisms in both domestic and 
international partnerships in China.  
Prior empirical studies have referred to trust as one of the key contingency factors for 
the choice of governance mechanisms. For instance, Lui and Ngo (2004) showed that with a 
higher level of competence trust between partners, greater contractual safeguards were 
needed, but the same study also suggested that detailed contracts were redundant when the 
level of goodwill trust was high. In another study, Yu et al. (2006) showed that low goodwill 
trust led to a reliance on formal governance. Examining the control and coordination functions 
of governance mechanisms, Mellewigt et al. (2007) indicated that in low trust conditions, 
contractual complexity played a dual role of control and coordination, but in high trust 
relationships, trust took a safeguarding role and contract’s function were limited to 
coordination. Şengün and Wasti (2009) showed that in a trusting atmosphere, output control 
was destructive, however, trust moderated the negative impact of output control on perceived 
performance. It was also found that trust enhanced the efficacy of social control, however 
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Zhao and Wang (2011) showed that a high level of relational trust reduced the impact of 
relationship learning on relationship performance. Regarding the contingent effect of 
calculative trust, Yu et al. (2006) found that high calculative trust decreased the reliance on 
formal governance mechanisms. 
The contingent effect of culture and institutional environment on the efficacy of 
different governance mechanisms has already been considered in some previous empirical 
studies, but they are few in number. For example, Zhou and Poppo (2010) investigated the 
efficacy of explicit contracts and relational governance mechanisms in Chinese buyer-supplier 
relationships under different levels of legal enforceability. The results showed that where the 
perception of legal enforceability was strong, the focus of governance was on explicit contract, 
but when legal enforceability was perceived to be weak, the focus turned to the use of 
relational governance mechanisms. Y. Li et al. (2010) referred to institutional and cultural 
differences between domestic and international partnerships in China and showed that in these 
partnerships, formal control and social control mechanisms are substitutive and 
complementary, respectively.  
Table 2-4 summarizes the conditions related to the choice and effects of governance 
mechanisms.  
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Table 2-4 : Main conditions studied in previous research regarding the choice and effects of governance mechanisms and their interactions 
Category  Main factor Dimensions  Representative research 
Transactional 
conditions 
Asset type Property-based (tangible) (Arranz & Arroyabe, 2012; D. Chen et al., 2009; 
Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009; Zhao & Wang, 2011) 
Knowledge-based (intangible) (Arranz & Arroyabe, 2012; D. Chen et al., 2009; 
Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009; Zhao & Wang, 2011) 
Asset specificity - (Poppo & Zenger, 2002) 
Environmental uncertainty Volatility (e.g., market dynamism, technological 
change) 
(Abdi & Aulakh, 2014; Cannon et al., 2000; 
Carson et al., 2006; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Rhee 
et al., 2014; L. Wang et al., 2011; Zhao & Wang, 
2011) 
Task ambiguity (e.g., measurement difficulty) (Cannon et al., 2000) 
Environmental ambiguity (e.g., uncertainty in the 
perception of environmental conditions and 
events) 
(Carson et al., 2006) 
Behavioral uncertainty - (Abdi & Aulakh, 2014) 
Expected future - (Lui, 2009) 
Buyer lock-in (e.g., monopoly) - (Rhee et al., 2014) 
Relational 
conditions 
Prior ties History of relationships (Y. Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009; Y. Li et al., 2010; 
Lui, 2009; Luo, 2002; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005; 
Zhang et al., 2009) 
Relationship phase (e.g., weak or strong social 
ties) 
(Ferguson et al., 2005; Jap & Ganesan, 2000; Lee 
& Cavusgil, 2006; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; 
Wallenburg & Schäffler, 2014; Wuyts & 
Geyskens, 2005; Yang et al., 2011) 
Shared norms (e.g., shared goals, 
shared values) 
- (J. J. Li et al., 2010; Y. Li et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 
2009) 
Trust Competence trust (Lui & Ngo, 2004; Şengün & Wasti, 2009) 
Goodwill (benevolent) trust (J. J. Li et al., 2010; Lui & Ngo, 2004; Mellewigt 
et al., 2007; Şengün & Wasti, 2009; Yu et al., 
2006; Zhao & Wang, 2011) 
Calculative trust (Mellewigt et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2006) 
Institutional 
conditions 
Institutional environment (e.g., 
legal enforceability) 
- (Zhou & Poppo, 2010) 
Domestic or international 
partners (e.g., culture) 
- (Y. Li et al., 2010) 
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2.6 Gaps in the literature 
In this section, three gaps in the literature are identified and discussed. 
2.6.1 Ex-ante and ex-post relational governance mechanisms 
A quick look at the reviewed studies shows that the definition of relational governance 
is still ambiguous and there are varied ways of measuring this construct. While some studies 
referred to prior ties and social embeddeness or pre-existing shared norms and/or trust among 
partners as relational governance mechanisms (e.g., Y. Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009; Lui & Ngo, 
2004; Yu et al., 2006), others regarded these as contingent factors and antecedents for the 
choice of contractual and relational governance mechanisms (e.g., Luo, 2002; Wuyts & 
Geyskens, 2005). Further, some studies considered joint actions and collaborations during 
exchange relationships as relational governance mechanisms and measured accordingly (e.g., 
Cannon et al., 2000; e.g., Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009). With the measurement of the relational 
governance construct, some used first-order constructs (e.g., Abdi & Aulakh, 2014; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002), while others treated it as a second-order construct (e.g., Arranz & Arroyabe, 
2012; Y. Liu et al., 2009).  
These inconsistencies in the definition and measurement of relational governance 
mechanisms have contributed to the inconsistent findings on the interactions between 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms and made it difficult to accumulate and 
develop knowledge based on the previous work. For example, Lui and Ngo (2004) considered 
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goodwill trust as a relational governance mechanisms where the results supported the 
substitutive effect of relational governance on formal contracts. In contrast, Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) examined the role of relational governance by measuring the level of trust and shared 
goals between partners as well as their joint collaborations during the exchange and found that 
relational mechanisms and formal contacts are complementary.  
One of the main criteria for conceptualizing and measuring relational governance 
mechanisms can be the nature of the mechanisms. As such, differentiating between the social 
bonds, norms and trust developed prior to the collaboration, and information exchange, joint 
actions and social exchanges that take place during the new exchange relationships can be 
helpful. As following discussion will show, such differentiation may help reconcile the 
seemingly contradictory findings in previous studies. 
To address this issue, I used the social capital theory and social exchange theory to 
differentiate the role of ex-ante and ex-post relational governance mechanisms and 
conceptualize them as social capital and collaboration, respectively.  
2.6.1.1 Social capital as ex-ante relational governance 
Recurring interactions between partners can gradually create shared norms and promote 
a trustful atmosphere that may function as a governance mechanism (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Previous studies examined the role of prior ties (e.g., Y. Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009), shared 
norms (e.g., Zhang et al., 2009), or trust (e.g., Mellewigt et al., 2007) in exchange 
performance. For example, Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) found that contract efficacy is 
contingent on the history of relationships between partners, such that the longer the past 
Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
52 
 
relationships, the less will be the need for formal contracts to control opportunistic behavior. 
Similarly, Zhang et al. (2009) pointed out that prior ties and shared values among partners 
promotes the use of social control mechanisms. The same results was reported by Mellewigt 
et al. (2007) regarding the role of trust in safeguarding the relationships against opportunistic 
behavior. Supported by the extant literature on relational governance mechanisms and 
drawing on social capital theory I contend that prior ties, shared norms, and trust can be 
regarded as mechanisms for regulating the IORs and reflect different aspects of social capital. 
As discussed in the literature, social capital is a valuable asset obtained through social 
relationships by gaining access to other resources (Granovetter, 1985). According to the 
literature, social capital refers to the sum of the actual and potential resources that is embedded 
within, available through, and derived from social relationships, as well as the goodwill made 
available through such relationships (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). As 
mentioned by Adler and Kwon (2002), “social capital resembles some kinds of capital and 
differs from others”. This notion of social capital makes it particularly appropriate for this 
thesis.  
According to the definition, capital is something valuable that is already available and 
is ready to be exploited. Social capital, like every form of capital, “is a long-lived asset into 
which other resources can be invested, with the expectation of a future flow of benefits such 
as superior access to information, power, and solidarity” (Adler & Kwon, 2002), and therefore 
it is arguably different from the social relationships from which social capital stems. That is, 
social capital itself is of value, regardless of whether the social interactions continue or not. 
First, as mentioned earlier, social capital provides access to some benefits which are not 
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available without it; second, “social capital is convertible to other kinds of capital such as 
economic capital” (Adler & Kwon, 2002), so in terms of the cost of governance, the existing 
shared norms and trust between partners may reduce the costs of negotiation, contract writing, 
and monitoring (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Cannon et al., 2000; Mellewigt et al., 2007); third, 
like other forms of capital, “social capital can either be a substitute for or can complement 
other resources” (Adler & Kwon, 2002).  
For example, Yang et al. (2011) showed that in strong relationships, trust is better than 
formal contracts because formal mechanisms may promote distrust in the working 
environment. On the other hand, Mellewigt et al. (2007) considered both control and 
coordination concerns in exchange relationships and suggested that under high-trust 
situations, trust complements contractual complexity because formal contracts enable 
coordination in exchange relationships, whereas a trustful atmosphere addresses the control 
concerns and mitigates the probability of any opportunistic behavior.  
In sum, I would argue that existing social capital among project partners which stems 
from past social relationships and collaboration between partners and is manifested by prior 
ties, shared norms and trust, can serve as a relational governance mechanism.     
2.6.1.2 Collaboration as ex-post relational governance 
As articulated by Adler and Kwon (2002), social capital should be maintained through 
regular recreation and reconfirmation of social bonds, otherwise it would lose its efficacy. I 
would argue that the process of creation/recreation and reconfirmation of social bonds is 
another form of relational governance that can be called collaboration. In other words, 
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collaboration is an ex-post relational governance that is not social capital by the time of 
application, but it includes tools and processes by which social capital is created. In this sense, 
the presence of ex-post relational governance in project partners’ relationships could be 
identified by discovering the extent to which the partners openly exchange information, 
widely share ideas and initiatives, solve their conflicts and problems through joint consultation 
and discussions and participate in joint decision making (Heide & John, 1992; Jap & Ganesan, 
2000; Y. Liu et al., 2009; Macneil, 1980). Based on social exchange theory and relational 
contracting theory, collaboration can promote solidarity that shifts the partners’ views from 
self-centered behavior towards ‘we-ness’ feeling, whereas information exchange, on the other 
hand, reduces asymmetries through communication that can harmonize of conflict and 
honesty in the project. Finally, collaboration enables the partners to share common decisions 
and establish or revise the project objectives (Y. Liu et al., 2009; Rokkan, Heide, & Wathne, 
2003). All these advantages can help the partners to control the opportunism, support 
integration, and promote value creation in joint activities.  
To summarize, this study distinguishes between ex-ante and ex-post relational 
governance by referring to the former as social capital (e.g. prior ties, shared norms, trust) that 
has been embedded into partners’ relationships through previous collaborations, and defining 
the latter as collaboration in the current exchange relationship (e.g. information exchange, 
solidarity, participation). In this study it is argued that these two forms of relational 
mechanisms can make different contributions to exchange performance. Accordingly, the first 
research question is as follows: 
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RQ1: By conceptualizing prior ties, shared norms, and trust as ex-ante relational 
governance while collaboration as ex-post relational governance, what are the joint effects of 
the two on performance? 
2.6.2 The mediation effect of project control capability 
Construction projects involve many complex processes and various uncertainties that 
should be controlled by project partners. For  a successful partnership, project parties should 
be able to precisely specify their requirements and objectives, determine the characteristics of 
the proposed transactions, and identify the factors that cause transactional difficulties 
(Rahman & Kumaraswamy, 2002). For example, Naoum (2003) suggested that the ability of 
partners to define mutually agreed and measurable targets is an essential requirement for 
improving the productivity of the partnership. In another study, Turner and Simister (2001) 
showed that one of the main criteria for choosing between different types of governance 
mechanisms is the ability of the project partners to resolve the problems, indeed these findings 
showed that the ability of the partners to apply various types of governance mechanisms will 
contribute to the partnership outcomes. In other words, even if the best governance 
mechanisms are selected, it does not guarantee satisfactory outcomes if the partners lack 
experience and/or understanding of the mechanisms.  
For example, since many construction activities need to comply with various technical 
and management standards, behavior control seems most likely because identifying and 
correcting errors early on in the construction process is critical. As a result, their ability to 
identify the activities and their sequences and interrelationships, and to assign resources to the 
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specified activities, and then monitor the progress of the project team towards project 
objectives, means that it is necessary to have effective behavior/process control. Similarly, to 
exercise output control, the partners should be able to set the project objectives and measure 
their compliance to the expected outcomes. Hence, project control capability appears to be a 
critical factor in the choice and effects of governance mechanisms.  
Prior studies within the organizational control domain suggested that the choice of 
control mechanisms can be affected by task programmability and outcome measurability 
(Eisenhardt, 1985; Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Tuuli et al., 2010). Borrowing from 
Perrow (1965), Reeves and Woodward (1970), and Thompson (1967), Ouchi in his seminal 
framework (Ouchi, 1977, 1979) argued that understanding the transformation process and 
being able to measure outputs are the two antecedents for the choice of control mechanisms 
(e.g., behavior control, output control). Ouchi explained (Ouchi, 1977, p. 4):  
“… in order to apply behavior control, the organization must possess at least 
agreement, if not true knowledge, about means-ends relationships. The process 
through which inputs are transformed into outputs must be felt to be known before 
supervisors can rationally achieve control by watching and guiding the behavior of 
their subordinates.”  
However, he also believed that adopting output control was different and “the 
transformation process need not be known at all, but a reliable and valid measure of the desired 
outputs must be available” (Ouchi, 1977, p. 4).  
In his subsequent work (Ouchi, 1979), Ouchi introduced clan control as a new control 
mechanism and argued that if an organization is unable to exercise monitoring or evaluate the 
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outputs, the preferred control mechanism will be clan control which can be exercised through 
social exchanges between personnel and sharing organizational attitudes, values, and beliefs.  
  Knowledge of the transformation process 
  Perfect Imperfect 
Ability to measure 
outputs 
High Behavior control or Output control Output control 
Low Behavior control Clan control 
Figure 2-1 : Conditions for the selection of control mechanisms (Adapted from Ouchi, 1979) 
Eisenhardt (1985) showed that the choice between behavior-oriented contract or 
outcome-oriented contract was contingent on the level of task programmability. That is, the 
more knowledge the partners have about the project tasks and transformation process, the 
more the contract will be behavior-oriented. While Eisenhardt (1985) emphasized the 
contingent effect of task characteristics by referring to task programmability and outcome 
measurability, Kirsch (1996) distinguished between task characteristics and controller’s 
capabilities—understanding and utilizing task information for control purposes—and 
suggested that the latter is important in the choice of control mechanisms. That is, even if the 
information about the transformation process and the outcome measures is available, the 
controller must be able to transform the information into knowledge and use it to exercise the 
control, otherwise the information will remain useless (Kirsch, 1996; Kirsch, Sambamurthy, 
Ko, & Purvis, 2002).  
Similarly, Tiwana and Keil (2009) distinguished between attempted and realized control 
where attempted control refers to the degree to which a controller implements governance 
mechanisms, and realized control reflects the degree to which the controller can successfully 
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exercise the governance mechanisms (Tiwana & Keil, 2009). Based on this differentiation, 
Tiwana and Keil (2009) explained the contradictory results on the relationship between the 
use of governance mechanisms in internal and outsourced projects and project performance. 
The results showed that while outsourced projects had greater usage of governance 
mechanisms compared to internal projects, the improvement in performance was less 
observed in outsourced projects. The study suggested that even though attempted control is 
motivated by transaction hazards, realized control is facilitated by meeting specific 
informational and social prerequisites, and since the specific informational and social 
requirements were not developed very well in outsourced projects, control realization was not 
achieved as expected.  
Although this differentiation was developed in past literature, one question remained 
unanswered; how control capability interacts with governance mechanisms to impact on 
exchange performance?  
Building on the aforementioned argument and addressing the above question, I submit 
that to achieve the expected results from exercising governance mechanisms, the project 
partners must have enough ‘project control capability’ and this capability can be improved by 
the use of governance mechanisms. In other words, ‘project control capability’ plays a 
mediating role in the relationship between governance mechanisms and performance, that is, 
even though governance mechanisms have been appropriately selected, if they cannot enhance 
the partners’ ‘project control capability’, they will lose their efficacy. Supporting this 
proposal, Tuuli et al. (2010) showed how formal control mechanisms can particularly be 
redundant in construction projects when the project partners are inexperienced or do not have 
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enough knowledge of the project. As another example, previous research into the construction 
industry recognized that ineffective communications between the project partners was the 
main obstacle to success (Cheng, Li, Love, & Irani, 2001; Thamhain, 1992; S. R. Thomas, 
Tucker, & Kelly, 1998), and S. R. Thomas et al. (1998) identified six critical concerns 
regarding communications (Table 2-5) that should be considered in implementing effective 
collaborations. In other words, since the establishment and implementation of communication 
channels incur additional costs and require the project team to spend some time for 
interactions, ignoring these concerns may lead to ineffective communications and project 
failure.  
Table 2-5 : Critical concerns regarding communication setup (S. R. Thomas et al., 1998) 
Critical concern Description  
Accuracy  The accuracy of information received as indicated by the frequency of conflicting 
instructions, poor communications, and lack of coordination 
Procedures The existence, use and effectiveness of formally defined procedures outlining scope, 
and methods, etc. 
Barriers  The presence of barriers (interpersonal, accessibility, logistic, or other) interfering with 
communications between supervisors or other groups 
Understanding  An understanding of information expectations with supervisors and other groups 
Timeliness  The timeliness of information received including design and schedule changes 
Completeness  The amount of relevant information received 
 
In sum, I contend that (1) appropriate combination and effective use of governance 
mechanisms can promote ‘project control capability’, and (2) ‘project control capability’ 
mediates the impact of governance mechanisms on exchange performance. Thus, the second 
research question is as follows: 
RQ2: How does ‘project control capability’ interact with governance mechanisms to 
impact on performance?  
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2.6.3 Contingent effect of culture and contract enforceability  
Given the importance of the choice of appropriate governance mechanisms, it is 
important to know whether the efficacy of contractual and relational governance mechanisms 
is constant in different cultural and legal contexts. As noted by North (1990), contract 
enforceability is likely to have a noticeable impact on the efficacy of different governance 
mechanisms. For example, North and Weingast (1989) suggested that in countries without 
effective legal systems, formal contracts are not reliable because it is very difficult to enforce 
expectations and promises.  
On the other hand, some scholars referred to the national culture as a ‘shifting 
parameter’ and argued that a country’s culture impacts on the choice of IORs governance 
mechanisms (Yang et al., 2011). For instance, in individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance 
cultures (e.g., Western countries) formal mechanisms are more reliable (de Pablos, 2005), 
whereas in collectivist cultures with high uncertainty avoidance (e.g. East Asia and middle 
east) social norms and relational mechanisms play the primary role in regulating these 
relationships (Luo, 2007).  
To better understand of the relationship between culture and the legal system, and their 
interactions with IORs governance mechanisms, it is necessary to put them in a larger context 
of a social system. In doing so Williamson (2000) identified four levels of social analysis to 
show the relationships between different levels of a social system (Figure 2-2), where the solid 
arrows show the constraints imposed by a higher level construct to the immediate below level 
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construct, and the dashed arrows indicate the feedback from bottom levels towards the upper 
levels.  
 
Figure 2-2 : Inter-relationships between different levels of a social system (Williamson, 2000) 
 
The first level is dedicated to culture (social embeddedness) in which the norms, beliefs, 
customs, and traditions are located. As defined by Kroeber and Parsons (1958, p. 583), culture 
includes “transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas, and other symbolic-
meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human behavior and the artifacts produced 
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through behavior”. This level has been taken as a given by most institutional economists who 
believe that the mechanisms through which culture and its informal institutions arise and are 
maintained have principally unplanned origins; in other words there is no deliberate or 
calculated choice involved (Williamson, 2000). These informal institutions are formed 
through an evolutionary process and gradually adopted by the people, and after a while the 
resulting informal institutions become an inseparable part of a society that displays a great 
deal of inertia.  
The second level is referred to as ‘institutional environment’ which is partly affected by 
the evolutionary formation of informal institutions despite there being design opportunities 
for establishing ‘formal rules’ such as constitutions, laws, and property rights. As a result, 
first-order economizing can begin from this level by establishing a formal framework and 
formulating ‘rules of the game’ (Williamson, 1991), because as Williamson (2000) stated, 
“executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic functions of government as well as the 
distribution of powers across different levels of government” are common instruments for 
establishing formal institutions at this level. Furthermore, it features the establishment and 
enforcement of property rights and contract laws.  
Although formal institutions are necessary tools for improving the economic 
productivity of an economy by eliminating chaos in the business environment, to streamline 
the working process through established legal systems (the rules of the game), there is a need 
for institutions through which contractual relations (the play of the game) could be regulated; 
in fact these are governance institutions located at the third level. Since exchange parties are 
mainly responsible for managing contracts and resolving disputes—e.g. through private 
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ordering—the governance of contractual relations must be addressed at this level, that is, 
proper contractual and relational governance mechanisms should be selected by the exchange 
parties to regulate the IORs (Williamson, 2000).  
As shown in Figure 2-2, the governance mechanisms located on the third level of the 
social system are probably affected by the two upper levels—the legal system and culture, so 
these two factors must be considered as important contextual factors that influence the choice 
and effects of governance mechanisms.  
2.6.3.1 Governance mechanisms and the culture 
As described earlier in this chapter, TCE is one of the underlying theories regarding the 
choice and effects of governance mechanisms in which opportunism is a key assumption, 
however, such an emphasis on opportunistic nature of all human beings has received a large 
number of criticisms (C. C. Chen, Peng, & Saparito, 2002; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; 
Granovetter, 1985; Kogut & Zander, 1996). Consequently, researchers tried to clarify and 
strengthen this assumption by introducing a number of contingent factors such as culture to 
explain the variation of this behavioral feature in different contexts. For example, Ghoshal 
and Moran (1996) argued that it may be unrealistic to assume opportunism as a constant factor 
across individuals and organizations around the world. In the same way, C. C. Chen et al. 
(2002) made further theoretical progress by explaining the impact of cultural differences on 
the likelihood of opportunistic behavior as well as the efficacy of governance mechanisms to 
mitigate this problem. Drawing upon social and cross-cultural psychology literature, they 
pointed out that “an economic actor’s opportunistic propensity is affected by one’s cultural 
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prior conditioning of individualism-collectivism and its associated feelings of moral 
obligations toward different transactions” and proposed a number of hypotheses to be 
examined in future studies. However, despite frequent calls to examine the role culture plays 
on the efficacy of governance mechanisms (e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Reuer, Ariño, & 
Mellewigt, 2006),  to the best of my knowledge, very few studies (e.g. Y. Li et al., 2010) have 
addressed this concern. For example, Y. Li et al. (2010) compared the role of formal and social 
control mechanisms in domestic and international buyer-supplier relationships in China and 
found that while formal and social control mechanisms are a substitute in domestic 
partnerships, they complement each other in international transactions.  
Although a comparison of domestic and international partnerships provides some useful 
information about the impact of culture on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms, 
since the international partners are usually from a variety of cultures, the results are not very 
informative. To address the gap, this study aimed to examine the impact of culture on the 
efficacy of governance mechanisms through conducting a cross-cultural study in two 
culturally different countries. 
Hofstede’s national culture dimensions (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede, & 
Minkov, 2010) are one of the most widely used measures for cross-cultural comparisons. The 
six dimensions of culture include power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty 
avoidance, pragmatism, and indulgence. In the most recent edition of Hofstede’s work 
(Hofstede et al., 2010), scores on each of these six dimensions were calculated and listed for 
76 countries and regions around the world.  
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Of these six dimensions, individualism has consistently been regarded as a core 
dimension for distinguishing different cultures (Cannon, Doney, Mullen, & Petersen, 2010; 
Cialdini, Wosinska, Barrett, Butner, & Gornik-Durose, 1999; Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; 
Hofstede, 1980), so this study used this dimension as a contingent factor for the choice and 
effects of governance mechanisms in two different cultural contexts. Individualism and 
collectivism represent opposite ends of the same dimension because in individualistic cultures 
self-serving behavior prevails and people prioritize their own interests over the interests of the 
society, whereas in collectivist societies loyalty and strong long-term commitment to group 
members overrides most other considerations and violating the social norms leads to shame 
and loss of face (Hofstede, 1980).  
2.6.3.2 Governance mechanisms and the contract enforceability 
Based on the conventional view of economic development, formal institutions, such as 
courts and contracts, enable economies to grow and to be successful and the inability to 
develop a court system that can enforce contracts is the most important basis for both historical 
depression and current underdevelopment in the third world (Mahoney, 2005; North, 1990; 
Zhou & Poppo, 2010). As noted by Williamson (2000), the establishment of property rights 
is of second importance after culture in the economics of institutions in a social system. Coase 
(1959, p. 12) asserted that “a private-enterprise system cannot function properly unless 
property rights are created in resources … a legal system to define property rights and to 
arbitrate disputes is, of course, necessary”. Similarly, Williamson (2000) highlighted the 
importance of the definition and enforcement of property rights and contract laws in regulating 
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contractual relations. While unpredictability of legal institutions discourages reliance on 
contractual agreements and in turn encourages managers to substitute formal contracts with 
relational mechanisms, an effective legal system may alleviate the need to rely on relational 
mechanisms (Mike W Peng, 2003; Xin & Pearce, 1996).  
Based on the above argument, it is expected that contract enforceability causes 
significant impact on the choice and effects of contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms in regulating transactional relationships, however, this area of research is still 
underexplored and very few studies have addressed this concern (e.g., Y. Li et al., 2010; Zhou 
& Poppo, 2010). As explained in the previous section, Y. Li et al. (2010) conducted a 
comparative study between domestic and international partnerships in China and explained 
the differences in the two samples by referring to the cultural and legal differences, but they 
did not specify any criterion for measuring the cultural and legal differences in the cases. By 
measuring the perceived contract enforceability, Zhou and Poppo (2010) examined the choice 
and effects of explicit contracts and relational reliability in buyer-supplier relationships in 
China and found that the formality or informality of governance mechanisms changed in 
different partnerships depending on the perceived contract enforceability. However, the 
authors questioned the generalization of their findings by referring to the limited context of 
the study—only two Chinese provinces—and called for further research to assess the role of 
contract enforceability in countries with established legal systems. To fill the gap, this thesis 
aimed to conduct a comparative study in order to examine the impact of contract enforceability 
in countries with weak/strong legal systems on the efficacy of governance mechanisms.  
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In recent years, aggregate indices of the quality of governance, called Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), have become very popular in cross-national studies (Langbein 
& Knack, 2010). WGI was developed by a group of World Bank researchers and since 1996, 
covers over two hundred countries for six aggregate indicators of broad dimensions of 
political governance, including: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and the 
absence of violence/terrorism, (3) governance effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of 
law, and (6) control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). Although the 
validity and reliability of directly using these dimensions as theoretical constructs in 
hypotheses has been doubted and criticized by some scholars (Apaza, 2009; Langbein & 
Knack, 2010; M. A. Thomas, 2010), they could be used as a good differentiator between 
countries. For example, the index of ‘rule of law’ was defined as: “the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2011).  
To summarize, this thesis attempts to fill the gap in the previous IORs governance 
literature by conducting a comparative research in two culturally and legally different 
countries, in order to study the impact of individualistic/collectivistic attitudes and high/low 
contract enforceability on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms in client-
contractor relationships. Thus, the third research question is as follows: 
RQ3: How do culture and contract enforceability impact the choice and effects of 
governance mechanisms? 
Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
68 
 
2.7 Chapter summary 
In this chapter the concept of governance and its applications in the IORs domain were 
described and multiple functions of contractual and relational governance mechanisms (e.g., 
safeguarding, integration, value creation), as well as their underlying theoretical perspectives 
were explained. Then, the literature on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms was 
reviewed and three major gaps were identified. First, the review showed that previous studies 
did not differentiate between relational mechanisms such as prior ties, shared norms, and trust 
that are originated from past relationships and other relational mechanisms such as 
information exchange and joint actions which were established during the current exchange 
relationships. Since the source of these two types of relational governance is different, this 
study conceptualized the former as social capital—ex-ante relational governance—and the 
latter as collaboration—ex-post relational governance—and posited that they act differently 
in explaining the exchange performance. The second gap in the literature was related to the 
impact of partners’ control capabilities on exercising governance mechanisms. Although past 
literature regarded the partners’ knowledge of the transformation process and their ability to 
measure the outcomes as antecedents for the choice of governance mechanisms (e.g., behavior 
control, outcome control, clan control), it did not consider the influence of utilizing 
governance mechanisms on the development of these control capabilities and the consequent 
impact of these capabilities on exchange performance. Thus, this study conceptualized a new 
construct of ‘project control capability’ to examine the mediation effect of this construct on 
the relationship between governance mechanisms and exchange performance. Finally, the 
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literature did little to explain the impact of culture and contract enforceability on the choice 
and effects of governance mechanisms. As such, this thesis aimed to fill the gap by conducting 
a comparative research in two culturally and legally different contexts.  
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3.1 Introduction  
An exhaustive review of the IORs literature on the choice and effects of governance 
mechanisms led to the identification of three gaps in the past literature and shaped the scope 
of this research. Addressing the identified gaps, this chapter presents the research questions 
and develops the research hypotheses and the theoretical framework.  
3.2 Research questions 
According to the identified gaps in the literature, the following research questions are 
recommended: 
4. By conceptualizing the prior ties, shared norms, and trust as ex-ante relational 
governance while collaboration as ex-post relational governance, what are the joint 
effects of the two on performance? 
5. How does ‘project control capability’ interact with governance mechanisms to 
impact on performance?  
6. How do the culture and the contract enforceability impact the choice and effects of 
governance mechanisms? 
Addressing these research questions, research hypotheses and theoretical framework are 
developed in the following sections. 
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3.3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
3.3.1 Interactions between governance mechanisms 
As explained in previous chapter, this study differentiates between social capital and 
collaboration as ex-ante and ex-post relational governance mechanisms, respectively. At this 
part, I examine interactions between formal contract, social capital, and collaboration. 
3.3.1.1 Social capital and formal contract 
The literature on the relationship between social capital and formal contract supports 
their substitutability. The advocates of this view believe that trust reduces the transaction costs 
by “replacing contracts with handshakes” (Adler, 2001). Dyer and Singh (1998) argued that 
informal agreements which are self-enforcing and are based on trust and reputation can 
supplant formal arrangements. Gulati (1995) contends that trust avoids contracting and 
monitoring costs and provides more flexibility for adaptation to new exchange conditions. 
Similarly, Uzzi (1997) believes that embedded norms within social structures reduce 
transaction costs by alleviating the time and cost needed for contract negotiations. In line with 
this substitutive view, some scholars refer to the negative effect of formal contracts on trust 
and believe that detailed negotiated contracts signal the lack of trust and discourages 
cooperation (Kadefors, 2004; Macaulay, 1963). For example, Luo (2002) believed that 
although prior ties between partners enhances contractual completeness, it reduces term 
specificity. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H1: Social capital has negative impact on the use of formal contract. 
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3.3.1.2 Formal contract and collaboration 
With providing an institutional framework, formal contract can guide the course of 
cooperation among project partners (Chua, Lim, Soh, & Sia, 2012; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) argue that formal contracts not only discourage the 
pursuit of short-term gains by specifying a long-term commitment to exchange, but also limit 
the gains from opportunistic behavior by providing clear provisions that specify punishment. 
This reduction in short-term gains consequently motivates the gains from cooperation in the 
exchange relationship. As noted by Poppo and Zenger (2002), more customized contracts can 
also increase the level of established and developed norms, and consequently, promote 
collaborations. Similarly, Chua et al. (2012, p. 21) revealed that “formal controls can establish 
shared structure, cognition, and relationships to facilitate the development of clan control or 
reinforce/inhibit clan norms”. In sum, formal contract introduces formal procedures and 
guidelines for communications among project team members and senior managers (e.g., 
information exchange, reports, meetings) that lead to more structured and regular interactions 
among project partners. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H2: Formal contract has positive impact on collaboration between partners during the 
project. 
3.3.1.3 Social capital and collaboration 
Some scholars hold that social capital can facilitate information exchange and 
knowledge transfer among partners (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998) and promote clan control (Chua et al., 2012; Kirsch et al., 2010). For 
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example, Kirsch et al. (2010) asserted that social capital with its all three forms of structural 
social capital (e.g., access to individuals and information resources), cognitive social capital 
(e.g., shared values, shared goals), and relational social capital (e.g., trust) provides conditions 
for informal interactions, open discussions, and free-flowing communications which are 
building blocks of clan control. In the same way, Chua et al. (2012) suggested that social 
capital is necessary for building the clan, and without social capital in place, leveraging the 
clan is impossible. Similarly, Morgan and Hunt (1994) contended that trust promotes 
relational norms such as information exchange, solidarity, and participation. It means that 
social capital, as a product of intensive social interactions in the past, provides trustful 
environment and enhances partners’ understanding of each others’ priorities, cultures, and 
objectives which can lubricate the relationships for doing joint activities and joint decision 
making. Thus, I hypothesize: 
H3: Social capital has positive impact on collaboration between partners during the project. 
3.3.2 The impact of governance mechanisms on project control capability 
To examine the second research question regarding the impact of governance 
mechanisms on project control capability, relevant hypotheses are developed in this part.  
3.3.2.1 Collaboration and project control capability 
As proposed by L. Liu and Zhu (2007), the levels of task programmability and outcome 
measurability increase throughout the project life cycle. That is, information exchange and 
socialization among project partners can enhance partners’ confidence about the project work 
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and counterpart’s behavior and facilitate joint decision making and joint problem solving 
(Selnes & Sallis, 2003). In other words, with more collaboration between project team 
members, they can more effectively transfer their accumulated knowledge and experience, 
and consequently, have a better understanding of the project process and project tasks as well 
as the sequence of the activities and resource allocation. In the same way, more collaboration 
can make project team’s behavior and the way they approach expected project outcomes more 
observable and traceable. When partners exchange information about the project progress and 
different issues encountered during the project, they can update project plans and track the 
updated version of the project performance to estimate divergence from initial objectives and 
take remedial actions if needed. Therefore, I hypothesize:     
H4: Collaboration between partners has positive impact on project control capability. 
3.3.2.2 The mediation effect of collaboration 
Formal contracts are effective tools for bringing transparency into partners’ 
relationships by clarifying all the rights and responsibilities of the two sides, defining the 
scope, objectives, and expected outcomes of the project, and determining the measures and 
procedures for controlling the project team’s behavior as well as the team’s progress towards 
project outcomes. Contracts set specific project targets which propels project partners to 
collaborate in order to successfully deliver the project through resolving problems. It can also 
enhance project control capability by providing a common ground for sharing knowledge and 
experience on contract negotiation and contract development as well as contract enforcement. 
However, these advantages would not be achieved in the absence of collaboration between 
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partners (Rahman & Kumaraswamy, 2002). Although unambiguous contract provides clear 
targets for project partners, the effective delivery requires close collaboration between 
partners. That is, the provisions specified within the contract should be effectively and 
exhaustively communicated in order to be usefully and successfully implemented. Therefore, 
I hypothesize: 
H5: The positive impact of formal contract on project control capability is fully mediated by 
collaboration between partners. 
On the other hand, social capital may account for project control capability through 
providing more information about the partner’s behavior and sharing more confidence 
between project parties (Adler & Kwon, 2002). The partners who have been working together 
for a long time may have good understandings of the points of strengths and weaknesses in 
counterpart’s behavior. It will, consequently, assist them to find the bottlenecks in their 
relationships and focus on those areas. Additionally, shared goals and values may reduce the 
asymmetries and enable the parties to better communicate their aims and objectives about the 
project (Zhang et al., 2009). Correspondingly, this knowledge enhances the controllability of 
the project and reduces the uncertainty. However, social capital by itself cannot guarantee the 
expected advantages. That is, social bonds among partners need to be recreated and 
reconfirmed through collaborative joint actions and information exchange. Otherwise, they 
may lose their efficacy (Adler & Kwon, 2002), and as a result, their significant impact on 
project control capability may be disappeared. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H6: The positive impact of social capital on project control capability is fully mediated by 
collaboration between partners. 
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3.3.3 The impact of governance mechanisms on exchange performance 
As explained in literature review section, the governance mechanisms may have 
different functions (e.g., safeguarding, integration, value creation), and the aim of using these 
mechanisms may be different. As shown in previous chapter, the efficacy of governance 
mechanisms and their interactions may differ based on the expected outcomes. Following Lui 
and Ngo (2004) and Jin, Doloi, and Gao (2007), this study differentiates between project 
(time&cost) performance and relationship satisfaction. Where project (time&cost) 
performance refers to the integration function of governance mechanisms which promotes 
coordination and cooperation among partners and leads to successful implementation of the 
project in terms of meeting time and cost objectives, relationship satisfaction adopts the value 
creation view and attempts to measure the long-term benefits of the cooperation by referring 
to the partners’ satisfaction with their cooperation, its contribution to their core competencies, 
and their hope for future collaborations.  
3.3.3.1 Relational governance mechanisms and relationship satisfaction 
Prior research in IORs domain shows that relational governance mechanisms promote 
relationship satisfaction. For example, Lui and Ngo (2004) showed how goodwill trust 
between partners enhances relationship satisfaction in terms of achieving goals and adding to 
partners’ long-term success. Similarly, Jap and Ganesan (2000) indicated how information 
exchange, solidarity, and participation can develop commitment between partners and 
enhance the chance of future collaborations.  
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Sociologists and psychologists refer to trust and reciprocity as “the basis of all human 
systems of morality” (Nowak & Sigmund, 2000) and differentiate between trust and social 
exchanges by referring to the former as the main motivator for emergence of the latter 
(Coleman, 1990; Messick & Brewer, 1983). The common sense in previous cross-cultural 
research was that in a collectivistic culture people place more importance on relationships 
than individualists and therefore trust would be higher among collectivists (C. C. Chen, Chen, 
& Meindl, 1998; Triandis, 1995), however, a deeper examination of social behavior in two 
cultures revealed that in a collectivist society in-group and out-group members are treated 
very differently (Triandis, 1995). For example, Watkins and Liu (1996) asserted that the 
quality of social interactions between individuals in a collectivist society differs substantially 
when the exchange partner changes from an in-group member to an out-group member. That 
is, people in collectivist societies are relatively suspicious of strangers and commonly use 
avoidance behaviors and even try to compete with and exploit out-groups more extensively 
than those of individualistic cultures (Huff & Kelley, 2005; Watkins & Liu, 1996). Watkins 
and Liu (1996), then concluded that trust within in-groups would be higher for collectivists 
than individualists, while trust for out-groups would be higher for individualists than 
collectivists. Similarly, Buchan, Croson, and Dawes (2002) suggested that the speed at which 
universal solidarity will be realized is likely to vary across different cultures. In this study, 
people from different cultures were asked to participate in multiple experiments. Experiments 
were designed to examine the extent to which the level of trust and reciprocity with in-groups 
and out-groups changes based on the cultural differences between participants. The results of 
the study showed that where individualist participants quickly adopted the notion of the group 
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by reflecting higher levels of trust toward ‘neighbors’ than toward ‘strangers’, collectivist 
participants did not embrace the group, but instead persisted in treating all participants in the 
experiment as strangers. The authors concluded that in collaborating with new partners 
collectivists should travel relatively longer road to embrace solidarity comparing with 
individualists that cope much easier to new partnerships (Buchan et al., 2002). 
Based on the above argument, I contend that in a collectivistic culture, social capital 
plays the main role in promoting relationship satisfaction, however, when the partners are new 
to each other and the level of social capital is low, they are suspicious of each other and try to 
evaluate each other’s capabilities. If their collaboration added to project control capability, 
they gradually accept the new partner as an in-group member and this collaboration leads to 
successful partnership with developing commitment and opening new avenues for future 
work. Thus, I hypothesize: 
H7a: In countries where the culture is collectivistic,  
1. social capital has positive impact on relationship satisfaction; 
2. collaboration has indirect effect on relationship satisfaction through project control 
capability.  
In individualist cultures, although social capital is important and provides better 
conditions for collaboration, the focus is on current relationship and the level of reciprocity 
between partners. Therefore, even in the absence of social capital and past relationships, the 
partners put their effort to develop their social interactions to exploit the opportunities and 
develop commitment and their core competencies. Hence, I hypothesize: 
H7b: In countries where the culture is individualistic,  
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1. collaboration has positive impact on relationship satisfaction; 
2. social capital has indirect effect on relationship satisfaction through collaboration. 
3.3.3.2 Formal contract and relationship satisfaction 
The findings of prior studies regarding the impact of formal contract on relationship 
satisfaction are inconsistent. For example, Jap and Ganesan (2000) showed that formal 
contract decreases the partners’ commitment by impeding flexibility and signaling distrust. 
However, Lui and Ngo (2004) indicated that the negative effect of contractual safeguards on 
relationship satisfaction is contingent to the level of trust between partners. That is, while in 
low trust conditions formal contracts have positive impact on relationship satisfaction, in high 
trust relationships it can be destructive. In contrast, some studies asserted that formal contracts 
have positive impact on relationship satisfaction (Ferguson et al., 2005). Reconciling this 
debate, some scholars contended that the negative effect of formal contract depends on use of 
the relational governance mechanisms. That is, when the partners utilize formal contract along 
with relational mechanisms such as joint actions and social interactions, the joint effect of 
these mechanisms on relationship satisfaction would be complementary and positive (J. J. Li 
et al., 2010; Luo, 2002). The reason for this complementary effect is that relational 
mechanisms can mitigate the negative consequences of formal contracts by providing 
flexibility and trustful conditions.  
Other factors that may be influential in determining the efficacy of formal contracts are 
cultural and legal characteristics of the exchange environment. For example, North and 
Weingast (1989) suggested that in countries without effective legal systems, formal contracts 
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are not reliable because it is very difficult to enforce expectations and promises. Similarly, 
Zhou and Poppo (2010) showed that formal contract can enhance relationship satisfaction 
only if the partners have strong perception of legal enforceability. Otherwise, formal contract 
loses its efficacy and the partners will focus on relational governance mechanisms. With 
respect to the cultural characteristics, formal contracts are more likely to be used in 
individualistic cultures (de Pablos, 2005), however, in collectivist cultures social norms and 
relational mechanisms play the primary role in regulating the relationships (Luo, 2007). 
According to above arguments, I contend that in countries with collectivistic culture and 
low contract enforceability, formal contract cannot contribute to relationship satisfaction. In 
contrast, in individualistic societies with high level of contract enforceability, formal contract 
plays considerable role in enhancing relationship satisfaction, however, its positive impact is 
conditional to the use of relational mechanisms such as social interactions and information 
exchanges. Thus, I hypothesize:  
H8a: In countries where the culture is collectivistic and the contract enforceability is low, 
formal contract has non-significant impact on relationship satisfaction.  
H8b: In countries where the culture is individualistic and the contract enforceability is high, 
formal contract has indirect effect on relationship satisfaction through collaboration. 
3.3.3.3 Relational governance mechanisms and project (time&cost) 
performance 
Relational governance mechanisms such as relational norms can help partners to fulfill 
time, cost, and quality requirements of the project by facilitating coordination and cooperation 
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among partners (Hatten et al., 2012; Jha & Iyer, 2007; Macneil, 1978). Similarly, trustful 
relationships facilitate joint actions (Claro et al., 2003) by ensuring the partners about 
capabilities of the exchange partner (competence trust) and its goodwill (benevolent trust). 
For example, Sohn (1994) contended that embedded social knowledge enhances coordination 
between exchange parties by making the partner’s behavior both foreseeable and 
understandable. It is also argued that social interactions lead to shared values and shared 
objectives which would consequently promote coordination and cooperation among partners 
(Kirsch et al., 2010; Ouchi, 1979). However, the dark side of these relational mechanisms has 
been addressed by some scholars as well (Cheng et al., 2001; Thamhain, 1992; S. R. Thomas 
et al., 1998). For example, S. R. Thomas et al. (1998) argued that ineffective communication 
between project partners may hinder project success.  
Since the project (time&cost) performance is measured based on pre-specified 
objectives in the contract, it is probable to be affected by contract enforceability. That is, if 
the contract enforceability is high, it would be more likely to have link between exercising 
control and achieving good project (time&cost) performance. On the contrary, where the 
contract enforceability is low, even if the partners hold well-developed control capabilities 
and effectively exercise control mechanisms, there is no guarantee for meeting project 
objectives. So in the absence of enforceable and practicable contracts, social capital is the only 
effective mechanism that can keep the project on the track. That is, under uncertain conditions 
in which contract cannot be enforced, if the partners share high level of social capital, their 
relationships would no longer be based on reciprocal transactions, but it would noticeably be 
trust-based. In other words, if one of the partners could not fulfill its promises, the other party 
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keeps doing its work, because he is confident about his partner’s goodwill and knows that 
sooner or later he would accomplish his allocated task. Consequently, interruptions in project 
work would considerably be decreased and project objectives would be less affected. 
Additionally, the efficacy of relational governance mechanisms may be affected by the 
cultural context of the project. Where social capital that is based on in-groups relationships is 
very influential in improving project (time&cost) performance in collectivistic cultures, 
collaboration that is built on reciprocity among partners would be more effective in 
individualistic cultures.  
Based on the above arguments, I posit that social capital is the primary governance 
mechanism for improving project (time&cost) performance in countries with collectivistic 
culture and low contract enforceability. In contrast, in individualistic countries with high 
contract enforceability, collaboration has more contribution to project (time&cost) 
performance, however this contribution is conditional and is mediated by project control 
capability and relationship satisfaction. That is, it is effective collaboration that improves 
project (time&cost) performance. If the collaboration could not enhance project control 
capability, it would be considered redundant. Because ineffective collaboration not only 
imposes extra time and money on project partners without providing any tangible outcome, 
but also leads to adversarial relationships. Thus, I hypothesize: 
H9a: In countries where the culture is collectivistic and the contract enforceability is low, 
social capital has positive impact on project (time&cost) performance. 
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H9b: In countries where the culture is individualistic and the contract enforceability is high, 
Collaboration has indirect effect on project (time&cost) performance through project control 
capability. 
3.3.3.4 Formal contract and project (time&cost) performance 
The findings of prior research show that formal contract has positive impact on project 
(time&cost) performance by specifying rights and obligations of both parties, defining 
procedures and guidelines, clarifying the scope and objectives of the project, and paving the 
ways for negotiations, that will ultimately improve coordination among partners (Carson et 
al., 2006; Jap & Ganesan, 2000; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Contracts 
can also reduce the monitoring and coordination costs by providing clear statements about the 
roles and responsibilities of exchange parties and by defining the monitoring process (Lui & 
Ngo, 2004; Reuer & Ariño, 2002). However, some studies argued that the efficacy of formal 
contracts is substantially affected by cultural and legal context. For example, North and 
Weingast (1989) suggested that in countries without effective legal systems, formal contracts 
are not reliable because it is very difficult to enforce expectations and promises. Similarly, 
Luo (2007) showed that in collectivistic cultures formal contracts are not effective and may 
signal distrust. In contrast, de Pablos (2005) showed that in individualistic cultures formal 
mechanisms are more effective.  
Based on the above argument, I hypothesize:  
H10a: In countries where the culture is collectivistic and the contract enforceability is low, 
formal contract has non-significant impact on project (time&cost) performance.  
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H10b: In countries where the culture is individualistic and the contract enforceability is high, 
formal contract has positive impact on project (time&cost) performance.  
Based on the research hypotheses, theoretical framework was developed (Figure 3-1).  
 
 Figure 3-1 : Theoretical framework 
3.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the research questions, and subsequently research hypotheses 
were developed to address the research questions. The first group of hypotheses (H1, H2, and 
H3) referred to the interactions between formal contract, social capital, and collaboration. The 
second group (H4, H5, and H6) were concerned with the interactions between governance 
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mechanisms and project control capability. H7a,b and H8a,b as the third group and H9a,b and 
H10a,b as the fourth group examined the impact of governance mechanisms on relationship 
satisfaction and project (time&cost) performance, respectively. Finally, according to the 
research hypotheses, the research framework was developed and presented. 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research design developed for this thesis. In broad terms 
‘research design’ describes the process by which research data is collected and analyzed in 
order to answer the proposed questions, and to provide a framework for undertaking the 
research (A.  Bryman & Bell, 2003).  
First,  inductive and deductive approaches to research are compared and the approach 
adopted is substantiated based on the literature and gap analysis; second, various research 
methods are overviewed and the comparative approach and cross-sectional survey are 
explained, and finally, details about the survey administration and data analysis approach 
using the PLS-SEM method are explained and vindicated.   
4.2 Research process 
Since logic and observation are two pillars of social science, any scientific explanation 
of the social world must make sense and conform to what we observe. These two elements 
link the three major aspects of social science: theory, data collection, and data analysis. Where 
theory communicates the logical aspect of science and provides rational explanations of the 
world, data collection deals with the observational aspect, and data analysis looks for potential 
patterns in observations and checks the conformity of logical expectations with real 
observations (Babbie, 2013).  
Generally, there are two alternative approaches for conducting research: (1) the 
inductive approach, and (2) the deductive approach. As Figure 4-1 shows, the inductive 
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approach begins with observation and data collection and proceeds with data analysis to 
discover patterns of relationships between variables; this is followed by a theory to explain 
the relationships found among the variables. Unlike an inductive approach that begins with 
data collection, deductive research starts with theory from which specific hypotheses are 
deduced and tested by collecting and analyzing data to determine whether the theory can be 
supported (Babbie, Halley, Wanger, & Zaino, 2013). Put simply, “deduction can be seen as 
reasoning from general understandings to specific expectations, whereas induction can be seen 
as reasoning from specific observations to general explanations” (Babbie et al., 2013, p. 9). 
Given the differences between inductive and deductive approaches, the goal of both is to 
develop theories to better understand and explain the real world (Babbie et al., 2013).  
The extent to which research is clear about its underlying theories affects the design of 
the research process regarding its inductive or deductive approach (Saunders, Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009), because as  Saunders et al. (2009) noted, the most important 
criteria a researcher uses to decide whether an inductive or deductive approach is best, is the 
research topic itself. For instance, a deductive approach is better suited to topics supported by 
a wealth of literature, from which a theoretical framework and hypotheses can be developed, 
whereas conducting research into a new and emerging topic without supportive literature, may 
better suit inductive approach beginning with observations and data collection, and then 
analyzing and reflecting upon what theoretical themes emanate from the data.  As reviewed 
in previous chapters, the literature on IORs governance is conceptually and empirically rich, 
so a deductive approach appears to be more appropriate for this research, as well as being 
more manageable in view of time limitations for a PhD study and the risks associated with 
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concluding the research (Saunders et al., 2009). As a result, a deductive approach was adopted 
in this thesis and the research process was developed. 
 
Figure 4-1 : The wheel of science (Babbie, 2013, p. 22) 
To reiterate, deduction begins with theory and continues with hypothesis development, 
while concepts are building blocks for theories that describe the relationships between 
concepts. Theory development typically involves developing new constructs or identifying 
new relationships among constructs (Babbie et al., 2013). This study primarily focuses on the 
latter. Testing hypotheses is a common way to discover new relationships because hypotheses 
are falsifiable predictions of causal relationships between variables; that is, a well-developed 
hypothesis is a tentative statement that predicts changes in one or more variables due to 
variations in another variable. Therefore, having established the hypotheses, the next step is 
to design and conduct an empirical study to validate them. The research framework for this 
thesis is presented in Figure 4-2 and describes the steps taken from a literature review and 
development of hypotheses, to data analysis, discussions, and conclusions. The literature 
review process and development of a conceptual framework were discussed in previous 
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chapters. In the sections that follow, the research design and data collection steps are 
explained. 
 
Figure 4-2 : Research process  
4.3 Selecting the research design 
Research design is the framework for turning research questions into a research project 
(Robson, 1997). As mentioned previously, how a researcher chooses to answer their research 
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questions depends on the approach adopted, such that, informed by the research questions, the 
researcher develops a plan on how to answer the questions that covers data collection and data 
analysis. The researcher specifies the data sources and addresses the strategies required to deal 
with constraints associated with the research (e.g. access to data, time, location, and money), 
as well as ethical issues (Saunders et al., 2009). Following Saunders et al. (2009), this study 
distinguished between research design and research tactics. Where the former is concerned 
with the overall plan of the research, the latter is concerned with the different quantitative and 
qualitative data collection techniques (e.g. questionnaires, interviews, historical archive 
analysis), and subsequent quantitative and qualitative data analysis procedures (e.g. data 
analysis method, bias checking, validity and reliability evaluation).  
In the following paragraphs different research designs will be introduced, and reasons 
are given for selecting survey design over alternative options. It is important to note that no 
research design is inherently superior or inferior to others; the preference for a particular 
research design is based on how well it enables the researcher to answer their questions and 
meet research objectives (Saunders et al., 2009). 
4.3.1  Experiment 
Experimental design is the most popular method used in natural science and also have 
a strong association with social science research, particularly psychology (Saunders et al., 
2009). Experiments are used to study patterns of causal relationships between independent 
and dependent variables (Hakim, 2000). In a classic experiment, one experimental group and 
one control group are established and members are randomly assigned to each. Both groups 
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should have exactly the same characteristics in all aspects relevant to the research, except for 
controlled factors (independent variables) that have been intentionally changed in the 
experimental group but which remain unchanged in the control group. The dependent variable 
is then measured in both groups to see if there are any significant differences between them 
that can be attributed to the intervention (Saunders et al., 2009). As Saunders et al. (2009) 
noted, experiments are often conducted in laboratories rather than in the field, and while this 
strategy promotes internal validity, it puts external validity at risk. The second problem with 
laboratory experiments is their weak link to the real world of organizations which limits the 
generalizations of the research findings. Field experiments follow the same process as lab 
experiments, but take place in a natural setting, which  gives them much greater external 
validity despite  limiting the researcher’s control over the research setting and impeding 
accurate conclusions about causality (Flynn, Sakakibara, Schroeder, Bates, & Flynn, 1990). 
In addition to these weaknesses in the experimental method, preparing the experimental 
setting to analyze the choice and effects of governance mechanisms is very time consuming 
and expensive, so I did not use experiment in this study.  
4.3.2  Case study 
In case study research the researcher investigates a particular phenomenon within real 
life settings (Robson, 1997), where context is an inherent part that cannot separate the 
phenomenon from its context (Yin, 2009). Unlike experiments that are undertaken within a 
highly controlled environment, case study researchers do not manipulate the contextual factors 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Various data collection techniques can be used in combination with 
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the case study method, including interviews, observations, historical archive analysis, and 
questionnaire.  
Case study is of particular interest to studies that are exploratory and need a deep 
understanding of the context of the research (Morris & Wood, 1991). As mentioned before, 
this is not the case in the field of IORs governance mechanisms. However, the case study 
method is limited by its generalization of the findings that are bounded by the cases studied 
(Flynn et al., 1990). For answering research questions and validating the conceptual 
framework proposed in this thesis, a large sample size which represents the whole population 
would be needed, and since case study would be too costly and time consuming, it was not 
selected. 
4.3.3  Panel study 
In a panel study, a group of experts analyze different solutions for the questions raised 
by a coordinator in order to reach a final agreement. Panel studies usually follow a structured 
process for problem solving, which is why the Delphi method is popular. Here, experts 
propose their solutions to a series of questions, anonymously and in writing, and then the 
responses are circulated among members to help them revise their answers until the group 
finally reaches a consensual solution (Flynn et al., 1990). As Flynn et al. (1990) noted, panel 
study is usually used to define terms and make predictions, which means it does not fit the 
research objectives of this thesis. 
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4.3.4  Focus group 
A focus group, like a panel study, consists of a group of experts that discuss particular 
issues through a structured procedure to arrive at a final decision. However, unlike panel 
study, the group members are physically present in meetings and know each other, and group 
discussions are oral, not in written form. A facilitator usually leads these meetings and tries 
to get all the experts involved in discussions so they arrive at proper solutions for the problems 
raised (Flynn et al., 1990). Since focus groups match the same topics as panel studies, it too 
was not an appropriate method for this study’s research questions. 
4.3.5  Survey 
Arguably, survey design is one of the most popular and common methods used in 
construction management research (Dainty, 2008). Surveys are usually associated with a 
deductive approach and are most frequently used to answer who, what, where, how much, and 
how many questions (Saunders et al., 2009). Survey is probably the best method available for 
collecting original data to study a large population (Babbie, 2013). The main reason for its 
popularity is its ability to collect a large amount of data from a sizeable population in a cost-
efficient way and in a short time. Survey questionnaires, in particular, can increase the amount 
of responses by providing anonymity and privacy to the respondents. By standardizing the 
data gathered, it may also facilitate comparison. Furthermore, compared to other methods, its 
results are easy to explain and understand. Sampling makes it possible to study particular 
relationships between variables in a small portion of a vast population, develop models of 
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these relationships, and then generalize the representative models to the whole population. 
However, despite its noticeable advantages, survey also has some considerable disadvantages; 
by applying standardized questionnaire items, the data collected from a survey questionnaire 
is cross-sectional with little information about the dynamic relationships between variables 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Moreover, survey is subject to various biases such as response bias 
(Babbie, 2013; Alan Bryman, 2012).  
Since the aim of this research is to compare the effects of governance mechanisms in 
client-contractor relationships within two culturally and legally contrasting contexts, this 
study has adopted the survey approach. As noted before, survey design is appropriate for 
deductive research and can generalize findings through hypothesis testing. The validity threats 
associated with survey design are addressed in detail in the survey administration section. 
4.4 Selecting the data collection method 
As discussed in the research design section, this study differentiates between research 
design and research tactics. While the former referred to the structure of the research, the latter 
is concerned with the appropriateness of techniques for collecting or analyzing research data. 
As explained in the previous section, survey was selected as the research design for this 
study, so in this section, I overview common techniques that are usable in survey design for 
data collection, and then explain the logic behind choosing questionnaire as a desired 
technique.  
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4.4.1 Historical archive analysis 
Unobtrusive measures, including physical traces and archives (Bouchard, 1976), are 
used for historical archive analysis (Flynn et al., 1990), and since the providers of the research 
data are not aware of observation, archival data are usually unbiased. However, having no 
control over the environment may limit researcher’s access to the desired data set, which is 
why they usually use archival analysis in conjunction with survey, panel study, or case study 
design, to triangulate the collected data with historical factual data from respondents (Flynn 
et al., 1990).  
In this study I collected data about the history of relationships between clients and 
contractors in large construction projects and the impact of different governance mechanisms 
on exchange performance. Since the samples in Iran and Australia were large and dispersed, 
and most of the data about surveyed projects were not publicly available, I did not use 
historical archive data.  
4.4.2 Participant observation 
In this method the observers become part of the working process to directly monitor the 
actions or interactions between participants, and collect the desired data. This technique is 
very effective when building theories and formulating hypotheses, because the participants 
are usually aware of being observed, even though their awareness may affect their behavior. 
Participant observation is a proper data collection technique in case study and panel study 
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design (Flynn et al., 1990), and since I used survey design to collect more data in the study, 
participant observation was not an appropriate method for this research.  
4.4.3 Interviews 
Dainty (2008) reported that conducting interviews was one of the most common 
techniques used in case studies in the construction management field because it does not mean 
only talking with participants and taking notes; rather, the researcher should have a specific 
design to conduct a structured interview without sacrificing the richness of conversations. In 
a structured interview the researcher prepares a script which specifies the key questions, and 
while they should be followed, other questions can also be asked based on the direction of the 
conversation (Flynn et al., 1990). By conducting face to face interviews, the researcher can be 
confident about the response rate and also mitigate the risk of having too many unanswered 
questions and missing values. Interviews are effective and suitable ways to study complicated 
research subjects that require thorough consideration and deep analysis or need clarification 
of the questions or terminologies used. Moreover, interviewers can observe the respondents’ 
behavior during Q&A that may help them to understand the context and refine their questions 
to obtain the best answer(s). This observation can also contribute to the research by providing 
some contextual information (Babbie, 2013). Despite the benefits of this technique, the 
drawbacks are also considerable. For example, it would be very costly and time consuming to 
collect data through interviews if the research needs to treat a large sample; so too would 
having to transfer interviews to manuscripts and find patterns of data in the text. Therefore, 
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the best option for using the interview technique is within case study design that deals with 
limited cases and individuals which is not the case in this research. 
4.4.4 Questionnaires 
As Dainty (2008) reported, questionnaire has been one of the most popular data 
collection techniques in the construction management field. Indeed, self-administered 
questionnaires are generally faster and more cost efficient than face to face interviews, which 
makes it an ideal method for a research student with limitations in time and budget. Moreover, 
unlike other methods such as observations or interviews which need the researcher to be 
present at the site, a questionnaire survey at the national or even cross-national level can be 
undertaken at about the same costs as a local survey without taking a trip or even making a 
call. Moreover, it needs less administrative work, takes less time, and requires fewer staff 
members. Furthermore, respondents sometimes feel uncomfortable having to respond to 
controversial or personal questions in interviews, but are happy to fill in an anonymous self-
administered questionnaire (Babbie, 2013). 
For these reasons, questionnaire is the preferred method for collecting cross-national 
data within Iran and Australia. In addition, there is a large body of literature on IORs 
governance with sophisticated definitions of key constructs and validated instruments for 
measuring the constructs, and therefore the questionnaire survey was used to collect field data 
to test the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter.  
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4.5 Cross-sectional vs. longitudinal study 
So far I have addressed the research design and the research method, and I will now 
establish the framework of my research by considering the two time related options that are 
available, i.e., a cross-sectional study or a longitudinal study. 
In cross-sectional studies a researcher samples a population at one point in time, whereas 
in longitudinal studies, sampling is extended over period of time or multiple snapshots of the 
time. Although longitudinal study is the best way to study changes over time, it is more 
difficult for quantitative studies such as large scale surveys (Babbie, 2013). O'Sullivan and 
Rassel (1994) argued that cross-sectional studies are better for collecting data on many 
variables, from a large group of subjects, and from subjects which are geographically 
dispersed. 
A longitudinal study of large samples of construction projects requires resources and 
time commitments beyond my PhD study, so due to the limitations associated with PhD 
research in terms of time, cost, and scope of the study, I conducted a cross-sectional study.  
4.6 Focus of study 
Cross-cultural studies are becoming increasingly important in different disciplines, 
particularly in the field of construction management (Chan & Tse, 2003). These studies 
generally have two main purposes: (1) to extend the generalization of implications across 
borders, and (2) to identify cultural differences regarding phenomena and relationships (Hult 
et al., 2008; Mintu, Calantone, & Gassenheimer, 1995). Although scholars such as Marsh 
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(1967) believe that comparative sociology should be considered as a separate field because its 
data and objectives are different from studies that focus on a single society, others argue that 
comparison is a generic aspect of human thought and has nothing to do with research 
methodology (Lewis, 1955; Neuman, 2000; Warwick & Osherson, 1973). They believe the 
only thing that differs between the comparative and non-comparative wings of social science 
is the range of variations considered in each view, or the types of problems addressed.  
By its very nature, comparison is the process of finding and studying similarities and 
differences among phenomena (Warwick & Osherson, 1973). As explained by Warwick and 
Osherson (1973), a comparative approach refers to social scientific analyses where 
observations are extended to more than one social system, or in the same social system at 
more than one point in time. Unlike single-study research that analyzes differences between 
different cases while explaining the covariation of one variable with another, comparative 
research examines patterns of similarities and differences across cases in different social 
contexts and tries to come to terms with their diversity (Neuman, 2000; Ragin, 1987).  
A comparative study may also reveal weaknesses in research design and can improve 
its quality by improving measurement and conceptualization by incorporating several 
viewpoints from different social contexts and various cultures. Hidden biases, assumptions, 
and values can be discovered by considering a wider range of events or behavior in multi-
cultural settings. Moreover, it can change or give alternative explanations for causal 
relationships, indeed, through comparative research, new questions may also be raised that 
lead to new theory building (Neuman, 2000). 
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Despite these advantages, comparative studies do have some disadvantages: it is more 
difficult, more costly, and more time consuming than non-comparative research, and it has 
problems with the types of data that can be collected and the equivalency of collected data 
(Neuman, 2000). 
Kohn (1987) identified four types of comparative research, that included: (1) case-study 
comparative research, (2) cultural-context research, (3) cross-national research, and (4) 
transactional research.  
In case-study comparative research, the idea is to compare particular societies or 
cultures, but not for broad generalizations, where the researcher examines a small number of 
cases in depth, in order to identify trivial differences (Ragin, 1987). Another type of 
comparative research is cultural-context research where the researcher studies cases that 
represent particular types of societies or cultural units (Neuman, 2000). In yet another type of 
comparative research the nation is the unit of analysis and variations in unique features across 
nations are measured. Cross-national researchers need to study at least 30 nations for the 
purpose of statistical analysis. The final form of comparative research is transactional research 
where the focus moves from isolated units to multi-nation units, as blocs of nations.  
In this study, the efficacy of different governance mechanisms in two culturally and 
legally different environments is examined and the results are compared to determine whether 
these contextual factors make any difference. For that reason, the second comparative 
design—cultural-context research—was used to study two sets of data from two different 
countries, representing countries with individualistic/collectivistic cultures and high/low 
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contract enforceability. This comparative study provided the opportunity to find similarities 
and differences in two contexts. 
4.7 Sampling frame 
In this part the reasons for choosing the research cases, unit of analysis and survey 
respondents are introduced. 
4.7.1 Case selection 
As discussed in previous chapters, one of the objectives of this research is to examine 
the impact of individualistic/collectivistic cultures and contract enforceability on the choice 
and effects of governance mechanisms. To achieve this objective, this study analyzed the 
contributions made by various governance mechanisms on exchange performance in two 
culturally and legally diverse environments.  
Regarding culture, while Iran has an IDV of 41 and is considered to be a collectivistic 
society, Australia, with an IDV of 90, is recognized as a highly individualistic culture 
(Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010). With regard to the contract enforceability, I used 
World Bank’s data on WGI. According to the data for the period between 2002 and 2012, 
Iran’s average score on the ‘rule of law’ was 23, and the average score for Australia was 96 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2013) which means these cases represent two contrasting 
contexts as far as their cultural and legal characteristics are concerned. Furthermore, 
replicating the survey in two distinct institutional contexts reduces the risk of random test and 
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provides an opportunity to investigate the boundary conditions and the ability to generalize 
the findings (Hubbard, Vetter, & Little, 1998; Sakhdari, 2014). Finally, since I, as the 
researcher, was studying in Australia and my home country is Iran, ‘convenience’ and 
‘familiarity’ were two other reasons for selecting Iran and Australia as research cases (Yin, 
2009). 
4.7.2 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis refers to the basic unit which is examined within the sample to 
create a summary description of all such units, and to explain variations between them 
(Babbie, 2013). Depending on the research questions, individuals, groups, organizations, 
projects, or social interactions can be used as the unit of analysis (Babbie, 2013; Flynn et al., 
1990). The unit of analysis in IORs governance studies are generally inter-organizational 
relationships between exchange partners (Woolthuis, Hillebrand, & Nooteboom, 2005), 
because all the transactions occur in bi-lateral relationships and contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms are applied to regulate these relationships. However, the choice of 
governance arrangements not only depend on the history of relationships between exchange 
partners, it is also motivated by characteristics of transactions (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; 
Williamson, 1979). Since this study has set out to analyze the choice and effects of governance 
mechanisms in regulating client-contractor relationships in large construction projects, the 
client-contractor relationships embedded in projects are the units of analysis. In this study 
large construction projects were treated as sets of transactions (Pryke & Pearson, 2006) to 
identify the effects of governance mechanisms on project performance.  
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4.7.3  Selection of survey respondents 
To collect data large construction contractors were approached because: (1) Contractors 
play a key role in large construction projects (Eccles, 1981) and as a result are more focused 
on the project, (2) Clients in large construction projects are generally publicly owned and are 
not as professional at project business as the contractors, (3) Contractor companies are more 
identifiable and approachable, (4) Regarding the sampling issue, there are more public data 
available about the population of contractor companies, and (5) Since large construction 
companies usually undertake large construction projects, there is more chance to acquire data 
about large construction projects.  
To identify a sample of large construction contractors in Iran, government directories of 
construction companies in five branches of the construction industry, including Building, 
Water, Transportation, Power, and Oil & Gas were analyzed. Since the focus of this study was 
on large construction projects, the sample was limited to contractors that hold tier 1 and tier 2 
grades in the fields mentioned previously. In these fields there are generally 5 professional 
grades, with each contractor starting from level 5, and with specific limitations on the size and 
number of projects they are allowed to undertake, after which they can  apply for higher levels 
based on their increased capabilities and records of project implementation.  Holders of tier 1 
and tier 2 grades are very large companies usually able to handle mega projects. Based on the 
government database, there were 365 construction contractors holding tier 1 or tier 2 grades 
in the nominated fields, so they were selected as samples from Iran.  
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In Australia, contractors were sampled based on two popular listings of top construction 
companies; namely the Australian Constructors Association (ACA) and Australian Industry 
Group. Accordingly, 56 companies and their state subsidiaries (241 in total) were selected for 
data collection.  
To obtain the data required executive/project managers in the nominated companies 
were approached. The respondents should have been involved in large construction projects, 
but to ensure they were knowledgeable about project and relationship characteristics, I 
included guidelines in the questionnaire explaining the conditions for taking part (See 
Appendix C). The respondents were requested to provide data about a recently completed 
construction project (completed during last 3 years or with at least 80% progress to date) with 
a total contract value of more than AU$5 M.  
In the following section, the process undertaken for survey administration is explained. 
4.8 Survey Administration 
There were two consecutive phases through which questionnaire survey was conducted 
and data was collected: (1) survey preparation, and (2) survey implementation. The following 
paragraphs describe the process through which these two phases were implemented in this 
study.  
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4.8.1 Survey preparation 
To collect data, a structured questionnaire was designed based on a review of previous 
empirical studies to capture the perception of practitioners with experience in large 
construction projects.  
4.8.1.1 Measurement considerations  
Measurement is an underlying concept in conducting a questionnaire survey. Basically, 
measurement is the process of allocating numbers to a variable based on a set of rules (Hair, 
Celsi, Money, Samouel, & Page, 2011; Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). To measure a 
concept (often referred to as an operational definition) it is necessary to have an indicator or 
indicators that represent the concept (Alan Bryman, 2012). Although operationalization is 
very straightforward for some concepts such as age or level of education, it is much more 
difficult for variables such as trust or performance, so where the concept is abstract, complex, 
and not directly observable, latent (unobservable) variables or constructs are applied (Hair et 
al., 2014). Latent variables are theoretical creations based on observations that cannot be 
observed directly or indirectly and must be inferred from measurable or observable indicators 
(manifest variables) (Babbie, 2013; Polites, Roberts, & Thatcher, 2012). Each of these 
indicators that serve as proxy variables would represent a single separate aspect of a larger 
abstract concept (Hair et al., 2014).   
The conceptual model presented in the previous chapter (Figure 3–1) consists of latent 
variables such as Formal Contract (FC), Social Capital (SC), Collaboration (CL), Project 
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Control Capability (PC), Project (time&cost) Performance (PP), Relationship Satisfaction 
(RS), and Project Size (PS). As advised by Diamantopoulos, Sarstedt, Fuchs, Wilczynski, and 
Kaiser (2012), all the main constructs in this study were measured using multiple items (as 
opposed to single-item measures). In such cases, several measures of multiple items were 
combined to form a single composite score for the latent variable. Using several individual 
indicators to measure an abstract concept made it more likely to capture all the different 
aspects of the concept, so the measure would be more accurate (Hair et al., 2014). That is, it 
reduced measurement error which is the difference between the true value of a variable and 
the value obtained by a measurement. This form of design accommodates the research 
approach by allowing constructs to be represented by a combination of variables that can be 
measured. 
The second issue in developing a measurement instrument is the measurement scale. A 
measurement scale is “a tool with a predetermined number of closed-ended responses that can 
be used to obtain an answer to a question” (Hair et al., 2014, p. 7). Measurement scales are 
categorized into four different types, including nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. Each of 
these scales represents a different level of measurement (Babbie et al., 2013; Hair et al., 2014). 
Nominal scales are the lowest level of scales because they restrict the analysis options by 
assigning names or numbers to variables that enable us to identify or classify those variables 
(e.g. industries, companies, people, etc.). These scales can be composed of several categories, 
but they should all be mutually exclusive. The ordinal scale is the next higher level of scale 
that arranges attributes of variables in some order: from low to high, from more to less, and 
so on, with the result being they add the quality of rank ordering to the measured variables 
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(Babbie et al., 2013). However, these ranked values are not based on equal differences 
between variables, so the means or variances for ordinal data cannot be calculated. The 
interval scale is the next measurement scale, and it not only gives the same ranking capability 
as an ordinal scale, it also provides precise information on the distances between the attributes 
of variables by capturing the differences in values. This precision in distances is necessary for 
having so-called ‘equidistance’ scales that are needed for certain analysis techniques such as 
structural equation modeling (SEM) (Hair et al., 2014).  Although interval scale enables the 
researcher to carry out almost any type of mathematical computations, including the mean and 
standard deviation, it does not provide the absolute zero point, and therefore the value of zero 
in an interval scale does not mean there is no value (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011). To include this 
information in measurement, the ratio scale should be used that is at the highest level of 
measurement (Hair et al., 2014).  
After choosing the scales to measure the indicators and constructs, the next thing that 
should become clear is the coding style. Coding is about assigning numbers to categories in a 
way that facilitates measurement (Hair et al., 2014). Coding is a critical issue in the application 
of multivariate analysis; for instance when Likert scales (which are very popular in 
questionnaire surveys) are used in a research, it is necessary to code the categories so they are 
symmetric and equidistant. After fulfilling this requirement the outcome values can be treated 
as the results of interval scale. This means that while the Likert scale is ordinal, it can 
approximate an interval-level measurement and the corresponding variables can be used in 
multivariate analysis (Hair et al., 2014).  
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The measurement scale and coding style applied in this study are described in the 
following paragraphs. The next part also shows the construction of the designed questionnaire.  
4.8.1.2  Questionnaire construction 
The questionnaire consists of several sections. In section one, the respondents were 
asked to give some general information about the project such as the project field, total 
planned budget, and total planned duration. The project field was defined as a nominal 
variable and the respondents were given five categories of projects, including building, water, 
transportation, power, and oil & gas to assign the nominated project to the most relevant field. 
The total planned budget and total planned duration were defined as ordinal variables. The 
defined order for total planned budget was: AUD5-10, AUD10-50, AUD50-100, AUD100-
500, AUD500-1000, and More than AUD1000. Similarly, the order for total planned duration 
was defined as: Less than 12 months, 12-18 months, 18-24 months, 24-36 months, 36-48 
months, and more than 48 months. The total planned budget and total planned duration were 
used as two indicators of the Project Size (PS). PS was used as a control variable in the model. 
PC was measured by seven items from which 5 items were adopted from Kirsch et al. (2010) 
and 2 items were developed as new scales. All the items related to PC construct were defined 
as ordinal variables to arrange different attributes of the construct in order. These items were 
rated on a seven point Likert scale (1= Strongly disagree, 7= Strongly agree). 
In the second section, respondents were asked to describe the social ties embedded 
within the client-contractor relationships. Social Capital (SC) was used as a second-order 
construct that consisted of Prior Ties (PT), Shared Norms (SN), and Trust (TR). This construct 
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reflected the level of social capital between partners that had accumulated by recurring 
interactions through past collaborations. PT was measured by two indicators adopted from 
Zhang et al. (2009), that reflected previous collaborations between partners. SN was measured 
by three indicators adopted from the work of Y. Li et al. (2010), that reflected  the extent of 
shared goals and values among partners. To measure TR, three items were obtained from 
Şengün and Wasti (2009) that showed the extent to which past collaborations convinced the 
firm to believe that its partner was honest and benevolent (Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 
1995). As with items in the previous section, the items included in SC were defined as ordinal 
variables and were rated on a seven point Likert scale (1= Strongly disagree, 7= Strongly 
agree). 
The third section of the questionnaire was devoted to measuring the degree to which 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms were used to regulate client-contractor 
relationships within the current project. Collaboration (CL) was operationalized using six 
items adopted from Selnes and Sallis (2003), Zhang et al. (2009),Yang et al. (2011), and Luo 
et al. (2011). This construct refers to the mechanisms that were deployed in the current project 
to enrich relational ties and promote a trusting environment between the partners. The next 
construct measured in this section of the questionnaire was FC that referred to the legal bonds 
established within partners’ relationships to specify the responsibilities and rights of both 
parties and consider contingencies that might emerge in the future. To measure the reliance of 
parties on Formal Contract (FC), five items were obtained from Zhang et al. (2009) and Y. Li 
et al. (2010). The questions in this section were also defined as ordinal variables and rated on 
a seven point Likert scale (1= Strongly disagree, 7= Strongly agree). 
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In the fourth section of the questionnaire, exchange performance was measured. 
Following Lui and Ngo (2004) and Jin et al. (2007), this study differentiated between Project 
(time&cost) Performance (PP) and Relationship Satisfaction (RS) because where the former 
referred the extent to which the project was successfully implemented and met its planned 
time and cost objectives, the latter measured the partners’ satisfaction with their cooperation 
and their hope for future collaborations. RS was operationalized using four items adopted 
from Saxton (1997), while the indicators were defined as ordinal variables and rated on a 
seven point Likert scale (1= Strongly disagree, 7= Strongly agree). To measure PP, two types 
of questions were developed; in the first the respondents were asked to rate the time and cost 
performance of the project compared to similar projects in the field. These questions were 
rated on a seven point Likert scale (1= Very poor to 7= Excellent). In the second part the 
respondents were asked to choose whether the project had been progressed, or finished ahead 
of schedule, on schedule, or behind schedule. For this question, a nine point Likert scale was 
used (1= Behind the schedule (+100%), 2= Behind the schedule (50%-100%), 3= Behind the 
schedule (25%-50%), 4= Behind the schedule (0-25%), 5= On schedule, 6= Ahead of schedule 
(0-25%), 7= Ahead of schedule (25%-50%), 8= Ahead of schedule (50%-100%), 9= Ahead 
of schedule (+100%)). Similarly, they should declare the cost performance of the project by 
specifying whether the final cost of the project was below the planned budget, on budget, or 
above the budget. This item was also measured by a nine-point Likert scale (1= Above the 
budget (+100%), 2= Above the budget (50%-100%), 3= Above the budget (25%-50%), 4= 
Above the budget (0-25%), 5= On-budget, 6= Below the budget (0-25%), 7= Below the 
budget (25%-50%), 8= Below the budget (50%-100%), 9= Below the budget (+100%)).  
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The final section of the questionnaire asks about some background information of the 
respondents such as their designation in the company or project, their experience in the 
construction industry, their age, and their level of education. A summary of the measured  
items is listed in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1 : Measurement items 
Constructs and indicators Source  
Project Control Capability (PC): 
PC1: It was possible to check the project team’s progress towards project goals 
through formal reviews and reports. 
PC2: It was possible to monitor how well the project team was meeting project goals. 
PC3: It was possible for us to determine whether the project team built a product (or 
deliverable) that satisfied the users’ requirements. 
PC4: There were quantifiable measures of the extent to which project cost targets were 
achieved. 
PC5: It was possible for us to determine whether the project team completed the 
project work on time.  
PC6: There was a well-understood way to carry out project tasks. 
PC7: The project team had substantive experience with this type of project. 
 
(Kirsch et al., 
2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New scale 
Social Capital (SC): 
Prior Ties (PT) 
PT1: Before this project, we had extensive collaboration with this partner on other 
projects. 
PT2: It has always been pleasant during our collaboration. 
Shared Norms (SN) 
SN1: Both organisations had a mutual understanding of each others organisational 
culture, values, and operations. 
SN2: Both organisations had a common vision and ambition for the cooperative 
venture. 
SN3: A comprehensive set of norms of action was well developed in the cooperation. 
Trust (TR) 
TR1: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been evenhanded in its 
negotiations with us. 
TR2: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been an excellent source of 
accurate information. 
TR3: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been reliable. 
 
(Zhang et al., 
2009) 
 
 
(Y. Li et al., 
2010), 
 
 
 
 
(Şengün & 
Wasti, 2009) 
Collaboration (CL): 
CL1: The two sides exchanged information on changes related to organisations’ 
strategies and policies.  
CL2: The two sides exchanged information on successful and unsuccessful 
experiences. 
CL3: The two sides have been communicating with each other via frequent interaction 
and informal socialization. 
CL4: The two sides agreed to effectively do things for each other. 
CL5: The two sides agreed to work together to resolve the problems caused by 
whichever party. 
CL6: The two sides have been communicating with each other about events and 
changes that would affect collaboration. 
(Luo et al., 
2011), (Selnes & 
Sallis, 2003), 
(Yang et al., 
2011), (Zhang et 
al., 2009) 
Formal Contracts (FC): 
FC1: Generally, the contract was the primary mechanism to regulate the behavior of 
the partner in cooperation. 
FC2: In our contract with our partner we defined project targets in detail. 
FC3: There were well-specified responsibilities and rights for each partner. 
FC4: There were explicitly prescribed institutions and measures to resolve the disputes 
and conflicts between partners. 
FC5: Each partner considered the contingencies that might emerge in the future at its 
best and made an exhaustive explanation in the contract. 
(Y. Li et al., 
2010), (Zhang et 
al., 2009) 
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Table 4-1 : Measurement items (Cont.) 
Constructs and indicators Source  
Relationship Satisfaction (RS): 
RS1: This cooperation contributed to our core competencies and competitive 
advantage. 
RS2: This cooperation realised the objectives we set out to achieve. 
RS3: This cooperation improved our relationship and increased the likelihood of 
working together in the future. 
RS4: Overall, we were satisfied with the performance of this cooperation.  
 
(Saxton, 1997) 
 
 
 
 
Project (time&cost) Performance (PP): 
PP1: Project time performance (comparing to similar projects in the field) 
PP2. Project cost performance (comparing to similar projects in the field) 
PP3: Project time performance against the planned schedule 
PP4: Project cost performance against the planned budget 
- 
Project Size (PS): 
PS1: Total planned budget (Million AUD) 
PS2: Total planned duration (Months) 
- 
 
4.8.1.3  Translation procedure 
One of the key challenges that researchers must address with cross-national studies is 
data equivalency among different cultures (T. Peng, Peterson, & Shyi, 1991), that is, when  
developing instruments to measure indicators, several types of equivalences should be 
considered, such as vocabulary, or a translation that is equivalent to the original language in 
which the instrument was developed, idiomatic equivalence which could become a serious 
problem when some idioms unique to one language cannot be translated into other languages, 
grammatical and syntactical equivalence, which is especially important when translating long 
passages,  or the inferences drawn by respondents in various cultures from a given statement, 
and finally, conceptual equivalence where the meaning of certain concepts such as love may 
differ in different cultures (Sekaran, 1983). 
As Sekaran (1983) argued, every type of  equivalence mentioned generally refers to ‘the 
equivalence of source and target versions of the instrument, and usually can be ensured with 
Chapter 4: Research Design 
 
118 
 
good back translations by persons who are not only facile with the different languages in 
question but are also familiar with the cultures involved, and with the usage of the concepts 
and their meanings in the relevant cultures’. 
Accordingly, an English version of the questionnaire was developed first, translated into 
Persian and then translated back into English, according to the steps suggested by Brislin 
(1970) and Sekaran (1983). The back translated English version was then checked against the 
original English version, which was evaluated item by item for clarity, specificity, and 
representativeness. Some questions in the Persian version were reworded to improve the 
accuracy of the translation. 
4.8.1.4  Pilot testing 
Even carefully designed questionnaires can contain ambiguous or wrong questions, or 
other types of errors (Babbie, 2013), so a pilot study was carried out before conducting the 
main survey (Krosnick, 1999). Accordingly, the Persian and English versions of the 
questionnaire were distributed to 14 people, of whom 7 were asked to complete the Persian 
version and comment on it, while the others commented on the English version. These people 
were a selection of university professors, construction industry practitioners, and fellow PhD 
students from Sydney University and The University of New South Wales (UNSW). Based 
on feedback from the pilot study, some minor modifications and changes were made to the 
questionnaire and then the final draft was prepared.   
Chapter 4: Research Design 
 
119 
 
4.8.1.5 Considering ethical issues 
Ethics and the role of values in the research process are critical issues in social research 
that must be addressed. The main concerns in this respect are as follows (Alan Bryman, 2012): 
 How should we treat the people with whom we conduct research? 
 Are there activities in which we should or should not engage in our relations 
with them? 
To address these concerns, Diener and Crandall (1978) specified four main areas that 
social researchers must consider: 
1. Whether the participants will be harmed; 
2. Whether there is lack of informed consent; 
3. Whether there is an invasion of privacy; 
4. Whether deception is involved. 
Since this research was conducted at the University of Sydney, the university rules were 
followed regarding these concerns. After preparing the English and Persian versions of the 
questionnaire, an application process was undertaken via integrated research management 
application (IRMA) system to obtain ethical approval. After fulfilling the requirements raised 
by the review committee, final approvals of English and Persian versions were received by 
May 20, 2013 and October 23, 2013, respectively. Based on the rules, three sections were 
added to the beginning of the questionnaire: (1) a participation information statement; (2) a 
questionnaire guideline; and (3) a participant consent form. In the first part, the research study 
and the researchers were introduced, including information such as the estimated time to 
answer the questions, how to withdraw from the study, its potential benefits,  and contact 
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information of the researchers and the university’s Human Ethics Administration office. In 
the second part, key terms used in the questionnaire and some guidelines for answering the 
questions were introduced. The third part laid out the rights of participants and contained a 
requested for consent to participate in this research project. Finally, a covering letter 
explaining the research objectives and assuring confidentiality and access to the summary of 
our aggregated survey results was developed to be posted with the questionnaires to the 
construction companies. 
4.8.2 Survey implementation 
Data used in this study were extracted from a survey conducted between May 2013 and 
February 2014 in Australia and Iran. There are three main methods for implementing survey 
questionnaires (Babbie, 2013):  
1. A self-administered questionnaire where respondents are required to answer the 
questions on their own; 
2. Surveys administered by interviewers through face-to-face meetings; 
3. Telephone survey. 
A self-administered survey was adopted in this study because it was faster and more 
cost effective for such a cross-national study with budget and time limitations.  
Since the researcher was in Australia, two people were appointed in Iran as research 
assistants to distribute the questionnaires, follow up the respondents, collect the completed 
questionnaires, carry out data entry, and send all the data to the researcher. First, all the 
information previously acquired from 365 construction contractors (e.g. email address, 
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telephone number, postal address), including the Persian version of the questionnaire, was 
sent to the research assistants, and then the research topic and procedure for implementing the 
mail survey was explained to research assistants. The research assistants then printed 365 
copies of the questionnaires and cover letters, and posted them accompanied with reply paid 
envelopes to the managing directors of the nominated companies. In the cover letter, the 
research objectives and confidentiality of responses were explained and managing directors 
of the companies were asked to complete the questionnaires themselves or to ask one of their 
executive managers/project managers to complete them. After sending out three reminders 
(e.g. telephone calls, emails), 95 questionnaires were returned, of which 84 were valid and 
complete, giving a response rate of 23%. To make sure that there was no duplicated data, the 
project characteristics in data sets, including the size of the company, project field, and 
planned budget and duration, as well as time and cost performance of the project were checked 
and no duplications were found. 
The same processes took place in Australia, where 241 questionnaires were sent to 56 
companies and their state subsidiaries. 49 questionnaires were returned, of which 42 were 
complete. Each questionnaire was checked for duplication, and data on two projects appeared 
to be identical, and indeed, it was found that data had been provided by the project director 
and project manager for the same project; consequently, the data received from the project 
director was kept, whilst the other was removed from the database. No other identical 
characteristics were found in collected dataset, which confirmed there were no repeated 
projects. As a result, 41 unique responses remained for further analysis, giving a response rate 
of 17%.   
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The response rate from both countries was reasonable compared to the normal rate in 
construction industry (Li, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005; Ning, Yean, & Ling, 2013) 
and also for surveys mailed to top managers (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993; 
Lui, 2009). Although the responses were relatively low in Australia, a statistical analysis could 
still be performed based on the central limit theorem that holds true if the sample size is more 
than 30 (Field, 2013; Ott & Longnecker, 2001).  
Table 4-2 summarizes the respondents’ background and shows that 69% of respondents 
came from the Iranian sample and 78% of respondents in the Australian sample were from 
top managers from construction companies or in projects. The data also indicated that more 
than 80% of the respondents in both samples were highly experienced (with more than 10 
years working experience in the construction industry).  
Table 4-3  is a profile of the projects surveyed in Iran and Australia, and shows that in 
both samples, the planned budget in about one third of the projects exceeded AU$100 million. 
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Table 4-2 : A summary of respondents’ background information 
Profile items  Iran Australia 
Number  
 
% 
 
Number % 
Designation 
of 
respondent 
- Company top managers (e.g. managing director, 
general manager, state manager) 
- Company middle managers (e.g. business support 
manager, commercial manager) 
- Project top managers (e.g. project director, project 
manager, construction manager, site manager) 
- Project middle managers (e.g. project engineer, project 
risk manager, earthworks construction manager) 
- Not specified 
31  
 
14  
 
27 
 
6 
 
6  
37 
 
17 
 
32 
 
7 
 
7 
4  
 
4  
 
28  
 
4  
 
1  
10 
 
10 
 
68 
 
10 
 
2 
Experience 
(years) 
< 5  
5-10  
10-20  
20-30  
> 30  
3 
10  
33  
25  
13 
4 
12 
39 
30 
15 
2  
6  
7  
14 
12 
5 
15 
17 
34 
29 
Age (years) 25-30 
30-40 
40-50 
50-60 
> 60  
3  
31 
23 
17  
10  
4 
37 
27 
20 
12 
3  
7  
15 
14 
2  
7 
17 
37 
34 
5 
Education High school 
Diploma 
Bachelor 
Masters/ Honors 
PhD 
Not Specified 
0  
1  
39 
36 
7  
1  
0  
1  
47 
43 
8 
1 
1  
6  
23 
10 
1  
0  
2 
15 
56 
24 
2 
0  
Table 4-3 : Profile of the surveyed projects 
  Iran Australia 
Number % Number % 
Field Building 
Water 
Transportation 
Power 
Oil & Gas  
Others 
24 
8 
17 
8 
27 
0 
28 
10 
20 
10 
32 
0 
22 
7 
8 
0 
2 
2 
54 
17 
19 
0 
5 
5 
Planned budget 
(Million AUD) 
5-10 
10-50 
50-100 
100-500 
500-1000 
> 1000  
18 
38 
5 
13 
5 
5 
21 
45 
6 
16 
6 
6 
7 
14 
3 
11 
4 
2 
17 
34 
7 
27 
10 
5 
Planned duration 
(Months) 
< 12  
12-18 
18-24 
24-36 
36-48 
> 48 
5 
16 
23 
23 
8 
9 
6 
19 
27 
27 
10 
11 
4 
12 
13 
5 
3 
4 
10 
29 
32 
12 
7 
10 
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4.8.2.1 Considering the non-response bias 
As Armstrong and Overton (1977) recommended, a potential non-response bias was 
assessed by analyzing the equality of variances and the means of two representative indicators, 
i.e., the age of the company and the field of the nominated project between early and late 
responses. Accordingly, the data from each country was split into two parts based on the 
response date. For instance, in the Australian case, the first and last questionnaires were 
received on May 27, 2013 and January 27, 2014, so all the data received in first four months 
were coded as 1 and later responses were coded as 2, after which an independent t-test was 
carried out in SPSS Software version 21. As Field (2013) explained, Leven’s test was to 
analyze whether the variances were different in various groups, so if the Leven’s test was not 
significant at p>0.05, an assumption about the homogeneity of variances in two groups was 
approved, otherwise this assumption was violated. In former conditions (p>0.05), the test 
statistics from the row labeled Equal variances assumed should be read, whereas, in later 
situations, the row labeled Equal variances not assumed would be considered to check the 
equality of means. Consequently, the two-tailed values of p should be checked for equality of 
means. That is, if the p value was greater than 0.05, there was no significant difference 
between the means of the two groups and as a result, there was no bias in the responses (Field, 
2013).  
Table 4-4 through Table 4-7 show the results for the Iranian and Australian samples; 
Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 indicate that Leven’s tests and t-tests for the samples in Iran and 
Australia found no significant difference between the two groups (early and late respondents), 
suggesting there was almost no threat of a non-response bias.  
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Table 4-4 :Group statistics for early and late respondents (Iran)  
 Response date N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
AGE 1.00 65 4.3538 1.06699 .13234 2.00 19 4.3684 1.30002 .29825 
FLD 1.00 65 2.9846 1.59582 .19794 2.00 19 3.3684 1.73879 .39891 
 
Table 4-5 : Group statistics for early and late respondents (Australia) 
 Response date N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
AGE 1.00 25 4.6000 1.11803 .22361 2.00 16 4.8667 .51640 .13333 
FLD 1.00 25 2.0000 1.22474 .24495 2.00 16 1.5000 .81650 .20412 
 
Table 4-6 : Independent sample test for considering non-response bias (Iran) 
 Leven's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
AGE 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.102 .750 -.050 82 .960 -.01457 .29269 -.59684 .56769 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  -.045 25.508 .965 -.01457 .32629 -.68590 .65675 
FLD 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.731 .395 -.904 82 .369 -.38381 .42465 -1.22858 .46097 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  -.862 27.486 .396 -.38381 .44531 -1.29676 .52915 
 
Table 4-7 : Independent sample test for considering non-response bias (Australia) 
 Leven's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
AGE  
Equal variances 
assumed 
2.964 .093 -.867 38 .392 -.26667 .30772 -.88961 .35627 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  -1.02436.246 .312 -.26667 .26034 -.79454 .26121 
FLD 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.835 .183 1.438 39 .158 .50000 .34770 -.20330 1.20330 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  1.568 38.895 .125 .50000 .31885 -.14499 1.14499 
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4.9 Selecting the Data Analysis Method 
This section describes the methods used to analyze the survey data; different analytical 
methods are reviewed and then the reasons for adopting PLS-SEM is given, followed by an 
explanation of the systematic procedure used to conduct PLS-SEM.   
4.9.1 Multivariate analysis methods 
There are two general categories of statistical methods for analyzing the relationships 
between multiple variables, namely first generation and second generation techniques 
(Fornell, 1982; Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004; Hair et al., 2014). Although first generation 
techniques have been the dominant tools used by social science scholars to develop and 
confirm their research findings (Fornell, 1982), since the early 1990s second generation 
methods have increasingly been applied. This increase has been very significant in some 
disciplines because almost 50% of empirical studies have applied these methods for statistical 
analysis (Hair et al., 2014). Scholars have increasingly been turning to second generation 
techniques to overcome the weaknesses of first generation methods. As Table 4-8 shows, first 
generation methods not only include approaches such as multiple regression, logistical 
regression, and analysis of variance, they also embrace techniques such as exploratory factor 
analysis, cluster analysis, and multi-dimensional scaling. These statistical analysis methods 
can be applied to both exploratory and confirmatory studies, that is, they can be used as 
confirmatory tools to test the hypotheses of existing theories and concepts, and to exploratory 
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research where there is little or no prior knowledge of the relationships between variables and 
the researcher is looking for latent patterns of relationships in the data (Hair et al., 2014).  
Table 4-8 : Classification of multivariate methods 
First-generation techniques Second-generation techniques 
 Cluster analysis 
 Exploratory factor analysis 
 Multidimensional scaling 
 Analysis of variance 
 Logistic regression 
 Multiple regression 
 Confirmatory factor analysis 
 CB-SEM  
 PLS-SEM 
Despite these capabilities, first generation methods have three limitations (Haenlein & 
Kaplan, 2004): 
1. The postulation of a simple model structure (at least in the case of regression-
based approaches); 
2. The assumption that all variables can be considered as observable (not able to 
manage latent variables measured indirectly by indicator variables); 
3. The conjecture that all variables are measured without error, which may limit 
their applicability in some research situations. 
Regarding the first limitation, Jacoby (1978, p. 91) stated that “we live in a complex, 
multivariate world [and that] studying the impact of one of two variables in isolation, would 
seem … relatively artificial and inconsequential”. Although building a research model is 
always associated with ignoring some aspect of reality (Shugan, 2002), regression-based 
assumptions may be too limiting for an analysis within more complex and more realistic 
situations (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004). This limitation would be more critical when researchers 
look for mediation or moderation effects of one or more variables on the relationships between 
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dependent and independent variables because it may result in finding some dependent 
variables influencing other dependent variables (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004).  
With respect to the assumption of first-order methods about the observability of all 
variables, McDonald (1996, p. 239) emphasized that a variable can be called observable “if 
and only if its value can be obtained by means of a real-world sampling experiment”. 
Accordingly, any variable that cannot be represented by an observable object must be 
considered as unobservable (Babbie, 2013; Dijkstra, 1983). Therefore, it is obvious that only 
a handful of variables (e.g. age, gender) can be observed directly and can be considered as 
observable variables, whereas the effects and properties of some concepts such as trust, 
performance, or satisfaction are usually observed only indirectly through other observable 
variables (Babbie, 2013; Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004).  
The third assumption with first-generation methods was about ignoring errors when 
measuring variables, but when considering different types of errors associated with each 
observation within the real world, this conjecture appears to be unrealistic. According to 
Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips (1991), each observation in this world is accompanied by  at least 
two types of errors, namely, random error and systematic error. While random error is usually 
caused by the order of items in a questionnaire or respondent fatigue (Heeler & Ray, 1972), 
systematic error originates from biases in measurement (e.g. method variance in which 
variance is attributed to the measurement method rather than the construct of interest) 
(Bagozzi et al., 1991).  
Consequently, structural equation modeling (SEM) techniques have been introduced as 
second generation methods to overcome these limitations. SEM techniques can 
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simultaneously model relationships between multiple independent and dependent constructs 
(Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000; Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004). As a result, SEM terminology 
no longer uses the terms dependent and independent variables, it has introduced new terms 
called exogenous and endogenous latent variables. While the former refers to variables which 
are not explained by the proposed model (i.e. always act as independent variables), the latter 
represents variables that are explained by the relationships postulated in the model 
(Diamantopoulos, 1994).  
Furthermore, SEM methods enable the researcher to incorporate unobservable variables 
(also called latent variables, or constructs) measured by indicator variables (also called items, 
manifest variables, or observed measures), whilst including the measurement error for the 
observed variables (Chin, 1998; Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004; Hair et al., 2014; Polites et al., 
2012).  
Given the advantages of second generation methods, this study chose SEM methods. In 
the following paragraphs, different SEM approaches are analyzed and the method most 
relevant to this study will be selected. 
4.9.2 Structural equation modeling (SEM) methods 
Based on their approach to estimating the parameters of a structural model, SEM 
methods are generally classified into two groups: (1) covariance-based methods, and (2) 
variance-based (components-based) methods (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004; Hair et al., 2014). 
Covariance-based SEM (CB-SEM) is primarily applied in confirmatory studies to confirm or 
reject a theoretical model by determining how well the proposed model can estimate  the 
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covariance matrix for a sample data set (Hair et al., 2014), whereas, variance-based SEM such 
as the partial least squares (PLS-SEM), takes a more exploratory approach to develop theories 
by explaining the variance in the endogenous constructs within the model. That is, PLS-SEM 
estimates the path relationships in the model by using sample data to minimize the error terms 
(i.e. the residual variance) of the endogenous constructs (Hair et al., 2014). Put another way, 
PLS-SEM calculates the path coefficients to maximize the R2 values of the endogenous 
constructs.  
Not only are these two methods not competitors, but they can be considered 
complementary for different research settings because  each method may suit specific 
empirical contexts and objectives (Chin, 2010). Although the results for CB-SEM and PLS-
SEM are typically very close and PLS-SEM estimates can be good proxies of CB-SEM 
results, several conditions should be considered when choosing most appropriate option (Hair 
et al., 2014). For example, Chin (2010) identified some key issues considered in previous 
studies as justifications for the choice of PLS-SEM over CB-SEM: (1) soft distributional 
assumptions; (2) high model complexity as criterion; (3) sample size requirement; (4) 
exploratory in nature; (5) higher order molar and molecular models; (6) modeling formative 
measurement items; (7) accuracy of parameter estimation; (8) eschewing the ‘true’ model for 
prediction focus; (9) determinate scores/indices for predictive relevance (10) ease of model 
specification and model interpretation; (11) degree of emphasis on covariance explanation. 
Similarly, Ringle, Sarstedt, and Straub (2012) reviewed empirical studies where PLS-SEM 
was used as the method of analysis and were published in the MIS Quarterly journal during 
1992 and 2011. Based on the review, among the 65 studies that used PLS-SEM, the most 
Chapter 4: Research Design 
 
131 
 
frequently cited reasons for preferring PLS-SEM over CB-SEM were small sample sizes (24 
studies, 36.92%), non-normal data (22 studies, 33.85%), and the use of formatively measured 
latent variables (20 studies, 30.77%).  
Based on the empirical settings used in this study, two critical issues were considered 
(data set, model properties), as advised by (Hair et al., 2014), and consequently, PLS-SEM 
was selected for analytical purposes. In the following paragraphs, the justification for using 
PLS-SEM is highlighted by comparing CB-SEM and PLS-SEM around two issues. 
4.9.2.1 Data set 
Basically, an analysis of covariance structures is grounded in large sample theory 
(Byrne, 2010), and although efforts were made to adapt CB-SEM technique to accommodate 
small sample sizes (e.g. Nevitt & Hancock, 2004), it is still sensitive to sample size and small 
sample size reduces its statistical power (Kline, 2011). Additionally, MacCallum, Browne, 
and Sugawara (1996) argued that confidence intervals can also be seriously influenced by 
sample size. Several factors affect the optimum sample size in CB-SEM, including the number 
of measurement parameters, the type of estimation algorithm used in the analysis, the 
distributional characteristics of the data, complexity of the model, and so on (Kline, 2011; 
MacCallum et al., 1996). A typical sample size in studies where CB-SEM was used is about 
200 cases (Kline, 2011). In inter-organizational relationships (IORs) governance literature, 
the least sample size used for covariance-based SEM was found in two relevant studies 
undertaken by Zhang et al. (2009) and Fryxell, Dooley, and Vryza (2002) with samples of 124 
public-private partnership (PPP) firms and 129 international joint ventures (IJVs), 
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respectively. Unlike covariance-based SEM, PLS-SEM can handle small sample sizes (Chin, 
Marcolin, & Newsted, 2003; Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, & Mena, 2012). There have been a range 
of studies that systematically evaluated the performance of PLS-SEM with small sample sizes 
and they all concluded that it is a good choice when the sample size is small (Chin & Newsted, 
1999; Hui & Wold, 1982; Reinartz, Haenlein, & Henseler, 2009). A review of construction 
management studies related to organizational and inter-organizational issues revealed that in 
studies with small sample sizes (e.g. 41 or 51 cases) the PLS-SEM method was successfully 
applied (Aibinu, Ling, & Ofori, 2011; Lim, Ling, Ibbs, Raphael, & Ofori, 2010; Ling et al., 
2013). As explained in earlier sections, the sample size in this study was 84 and 41 for the 
Iranian and Australian data sets, respectively, so based on these explanations PLS-SEM was 
recognized as the preferred method for this study.  
Furthermore, the normality of data is another concern when using the  CB-SEM method 
because most estimation techniques used in CB-SEM require normal data in order to obtain 
reliable estimates (Shook, Ketchen, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004), which means that applying this 
method with non-normal data could result in distorted goodness-of-fit measures and 
underestimated standard errors (MacCallum, Roznowski, & Necowitz, 1992). In these 
conditions, underestimated standard errors may be accounted for significant coefficients in 
the model and result in inaccurate findings and conclusions (Hult et al., 2006). Fortunately 
PLS-SEM has no distributional assumption, so unlike CB-SEM which assumes a specific joint 
multivariate distribution and independence of observations, PLS modeling is based on 
predictor specification. Thus, not only are no restrictions imposed on the structure of the 
residual covariance, the residual variance terms are actually minimized under PLS modeling 
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(Chin, 2010). Small sample sizes are generally subjected to non-normality and need special 
considerations to fulfill normality assumptions (Field, 2013), but having said that, PLS-SEM 
becomes the preferred method in studies with small sample sizes, and therefore this study 
adopted PLS-SEM. 
4.9.2.2 Model properties 
Confidence intervals can be seriously influenced not only by sample size, but also by 
model complexity (MacCallum et al., 1996). For example, if the sample size is small and the 
number of estimated parameters is large, the confidence interval will be wide. Accordingly, 
given a complex model (i.e., a large number of estimated parameters), the CB-SEM method 
requires a very large sample size in order to obtain a reasonably narrow confidence interval, 
whereas  the PLS-SEM method is very flexible regarding model complexity. That is, PLS-
SEM can robustly estimate complex models with many latent variables and/or indicators (Hair 
et al., 2014), and since our proposed research model is complex and has a large number of 
latent variables and indicators, it is better adapted to the PLS-SEM technique. 
4.9.3 Software for undertaking PLS-SEM method 
From the early years of development and advancement of the PLS-SEM approach 
(Lohmöller, 1989; Wold, 1974), various software packages were already available for 
researchers to analyze their data. Of these many software packages such as LVPLS 
(Lohmöller, 1984), PLS-GUI (Y Li, 2005), VisualPLS (Fu, 2006), PLS-Graph (Chin, 2003), 
and SmartPLS (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005), the last one was selected for this study because 
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it was free, easy to use, and there was a book (Hair et al., 2014) that had recently been 
published and could be used as a guide for applying the software. All the steps required for 
undertaking the data analysis process were very well explained in the book, which made 
applying the smartPLS software much more reliable. There was also a forum available for 
users to share their experiences and discuss different issues raised through their analysis. 
4.10 Chapter summary 
In this chapter the whole research process and research design method has been 
described. In the research design section, the reason for selecting survey design was explained 
and the logic behind doing cross-national study was defended. Then, by considering the 
limitations associated with this study, cross-sectional study was preferred over longitudinal 
study, and afterwards, the sampling frame, including case selection, unit of analysis, and 
survey respondents were explained. In the next section, after comparing different data 
collection methods, a questionnaire was chosen as the preferred method, and the steps for 
preparing and implementing the survey were described. In the final section, the first 
generation and second generation methods for analyzing data were compared and the PLS-
SEM was selected as the most suitable method for this research. SmartPLS software package 
was also selected for analyzing the measurements and the structural models. 
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5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, PLS-SEM was selected to analyze the survey data 
in this study. The data preparation and analytical processes are outlined in Figure 5-1 and 
described below.  
 
Figure 5-1 : Process for data analysis using PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2014) 
Figure 5-1 shows that the first two stages for undertaking research using PLS-SEM 
approach are to define the structural model and measurement models to establish the path 
model. The path model is a diagram based on theory that connects different 
variables/constructs in the research model which depicts the proposed hypotheses that will be 
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tested in the study. In PLS-SEM, the path model consists of two elements: (1) the structural 
model (inner model), and (2) the measurement model (outer model). Where the structural 
model describes the relationships between the latent variables, the measurement model defines 
the relationship between the constructs and indicators. As discussed before, there are two 
types of variables in path models: (1) exogenous variables (act always as independent 
variables), and (2) endogenous variables (explained by the relationships postulated in the 
model) (Diamantopoulos, 1994). Accordingly, a path model, such as the one shown in 
Figure 5-2, can be represented by three sets of equations to describe all the proposed 
relationships between different parameters of the research model.  
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
4
2
1
3
4
11
21
22
2112
1
2
11x
21x
32x
42x
11y
21y
32y
42y
 
Figure 5-2 : path diagram scheme (Diamantopoulos, 1994; Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004) 
Note: η (eta) = latent endogenous variable; ξ (xi) = latent exogenous (i.e., independent) variable; ζ (zeta) = 
random disturbance term; γ (gamma) = path coefficient; ϕ (phi) = non-causal relationship between two 
latent exogenous variables; yi = indicators of endogenous variables; εi (epsilon) = measurement errors for 
indicators of endogenous variable; λyi (lambda y) = loadings of indicators of endogenous variable; xi = 
indicators of exogenous variable; δi (delta) = measurement error for indicators of exogenous variable; λxi 
(lambda x) = loadings of indicators of exogenous variable.  
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The first set of equations represent measurement models that are related to the indicators 
of the exogenous variables (x), to their associated measurement error (δ), and the latent 
exogenous variables (ξ):  
ݔଵ ൌ ߣ௫ଵଵߦଵ ൅ ߜଵ 5-1 
ݔଶ ൌ ߣ௫ଶଵߦଵ ൅ ߜଶ 5-2 
ݔଷ ൌ ߣ௫ଷଶߦଶ ൅ ߜଷ 5-3 
ݔସ ൌ ߣ௫ସଶߦଶ ൅ ߜସ 5-4 
The second set of equations describes the measurement models where the relationship 
between the indicators of the endogenous variables (y), their associated measurement error 
(ε), and the latent endogenous variables (η) are depicted: 
ݕଵ ൌ ߣ௬ଵଵߟଵ ൅ ߝଵ 5-5 
ݕଶ ൌ ߣ௬ଶଵߟଵ ൅ ߝଶ 5-6 
ݕଷ ൌ ߣ௬ଷଶߟଶ ൅ ߝଷ 5-7 
ݕସ ൌ ߣ௬ସଶߟଶ ൅ ߝସ 5-8 
Finally, the last set represents the structural model that deals with the relationship 
between the latent endogenous (η) and exogenous (ξ) variables: 
ߟଵ ൌ ߛଵଵߦଵ ൅ ߞଵ 5-9 
ߟଶ ൌ ߚଶଵߟଵ	 ൅ ߛଶଵߦଵ ൅ ߛଶଶߦଶ ൅ ߞଶ  5-10 
By applying matrix algebra, these three sets of equations can also be written in the 
following way: 
ݔ ൌ ߉௫ߦ ൅ ߜ  5-11 
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ݕ ൌ ߉௬ߟ ൅ ߝ  5-12 
ߟ ൌ ߀ ߟ ൅ ߁ ߯ ൅ ߞ  5-13 
Where equations 5-11 and 5-12 represent the measurement models, equation 5-13 
describes the structural model, and the aggregated models can be subsumed by the term 
structural equation model.  
In the following sections of this chapter, the basic concepts of structural and 
measurement model specifications are introduced, the structural and measurement models for 
this study are established, and then, the main considerations regarding data preparation for 
undertaking PLS-SEM method are discussed. Afterwards, the established measurement 
models and structural models are evaluated using the SmartPLS software package (Ringle et 
al., 2005), and then the research results are demonstrated.  
5.2 Specifying the structural model 
The structural model defines the relationship between the constructs, which is guided 
by theory, logic, or practical insight (Hair et al., 2014). As discussed in Chapter four, the main 
constructs in this research are Project Control Capability (PC), Social Capital (SC), 
Collaboration (CL), Formal Contracts (FC), Project Performance (PP), and Relationship 
Satisfaction (RS). Additionally, Project Size (PS) has been used as a control variable. 
Figure 5-3 shows the structural model proposed in this study. 
A construct can be modeled as a single-order or a higher-order construct. Using a 
higher-order construct enables the researcher to develop more concise explanations of how 
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broad concepts tie to existing well-known relationships and make the empirical research more 
realistic (Polites et al., 2012). Furthermore, it can enhance theoretical parsimony and reduce 
the model complexity (Hair et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 5-3 : Proposed structural model 
Note: SC= Social Capital, PT= Prior Ties, SN= Shared Norms, TR= Trust, CL= Collaboration, FC= 
Formal Contracts, PC= Project Control Capability, PP= Project (time&cost) Performance, RS= 
Relationship Satisfaction, PS= Project Size. 
In this study, Social Capital (SC) is modeled as a second-order construct consisting of 
three first-order constructs including: Prior Ties (PT), Shared Norms (SN), and Trust (TR). 
As these three first-order constructs tap into different dimensions that form social capital 
among partners, the parent construct—social capital—is modeled as a formative construct.  
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As discussed by Baron and Kenny (1986), there may be many different forms of 
relationships among variables other than simple bilateral relationships between dependent and 
independent variables, such as mediated or moderated relationships, so different types of 
mediation effects are briefly introduced because they will be used in this study.  
5.2.1 Mediation relationship  
As shown in Figure 5-4, a variable is considered to be a mediator when it meets the 
following conditions: (1) variations in the levels of the independent variable significantly 
account for variations in the presumed mediation (i.e., path a), (2) variations in the mediator 
significantly account for variations in the dependent variable (i.e., path b), and (3) when paths 
a and b are controlled, a previously significant relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables is no longer significant, with the strongest demonstration of the mediation 
occurring when path c' is zero (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The third condition assumes that the 
direct relationship between predictor and outcome variables are significant before adding the 
mediator variable.  
However, Hayes (2009) pointed out that the third condition may not hold all the time, 
even though the mediation effect still exists. For example, the predictor-mediator and 
mediator-outcome relationships are both significant, but the direct relationship between 
predictor and outcome variables is insignificant because the two path coefficients are in 
opposite signs and cancel each other out (Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 
2000). Correspondingly, Mathieu and Taylor (2006) introduced three alternative intervening 
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models based on different interactions between predictor, mediator, and outcome variables 
(Figure 5-5). 
 
 
Figure 5-4 : Schematic diagrams of simple and mediated relationships (Field, 2013) 
 
Figure 5-5 : Alternative intervening models (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006) 
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As illustrated in Figure 5-5, the indirect effects model refers to situations where only 
the combined effect (ߚ௠௫ ൈ ߚ௬௠ ) is a significant observed relationship and implicitly 
suggests that the total ܺ → ܻ relationship (ߚ௬௫) is absent. Like the indirect effects model, the 
full mediation model includes significant ܺ → ܯ (ߚ௠௫) and ܯ → ܻ (ߚ௬௠) paths. However, 
the dashed line from ܺ → ܻ in this model indicates a significant total  ܺ → ܻ (ߚ௬௫) 
relationship that turns out to be insignificant when ܯ → ܻ (ߚ௬௠) is added. To put it another 
way, ߚ௬௫.௠ needs to be non-significant in full mediation assumption. Unlike full mediation, a 
partial mediation hypothesis implies that ܺ → ܯ (ߚ௠௫), as well as both ܯ → ܻ (ߚ௬௠.௫) and 
ܺ → ܻ (ߚ௬௫.௠) are simultaneously significant. 
5.3 Specifying the measurement model 
All the constructs in this study were measured by multiple indicators, and whenever 
possible, the questions were adapted from a validated instrument. All the relevant constructs 
and their corresponding measures are demonstrated in Table 4-1.  
When specifying measurement models, the main step is to decide whether the indicators 
are reflective or formative (Figure 5-6). In the former (also referred to as Model A 
measurement in PLS-SEM), variations in the indicators are caused by changes in the 
underlying construct, whereas in the formative models (also referred to as Model B 
measurement in PLS-SEM), indicators cause variations in the construct (Hair et al., 2014).  
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Figure 5-6 : Schematic diagrams of reflective and formative measurement models 
Figure 5-7 shows the main difference between the reflective and formative measurement 
models. The black circles in diagrams below illustrate the construct domain, i.e., the meaning 
of the relevant construct that is measured by the corresponding indicators. The colored circles 
show the domain captured by each indicator.  
 
Figure 5-7 : Differences between reflective and formative measures (Hair et al., 2014) 
As suggested by Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001), when causal priority between 
the indicator and the construct is from the construct to the indicators, a reflective measurement 
model is preferred, but when the causal priority is from the indicators to the construct, a 
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formative measurement model is more appropriate. According to this guideline, all the 
constructs and their corresponding indicators were examined and the reflective measurement 
approach was selected as the preferred measurement model for all of them. Figure 5-8 shows 
all the research constructs and their reflective measurement models. 
  
PC
PC1: It was possible to check the project team’s progress towards project goals through formal reviews and reports.
PC2: It was possible to monitor how well the project team was meeting project goals.
PC3: It was possible for us to determine whether the project team built a product (or deliverable) that satisfied the users’ requirements.
PC4: There were quantifiable measures of the extent to which project cost targets were achieved.
PC5: It was possible for us to determine whether the project team completed the project work on time. 
PC6: There was a well-understood way to carry out project tasks.
PC7: The project team had substantive experience with this type of project.
PT
PT1: Before this project, we had extensive collaboration with this partner on other projects.
PT2: It has always been pleasant during our collaboration.
SN
SN1: Both organisations had a mutual understanding of each other’s organisational culture, values, and operations.
SN2: Both organisations had a common vision and ambition for the cooperative venture.
SN3: A comprehensive set of norms of action was well developed in the cooperation.
TR
TR1: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been evenhanded in its negotiations with us.
TR2: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been an excellent source of accurate information.
TR3: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been reliable.
CL
CL1: The two sides exchanged information on changes related to organisations’ strategies and policies. 
CL2: The two sides exchanged information on successful and unsuccessful experiences.
CL3: The two sides have been communicating with each other via frequent interaction and informal socialization.
CL4: The two sides agreed to effectively do things for each other.
CL5: The two sides agreed to work together to resolve the problems caused by whichever party.
CL6: The two sides have been communicating with each other about events and changes that would affect collaboration.
FC
FC1: Generally, the contract was the primary mechanism to regulate the behavior of the partner in cooperation.
FC2: In our contract with our partner we defined project targets in detail.
FC3: There were well-specified responsibilities and rights for each partner.
FC4: There were explicitly prescribed institutions and measures to resolve the disputes and conflicts between partners.
FC5: Each partner considered the contingencies that might emerge in the future at its best and made an exhaustive explanation in the contract.
RS
RS1: This cooperation contributed to our core competencies and competitive advantage.
RS2: This cooperation realised the objectives we set out to achieve.
RS3: This cooperation improved our relationship and increased the likelihood of working together in the future.
RS4: Overall, we were satisfied with the performance of this cooperation.
PP
PS
PS1: Total planned budget (Million AUD)
PS2: Total planned duration (Months)
Figure 5-8 : Reflective measurement models for research model constructs
Note: PC= Project Control Capability, PT= Prior Ties, SN= Shared Norms, TR= Trust, CL= Collaboration, FC= Formal Contracts, RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PP= Project 
Performance, PS= Project Size.
PP1: Project time performance (comparing with similar projects in the field)
PP2: Project cost performance (comparing with similar projects in the field)
PP3: Project time performance against the planned schedule
PP4: Project cost performance against the planned budget
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5.4 Preparing and examining data 
The data preparation stage is very important in the application of PLS-SEM. In this 
section, the process and methods for dealing with outliers and missing data are explained.  
5.4.1.1 Outliers 
An outlier is an extreme score or response to a particular question which is very different 
from the rest of the responses. These unusual scores may cause bias in the research model, 
and consequently, distort the findings (Field, 2013; Hair et al., 2014). There are several tools 
for spotting outliers in the dataset (e.g. histograms, z-scores, box-plots, stem-and-leaf plots). 
After coding all the observations (responses) in the Iranian and Australian datasets, IBM SPSS 
21 software was used to draw box-plots and spot the outliers existing in each variable. Out of 
84 and 41 observations in the Iranian and Australian datasets, 11 and 4 observations contained 
extreme outliers, respectively. As a result, the responses with extreme outliers were removed 
from the datasets. Table 5-1 shows the code for the removed observations and the relevant 
variables that were affected by the outliers. 
Table 5-1 : Observations contained extreme outliers and relevant variables 
Iranian dataset Australian dataset 
Variable  Code of removed 
observations 
Variable  Code of removed 
observations 
PC1 
PC2 
PC3 
PC5 
PC6 
CL4 
FC1 
31 
44, 46 
43, 80 
43, 46, 78 
34 
39, 68 
73, 74, 78 
CL6 
FC2 
FC4 
RS2 
RS3 
RS4 
PP1 
17 
17 
17 
17, 20 
17, 20 
7, 17, 20 
17 
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5.4.1.2 Missing data  
One of the most common problems in survey research is missing data. This problem 
occurs when a respondent either deliberately or unintentionally, does not answer one or more 
questions. It has been suggested that those responses where the number of missing values 
exceeds 15% of the total number of questions in the questionnaire (Hair et al., 2014)  should 
be eliminated, but since no such case was found in this study, all the responses were kept for 
further analysis.  
Another important concern regarding missing data is the non-randomness of these 
values that may cause bias in research findings (Little, 1988; Little & Rubin, 2002). There 
were 24 and 17 missing values in the Iranian and Australian datasets, which accounted for 
0.91% and 1.24% of the total number of data points in each dataset, respectively. Following 
Little and Rubin (2002), Little’s MCAR test was performed for both datasets to check whether 
the missing data were missing at random. The results showed that the null hypothesis was 
rejected for Iranian (sig. = 0.375) and Australian (sig. = 0.642) datasets, showing there was 
no evidence for non-random missing data. 
One of the ways for handling missing data is case-wise deletion. This method would 
lead to the loss of a great deal of useful data, particularly when the sample size is small. An 
alternative way is to replace the missing data with estimated values using methods such as 
multiple imputation or the expectation maximization algorithm (EM method) (Little & Rubin, 
2002). However, the suitability of these methods in the PLS-SEM context has not yet been 
tested, so it was recommended that these approaches not be used (Hair et al., 2014). 
Alternatively, Hair et al. (2014) recommend using a sub-group mean to replace missing 
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values. To do this, all the cases are classified into subgroups based on their demographic 
characteristics, and then, the missing values can be replaced by the subgroup mean (Hair et 
al., 2014).  
In this study, all the cases within both samples were classified into five subgroups based 
on the project field (i.e., building, water, transportation, power, oil & gas), and then, the 
missing values were replaced with the subgroup means.  
5.5 Evaluating the measurement model 
After preparing the data, it was time to evaluate the specified measurement model in 
order to assess the reliability and validity of the measures. This step had to be undertaken 
before analyzing the structural model because if the measurement of constructs were 
unreliable or invalid, the findings about the nature of the relationships among constructs drawn 
from structural model evaluation may also be invalid.  
As demonstrated in Figure 5-9, validity explains the accuracy of the measuring 
instrument in capturing the intended concept, while reliability refers to the quality of the 
instrument regarding its capability to produce the same value in successive observations of 
the same case (Babbie et al., 2013).  
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Not Valid Valid
Reliable
Not 
Reliable
 
Figure 5-9 : Comparing reliability and validity (Hair et al., 2014) 
To evaluate the reflective measurement models, it is common to start with convergent 
validity and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2014).  
5.5.1 Convergent validity 
For multiple-item reflective constructs, it is useful to estimate the correlations between 
indicators of the same construct because indicators of a reflective construct are supposed to 
capture the meaning of that construct common to all of its indicators. Thus, these indicators 
are expected to share a high proportion of variance and converge on the same concept; which 
is why the convergent validity is also referred to as the homogeneity of the constructs 
(Ayodeji, 2008). Moreover, the outer loadings of the indicators, average variance extracted 
(AVE), and internal consistency reliability are also widely used to evaluate the convergent 
validity of the measurement models.  
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5.5.1.1 Outer loadings 
If the indicators of a construct show high loadings, then they have more things in 
common and do reflect variations in the main construct, that is, the outer loadings reflect each 
indicator’s reliability (Hair et al., 2014). As a rule of thumb, the standardized outer loadings 
of indicators should be 0.708 or higher. To understand the logic behind this rule, one should 
consider the square of a standardized indicator’s outer loading which is referred to as 
communality. Communality shows the extent to which the variation in an indicator is caused 
by the construct and is defined as the variance extracted from the indicator. To be accepted as 
a valid measure, the relevant construct should be able to explain at least 50% of the indicator’s 
variance. To put it another way, this rule implies that the measurement error variance is less 
than the shared variance between the construct and its indicator. As a result, the minimum 
value for an indicator’s outer loading should be at least 0.708, because the outer loading is the 
squared root of communality (√0.5). However, it is not a strict rule and the researcher should 
investigate the effects of removing an indicator on other factors such as composite reliability, 
Cronbach’s alpha, and AVE. As advised by Hair et al. (2014), indicators with outer loadings 
between 0.4 and 0.7 should be treated carefully and should be kept if deleting of the indicator 
does not increase the previously mentioned factors above the threshold value. Nonetheless, 
the indicators with outer loadings below 0.4 should definitely be eliminated from the 
measurement model (Hair et al., 2014; Hulland, 1999).  
These instructions were followed, and a conservative value of 0.7 was chosen as the 
cut-off point for outer loadings. However, in some cases where the outer loadings were 
between 0.4 and 0.7, the consequence of removing the indicators regarding their effects on 
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other factors such as AVE, composite reliability, and Cronbach’s alpha was evaluated, and if 
their removal did not increase the validity and reliability of the relevant measurement model, 
the indicator was kept. Table 5-2,Table 5-3, Table 5-5,Table 5-6 show the outer loadings for 
all the indicators before and after removing the redundant indicators. 
5.5.1.2 Average variance extracted (AVE) 
Another common measure for examining convergent validity is the average variance 
extracted (AVE). Unlike the outer loading that was an indicator-level factor, AVE is examined 
at the construct level and is defined as the grand mean value of the squared loadings of the 
construct’s indicators (i.e., the sum of the squared loadings divided by the number of 
indicators). In other words, it represents the communality of the construct. The rationale 
behind AVE is the same as the one explained for outer loadings, and as a result, the threshold 
value for AVE was 0.5 or higher (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). That is, If AVE was less than 0.5, 
the measurement error was relatively greater than the variance of indicators explained by the 
corresponding construct (Hair et al., 2014). AVE can be calculated using the following 
formula: 
ܣܸܧ ൌ ∑ ߣ௜
ଶ௜
∑ ߣ௜ଶ ൅ ∑ ݒܽݎሺߝ௜ሻ௜௜  5-14 
Where ߣ௜ is the factor loading between each indicator and its corresponding latent 
construct, and  
ݒܽݎሺߝ௜ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣ௜ଶሻ 5-15 
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The AVEs were calculated for each construct in the measurement models using 
smartPLS software (Ringle et al., 2005). Table 5-2 and Table 5-3show the AVEs for initial 
measurement models. After removing the indicators that did not meet the requirements, AVEs 
for the new measurement models were recalculated.  Table 5-5 and Table 5-6 show that all 
the AVE values were greater than 0.5, indicating good convergent validity. 
5.5.1.3 Internal consistency reliability 
Traditionally, Cronbach’s alpha has been used to estimate internal consistency. To 
estimate Cronbach’s alpha, it is assumed that all the indicators are equally reliable (e.g., outer 
loadings of all indicators on the same construct are equal), but in PLS-SEM, the indicators are 
prioritized based on their individual reliability. Moreover, in multiple-item constructs it is 
likely that Cronbach’s alpha test would underestimate the internal consistency reliability (Hair 
et al., 2014). Composite reliability is another measure that is more appropriate for testing the 
reliability of internal consistency in PLS-SEM approach because by mitigating limitations 
associated with Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability considers different outer loadings of 
the indicators. Following Hair et al. (2014), internal consistency reliability were assessed 
using composite reliability and Cronbach’s alpha, so Cronbach’s alpha (α) and composite 
reliability (CR) were assessed for all the constructs.  
Cronbach’s alpha (α) developed by Cronbach (1951) was calculated by the following 
formula:  
ߙ௦௧௔௡ௗ௔௥ௗ௜௭௘ௗ ൌ ܭ. ̅ݎሺ1 ൅ ሺܭ െ 1ሻ̅ݎሻ 5-16 
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Where ܭ is equal to the number of indicators and ̅ݎ is the average inter-correlation 
among indicators (average of all Pearson correlation coefficients between indicators). 
To calculate the composite reliability (CR), the following formula was used (Hair et al., 
2014): 
ܥܴ ൌ ሺ∑ ݈௜௜ ሻ
ଶ
ሺ∑ ݈௜௜ ሻଶ ൅ ∑ ݒܽݎሺ݁௜ሻ௜  5-17 
Where ݈௜ represents the standardized outer loading of the indicator ݅ of a specific 
construct, ݁௜ refers to the measurement error of the indicator ݅, and ݒܽݎሺ݁௜ሻ symbolizes the 
variance of the measurement error which is defined as 1 െ ݈௜ଶ. 
The values for both Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability vary between 0 and 1, 
and the interpretation of them is the same because higher values indicate higher levels of 
reliability (Ayodeji, 2008; Hair et al., 2014). Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) and Churchill Jr 
(1979) suggest 0.7 as good and 0.6 as cut-off points. Nevertheless, values above 0.9 are not 
desirable for composite reliability and if the value for a construct exceeds 0.95, it means that 
some of its indicators are measuring the same concept, and as a result, duplicated indicators 
should definitely be eliminated (Hair et al., 2014). Thus, constructs with Cronbach’s alpha (α) 
below 0.6 or Composite reliability (CR) less than 0.6 or above 0.95 were investigated to find 
and remove inappropriate indicators.  
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 Figure 5-10 : Initial structural and measurement models (Iran) 
Table 5-2 : Initial measurement models’ reliability and validity (Iran) 
Constructs and indicators Outer 
loadings 
AVE CR α 
Project Control Capability (PC): 
PC1: It was possible to check the project team’s progress towards project goals through 
formal reviews and reports. 
PC2: It was possible to monitor how well the project team was meeting project goals. 
PC3: It was possible for us to determine whether the project team built a product (or 
deliverable) that satisfied the users’ requirements. 
PC4: There were quantifiable measures of the extent to which project cost targets were 
achieved. 
PC5: It was possible for us to determine whether the project team completed the project 
work on time.  
PC6: There was a well-understood way to carry out project tasks. 
PC7: The project team had substantive experience with this type of project.
 
0.702 
 
0.648 
0.541 
 
0.403 
 
0.251 
 
0.667 
0.657 
0.330 0.762 0.636 
Social Capital (SC): 
Prior Ties (PT) 
PT1: Before this project, we had extensive collaboration with this partner on other 
projects. 
PT2: It has always been pleasant during our collaboration. 
Shared Norms (SN) 
SN1: Both organizations had a mutual understanding of each other’s organizational 
culture, values, and operations. 
SN2: Both organizations had a common vision and ambition for the cooperative 
venture. 
SN3: A comprehensive set of norms of action was well developed in the cooperation. 
Trust (TR) 
TR1: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been evenhanded in its 
negotiations with us. 
TR2: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been an excellent source of 
accurate information. 
TR3: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been reliable.
 
 
0.834 
 
0.908 
 
0.934 
 
0.945 
 
0.972 
 
0.954 
 
0.920 
 
0.956
0.780 
0.760 
 
 
 
0.902 
 
 
 
 
 
0.891 
0.966 
0.864 
 
 
 
0.965 
 
 
 
 
 
0.961 
 
 
 
0.959 
0.690 
 
 
 
0.946 
 
 
 
 
 
0.939 
 
Chapter 5: Data analysis 
 
156 
 
Table 5-2 : Initial measurement models’ reliability and validity (Iran) (Cont.) 
Constructs and indicators Outer 
loadings 
AVE CR α 
Collaboration (CL): 
CL1: The two sides exchanged information on changes related to organizations’ 
strategies and policies.  
CL2: The two sides exchanged information on successful and unsuccessful experiences. 
CL3: The two sides have been communicating with each other via frequent interaction 
and informal socialization. 
CL4: The two sides agreed to effectively do things for each other. 
CL5: The two sides agreed to work together to resolve the problems caused by 
whichever party. 
CL6: The two sides have been communicating with each other about events and changes 
that would affect collaboration. 
 
0.662 
 
0.616 
0.486 
 
0.812 
0.620 
 
0.750 
0.444 0.824 0.750 
Formal Contract (FC): 
FC1: Generally, the contract was the primary mechanism to regulate the behavior of the 
partner in cooperation. 
FC2: In our contract with our partner we defined project targets in detail. 
FC3: There were well-specified responsibilities and rights for each partner. 
FC4: There were explicitly prescribed institutions and measures to resolve the disputes 
and conflicts between partners. 
FC5: Each partner considered the contingencies that might emerge in the future at its 
best and made an exhaustive explanation in the contract. 
 
0.739 
 
0.704 
0.826 
0.773 
 
0.805 
0.594 0.879 0.838 
Relationship Satisfaction (RS): 
RS1: This cooperation contributed to our core competencies and competitive advantage. 
RS2: This cooperation realised the objectives we set out to achieve. 
RS3: This cooperation improved our relationship and increased the likelihood of 
working together in the future. 
RS4: Overall, we were satisfied with the performance of this cooperation.  
 
0.528 
0.920 
0.861 
 
0.898 
0.668 
 
 
 
 
0.886 
 
 
 
 
0.820 
 
 
 
 
 
Project (time&cost) Performance (PP): 
PP1: Project time performance (compared to similar projects in the field) 
PP2. Project cost performance (comparing to similar projects in the field) 
PP3: Project time performance against the planned schedule 
PP4: Project cost performance against the planned budget 
 
0.813 
0.794 
0.808 
0.564 
0.566 0.836 0.740 
Project Size (PS): 
PS1: Total planned budget (Million AUD) 
PS2: Total planned duration (Months) 
 
0.580 
0.991 
0.659 0.784 0.813 
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 Figure 5-11 : Initial structural and measurement models (Australia) 
Table 5-3 : Initial measurement models’ reliability and validity (Australia) 
Constructs and indicators Outer 
loadings 
AVE CR α 
Project Control Capability (PC): 
PC1: It was possible to check the project team’s progress towards project goals through 
formal reviews and reports. 
PC2: It was possible to monitor how well the project team was meeting project goals. 
PC3: It was possible for us to determine whether the project team built a product (or 
deliverable) that satisfied the users’ requirements. 
PC4: There were quantifiable measures of the extent to which project cost targets were 
achieved. 
PC5: It was possible for us to determine whether the project team completed the project 
work on time.  
PC6: There was a well-understood way to carry out project tasks. 
PC7: The project team had substantive experience with this type of project.
 
0.441 
 
0.689 
0.055 
 
0.040 
 
0.836 
 
0.762 
0.702 
0.349 0.732 0.630 
Social Capital (SC): 
Prior Ties (PT) 
PT1: Before this project, we had extensive collaboration with this partner on other 
projects. 
PT2: It has always been pleasant during our collaboration. 
Shared Norms (SN) 
SN1: Both organizations had a mutual understanding of each other’s organizational 
culture, values, and operations. 
SN2: Both organizations had a common vision and ambition for the cooperative 
venture. 
SN3: A comprehensive set of norms of action was well developed in the cooperation. 
Trust (TR) 
TR1: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been evenhanded in its 
negotiations with us. 
TR2: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been an excellent source of 
accurate information. 
TR3: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been reliable.
 
 
0.909 
 
0.930 
 
0.985 
 
0.918 
 
0.915 
 
0.904 
 
0.936 
 
0.919
0.780 
0.846 
 
 
 
0.833 
 
 
 
 
 
0.846 
0.966 
0.916 
 
 
 
0.937 
 
 
 
 
 
0.943 
 
 
 
0.959 
0.818 
 
 
 
0.900 
 
 
 
 
 
0.909 
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Table 5-3 : Initial measurement models’ reliability and validity (Australia) (Cont.) 
Constructs and indicators Outer 
loadings 
AVE CR α 
Collaboration (CL): 
CL1: The two sides exchanged information on changes related to organizations’ 
strategies and policies.  
CL2: The two sides exchanged information on successful and unsuccessful experiences. 
CL3: The two sides have been communicating with each other via frequent interaction 
and informal socialization. 
CL4: The two sides agreed to effectively do things for each other. 
CL5: The two sides agreed to work together to resolve the problems caused by 
whichever party. 
CL6: The two sides have been communicating with each other about events and changes 
that would affect collaboration. 
 
0.567 
 
0.631 
0.673 
 
0.710 
0.797 
 
0.586 
0.443 0.825 0.748 
Formal Contract (FC): 
FC1: Generally, the contract was the primary mechanism to regulate the behavior of the 
partner in cooperation. 
FC2: In our contract with our partner we defined project targets in detail. 
FC3: There were well-specified responsibilities and rights for each partner. 
FC4: There were explicitly prescribed institutions and measures to resolve the disputes 
and conflicts between partners. 
FC5: Each partner considered the contingencies that might emerge in the future at its 
best and made an exhaustive explanation in the contract. 
 
0.747 
 
0.694 
0.647 
0.588 
 
0.885 
0.517 0.840 0.816 
Relationship Satisfaction (RS): 
RS1: This cooperation contributed to our core competencies and competitive advantage. 
RS2: This cooperation realised the objectives we set out to achieve. 
RS3: This cooperation improved our relationship and increased the likelihood of 
working together in the future. 
RS4: Overall, we were satisfied with the performance of this cooperation.  
 
0.755 
0.931 
0.875 
 
0.930 
0.767 
 
 
 
 
0.929 
 
 
 
 
0.897 
 
 
 
 
 
Project (time&cost) Performance (PP): 
PP1: Project time performance (compared to similar projects in the field) 
PP2. Project cost performance (comparing to similar projects in the field) 
PP3: Project time performance against the planned schedule 
PP4: Project cost performance against the planned budget 
 
0.902 
0.808 
0.751 
0.724 
0.639 0.875 0.811 
Project Size (PS): 
PS1: Total planned budget (Million AUD) 
PS2: Total planned duration (Months) 
 
0.885 
0.947 
0.840 0.913 0.816 
5.5.1.4 Removing redundant indicators 
Based on the criteria defined for assessing the reliability and validity of measurement 
models, an iterative analysis of measurement models was conducted using smartPLS software 
(Ringle et al., 2005) to improve the models. To achieve this, the indicators were initially 
entered into the measurement models (as defined in section 5-1) and set out in the software, 
and then, based on the structural model developed in section 5-2, the relationships between 
measurement models were designed in the software and the model was run. After each run, 
the measurement models were checked against criteria, and indicators which violated one or 
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more conditions were removed in sequence after each run. This iterative process was 
continued until all the indicators and constructs met the reliability and validity requirements. 
Table 5-4 summarizes the indicators that were removed and the reason for their removal. 
Furthermore, where Figure 5-12 and Table 5-5 present the final measurement models and the 
relevant validity and reliability factors for the Iranian dataset, Figure 5-13 and Table 5-6 
demonstrate the same results for the Australian case.  
Table 5-4 : Removed indicators and the reason for their elimination 
Indicator Reason for elimination 
PC3 Outer loading was below 0.4 in Australian model. 
PC4 Outer loading was below 0.4 in both Iranian and Australian models. 
PC5 Outer loading was below 0.4 in Iranian model. But it was kept for Australian model, because its outer 
loading was between 0.4 and 0.7 and its deletion decreased AVE below threshold (0.5) 
SN3 Its deletion improved the CR in Iranian model to fall below 0.95 for the relevant construct (SN). 
TR3 Its deletion improved the CR in Iranian model to fall below 0.95 for the relevant construct (TR). 
CL1 Outer loading was between 0.4 and 0.7 in Australian model and its deletion increased AVE above 
threshold (0.5). 
CL3 Outer loading was between 0.4 and 0.7 in Iranian model and its deletion increased AVE above threshold 
(0.5). 
 
 Figure 5-12 : Final structural and measurement models (Iran) 
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Table 5-5 : Final measurement models’ reliability and validity (Iran) 
Constructs and indicators Outer 
loadings 
AVE CR α 
Project Control Capability (PC): 
PC1: It was possible to check the project team’s progress towards project goals through 
formal reviews and reports. 
PC2: It was possible to monitor how well the project team was meeting project goals. 
PC6: There was a well-understood way to carry out project tasks. 
PC7: The project team had substantive experience with this type of project.
 
0.716 
 
0.660 
0.751 
0.700 
0.501 0.800 0.668 
Social Capital (SC): 
Prior Ties (PT) 
PT1: Before this project, we had extensive collaboration with this partner on other 
projects. 
PT2: It has always been pleasant during our collaboration. 
Shared Norms (SN) 
SN1: Both organizations had a mutual understanding of each other’s organizational 
culture, values, and operations. 
SN2: Both organizations had a common vision and ambition for the cooperative 
venture. 
Trust (TR) 
TR1: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been evenhanded in its 
negotiations with us. 
TR2: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been an excellent source of 
accurate information. 
 
 
0.837 
 
0.905 
 
0.948 
 
0.947 
 
 
0.950 
 
0.949 
0.759 
0.761 
 
 
 
0.897 
 
 
 
 
0.901 
0.949 
0.864 
 
 
 
0.946 
 
 
 
 
0.948 
 
 
0.935 
0.690 
 
 
 
0.886 
 
 
 
 
0.891 
 
Collaboration (CL): 
CL2: The two sides exchanged information on successful and unsuccessful experiences. 
CL4: The two sides agreed to effectively do things for each other. 
CL5: The two sides agreed to work together to resolve the problems caused by 
whichever party. 
CL6: The two sides have been communicating with each other about events and changes 
that would affect collaboration. 
 
0.610 
0.858 
0.674 
 
0.731 
0.525 0.813 0.707 
Formal Contract (FC): 
FC1: Generally, the contract was the primary mechanism to regulate the behavior of the 
partner in cooperation. 
FC2: In our contract with our partner we defined project targets in detail. 
FC3: There were well-specified responsibilities and rights for each partner. 
FC4: There were explicitly prescribed institutions and measures to resolve the disputes 
and conflicts between partners. 
FC5: Each partner considered the contingencies that might emerge in the future at its 
best and made an exhaustive explanation in the contract. 
 
0.745 
 
0.725 
0.829 
0.750 
 
0.816 
0.599 0.882 0.838 
Relationship Satisfaction (RS): 
RS1: This cooperation contributed to our core competencies and competitive advantage. 
RS2: This cooperation realised the objectives we set out to achieve. 
RS3: This cooperation improved our relationship and increased the likelihood of 
working together in the future. 
RS4: Overall, we were satisfied with the performance of this cooperation.  
 
0.542 
0.920 
0.857 
 
0.893 
0.668 
 
 
 
 
0.886 
 
 
 
 
0.820 
 
 
 
 
 
Project (time&cost) Performance (PP): 
PP1: Project time performance (compared to similar projects in the field) 
PP2. Project cost performance (comparing to similar projects in the field) 
PP3: Project time performance against the planned schedule 
PP4: Project cost performance against the planned budget 
 
0.820 
0.796 
0.803 
0.557 
0.565 0.836 0.740 
Project Size (PS): 
PS1: Total planned budget (Million AUD) 
PS2: Total planned duration (Months) 
 
0.581 
0.991 
0.660 0.784 0.813 
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Figure 5-13 : Final structural and measurement models (Australia) 
Table 5-6 : Final measurement models’ reliability and validity (Australia) 
Constructs and indicators Outer 
loadings 
AVE CR α 
Project Control Capability (PC): 
PC1: It was possible to check the project team’s progress towards project goals through 
formal reviews and reports. 
PC2: It was possible to monitor how well the project team was meeting project goals. 
PC5: It was possible for us to determine whether the project team completed the project 
work on time.  
PC6: There was a well-understood way to carry out project tasks. 
PC7: The project team had substantive experience with this type of project.
 
0.447 
 
0.707 
0.820 
 
0.759 
0.721 
0.500 0.825 0.765 
Social Capital (SC): 
Prior Ties (PT) 
PT1: Before this project, we had extensive collaboration with this partner on other 
projects. 
PT2: It has always been pleasant during our collaboration. 
Shared Norms (SN) 
SN1: Both organizations had a mutual understanding of each other’s organizational 
culture, values, and operations. 
SN2: Both organizations had a common vision and ambition for the cooperative 
venture. 
Trust (TR) 
TR1: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been evenhanded in its 
negotiations with us. 
TR2: During our previous collaborations, this partner has been an excellent source of 
accurate information. 
 
 
0.911 
 
0.928 
 
0.936 
 
0.934 
 
 
0.939 
 
0.948 
0.773 
0.846 
 
 
 
0.875 
 
 
 
 
0.890 
0.953 
0.916 
 
 
 
0.933 
 
 
 
 
0.942 
 
0.941 
0.818 
 
 
 
0.857 
 
 
 
 
0.877 
Collaboration (CL): 
CL2: The two sides exchanged information on successful and unsuccessful experiences. 
CL4: The two sides agreed to effectively do things for each other. 
CL5: The two sides agreed to work together to resolve the problems caused by 
whichever party. 
CL6: The two sides have been communicating with each other about events and changes 
that would affect collaboration. 
 
0.726 
0.757 
0.790 
 
0.611 
0.525 0.814 0.708 
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Table 5-6 : Final measurement models’ reliability and validity (Australia) (Cont.) 
Constructs and indicators Outer 
loadings 
AVE CR α 
Formal Contract (FC): 
FC1: Generally, the contract was the primary mechanism to regulate the behavior of the 
partner in cooperation. 
FC2: In our contract with our partner we defined project targets in detail. 
FC3: There were well-specified responsibilities and rights for each partner. 
FC4: There were explicitly prescribed institutions and measures to resolve the disputes 
and conflicts between partners. 
FC5: Each partner considered the contingencies that might emerge in the future at its 
best and made an exhaustive explanation in the contract. 
 
0.750 
 
0.696 
0.647 
0.585 
 
0.883 
0.517 0.840 0.816 
Relationship Satisfaction (RS): 
RS1: This cooperation contributed to our core competencies and competitive advantage. 
RS2: This cooperation realised the objectives we set out to achieve. 
RS3: This cooperation improved our relationship and increased the likelihood of 
working together in the future. 
RS4: Overall, we were satisfied with the performance of this cooperation.  
 
0.740 
0.929 
0.883 
 
0.935 
0.766 
 
 
 
 
0.928 
 
 
 
 
0.897 
 
 
 
 
 
Project (time&cost) Performance (PP): 
PP1: Project time performance (compared to similar projects in the field) 
PP2. Project cost performance (comparing to similar projects in the field) 
PP3: Project time performance against the planned schedule 
PP4: Project cost performance against the planned budget 
 
0.902 
0.807 
0.754 
0.722 
0.639 0.875 0.811 
Project Size (PS): 
PS1: Total planned budget (Million AUD) 
PS2: Total planned duration (Months) 
 
0.884 
0.947 
0.840 0.913 0.816 
5.5.2 Discriminant validity 
After treating the measurement models for convergent validity and removing the 
redundant indicators, the next step was to examine discriminant validity. Unlike convergent 
validity that examines an individual construct to investigate the level of convergence between 
its indicators, discriminant validity compares different constructs and their indicators to make 
sure they are distinct and unique (Hulland, 1999). Following Chin (1998), the Fornell-Larcker 
analysis was applied to examine discriminant validity. 
5.5.2.1 Fornell-Larcker analysis 
Compared to the cross-loading test, the Fornell-Larcker analysis is a more conservative 
approach for evaluating discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2014). As suggested by Fornell and 
Larcker (1981), the square root of AVEs for each construct should be greater than all the 
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correlated values between that construct and all the other constructs. The rationale behind this 
method is to investigate whether a construct shares more variance with its correspondent 
indicators than any other construct.  In this test, the constructs’ correlations and AVE scores 
generated by smartPLS software (Ringle et al., 2005) were used. As demonstrated in Table 5–
7 and Table 5–8, the square root of AVEs for each construct that are in bold type and located 
on the main diagonal of the table, were greater than the correlation of the same construct with 
other constructs with other constructs, which represents a strong discriminant validity.   
Table 5-7 : Correlation matrix and square root of AVEs for each construct (Iran) 
 PC PT SN TR CL FC RS PP PS 
PC 0.707         
PT 0.186 0.872        
SN 0.125 0.842 0.947       
TR 0.113 0.839 0.830 0.949      
CL 0.386 0.330 0.406 0.326 0.724     
FC 0.257 -0.001 0.107 0.140 0.396 0.774    
RS 0.332 0.391 0.379 0.400 0.310 0.035 0.817   
PP 0.164 0.291 0.159 0.260 0.110 0.161 0.499 0.752  
PS -0.001 0.027 0.104 0.029 0.190 0.078 0.103 -0.095 0.812 
Note 1: PC= Project Control Capability, PT= Prior Ties, SN= Shared Norms, TR= Trust, CL= 
Collaboration, FC= Formal Contract, RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PP= Project (time&cost) 
Performance, PS= Project Size. 
Note 2: Bolded numbers are square root of AVEs  
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Table 5-8 : Correlation matrix and square root of AVEs for each construct (Australia) 
 PC PT SN TR CL FC RS PP PS 
PC 0.703         
PT 0.438 0.920        
SN 0.487 0.864 0.935       
TR 0.466 0.809 0.831 0.944      
CL 0.601 0.484 0.486 0.482 0.724     
FC 0.429 0.316 0.234 0.138 0.628 0.719    
RS 0.565 0.336 0.313 0.464 0.707 0.324 0.875   
PP 0.458 0.239 0.265 0.308 0.133 0.068 0.377 0.799  
PS 0.116 -0.024 -0.155 -0.197 0.157 0.216 0.056 -0.348 0.916 
Note 1: PC= Project Control Capability, PT= Prior Ties, SN= Shared Norms, TR= Trust, CL= 
Collaboration, FC= Formal Contract, RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PP= Project (time&cost) 
Performance, PS= Project Size. 
Note 2: Bolded numbers are square root of AVEs  
5.6 Evaluating the structural model 
Having examined the reliability and validity of the measurement models, the next step 
was to assess the structural model such that the explanatory power of the model and the 
relationships between constructs could be examined. Figure 5-14 shows the process for 
evaluating the structural model results.  
 
Figure 5-14 : Structural model assessment procedure (Hair et al., 2014) 
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5.6.1 Structural model path coefficients 
Path coefficients measure the strength of the hypothesized relationships among the 
constructs with values between -1 and +1, which means the closer the absolute value of 
estimated path coefficients are to 1, the stronger the relationship, and the more likely the 
association will be statistically significant (i.e., different from zero in the population). 
However, when the path coefficients are close to zero, the relationship would be weak and 
non-significant (i.e., not significantly different from zero).  
Since PLS-SEM does not assume normal distribution of data, parametric significance 
tests used in regression analysis cannot be used to analyze the significance of the path 
coefficients (Hair et al., 2014). As a result, PLS-SEM uses non-parametric methods such as 
bootstrapping to test the significance of path coefficients (Davison & Hinkley, 1997; Efron & 
Tibshirani, 1986). Bootstrapping is a procedure through which a large number of subsamples 
(i.e., bootstrapping samples) are drawn from the original sample with replacement. That is, 
after drawing observations from the sampling population and calculating the parameter of 
interest (i.e., the path coefficient), all the chosen subsamples will be returned to the sampling 
population before drawing the next subsample (Field, 2013; Hair et al., 2014). As a result, it 
is possible for one observation to be selected more than once or it may not be chosen at all for 
the subsample.  
In this study, the bootstrapping function of smartPLS software (Ringle et al., 2005) was 
used to validate the theoretical model. As recommended by (Hair et al., 2014), 5000 bootstrap 
samples were used to run the bootstrapping procedure. By using the standard error derived 
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from the bootstrap distribution, it was possible to calculate the ݐ values to test whether the 
path coefficient (݌) was significantly different from zero using the following formula (Hair et 
al., 2014):  
ݐ ൌ ݌௜௝ݏ݁௣೔ೕ∗
 5-18 
Where ݌௜௝ is the path coefficient from construct ݅ to construct ݆, and ݏ݁௣೔ೕ∗  is the relevant 
bootstrap standard error.  
Based on a general rule, with more than 30 observations, the ݐ distribution can be 
explained by the normal (Gaussian) distribution. Table 5-9 shows the cumulative probability 
and confidence level values associated with variations of ݐ for two-tailed test. 
Table 5-9 : Values for two-tailed significance test parameters  
T values Cumulative probability Confidence level (%) 
3.29 0.001 99.9  
2.58 0.01 99  
1.96 0.05 95  
1.65 0.10 90 
When the empirical ݐ value for a specific path in the structural model is greater than these 
critical values, it demonstrates the significance of the coefficient value at a certain error 
probability (i.e., significance level), and accordingly, the proposed association will be 
supported. Table 5-10 and Table 5-11 present the results of the analysis for the significance 
of hypothesized relationships in the Iranian and Australian models, respectively.  
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Table 5-10 : Structural model evaluation (Iran) 
Hypothesis Path Original Sample Sample Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error T Statistics 
H1 SC -> FC 0.093 0.1081 0.1395 0.1395 0.6658 
H2 FC -> CL 0.364 ** 0.376 0.1331 0.1331 2.7371 
H3 SC -> CL 0.343 *** 0.3429 0.0753 0.0753 4.5552 
H4 CL -> PC 0.386 *** 0.4016 0.1022 0.1022 3.7742 
H7a1 SC -> RS 0.236 * 0.2238 0.1186 0.1186 1.9918 
H8a FC -> RS -0.176 -0.1656 0.1167 0.1167 1.5054 
H9a SC -> PP 0.248 * 0.2547 0.122 0.122 2.0346 
H10a FC -> PP 0.142 0.1411 0.1431 0.1431 0.9915 
H11 PP -> RS 0.429 *** 0.4334 0.1251 0.1251 3.4289 
Control PS -> PP -0.108 -0.036 0.1517 0.1517 0.7139 
Control PS -> RS 0.117 0.0332 0.132 0.132 0.8868 
Note 1: PC= Project Control Capability, SC= Social Capital, CL= Collaboration, FC= Formal Contract, 
RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PP= Project (Cost&Time) Performance, PS= Project Size. 
Note 2: Critical t-values for a two-tailed test are 1.65 † (confidence level = 10%), 1.96 * (confidence level = 
5%), 2.58 ** (confidence level = 1%), and 3.29 *** (confidence level = 0.1%). 
Figure 5-15 : Validated model (Iran)  
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Table 5-11 : Structural model evaluation (Australia) 
Hypothesis Path Original Sample Sample Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error T Statistics 
H1 SC -> FC 0.242 0.2805 0.3152 0.3152 0.7674 
H2 FC -> CL 0.535 ** 0.5298 0.1841 0.1841 2.9092 
H3 SC -> CL 0.384 ** 0.3862 0.126 0.126 3.0493 
H4 CL -> PC 0.601 *** 0.6334 0.1052 0.1052 5.7104 
H7b1 CL -> RS 0.780 *** 0.7123 0.2078 0.2078 3.7551 
H10b FC -> PP 0.004 -0.0325 0.2655 0.2655 0.015 
H11 PP -> RS 0.293 † 0.2829 0.1667 0.1667 1.7542 
Control PS -> PP -0.383 -0.3995 0.1717 0.1717 2.2331 
Control PS -> RS 0.065 0.0634 0.1477 0.1477 0.4379 
Note 1: PC= Project Control Capability, SC= Social Capital, CL= Collaboration, FC= Formal Contract, 
RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PP= Project (Cost&Time) Performance, PS= Project Size. 
Note 2: Critical t-values for a two-tailed test are 1.65 † (confidence level = 10%), 1.96 * (confidence level = 
5%), 2.58 ** (confidence level = 1%), and 3.29 *** (confidence level = 0.1%). 
 
Figure 5-16 : Validated model (Australia) 
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5.6.2 Significance of mediation effects 
As recommended by Hayes (2009), the bootstrapping method was used to analyze the 
intervening variable effects. Unlike the Sobel (1982) test, the bootstrapping approach makes 
no assumptions about the shape of the sampling distribution of the mediation effect or the 
variables’ distribution, so it can be confidently applied to small sample sizes (Hair et al., 2014; 
Hayes, 2009). Furthermore, the bootstrapping method has higher levels of statistical power 
than the Sobel test that uses unstandardized path coefficients for running test statistics, 
particularly when it is applied to small sample sizes (Hair et al., 2014).  
Following Mathieu and Taylor (2006) procedures (Figure 5-17), the hypothesized 
mediation effects were tested. 5000 bootstrap samples were used for running the bootstrapping 
procedure using SmartPLS software (Ringle et al., 2005).  
 
Figure 5-17 : Decision tree for evaluating different intervening effects  
Chapter 5: Data analysis 
 
170 
 
After carrying out the bootstrapping procedure, the standard deviation of ߚ௠௫ ൈ ߚ௬௠ 
values was calculated, and then the following formula was used to calculate the t value for 
each hypothesized intervening effect.   
ݐ ൌ ߚ௠௫ ൈ ߚ௬௠ܵܶܦܧܸ൫ߚ௠௫ ൈ ߚ௬௠൯ 5-19 
Where, ߚ௠௫ represents the ߚ coefficient for the relationship between the exogenous 
construct ݔ and the intervening construct m,	and	similarly,	ߚ௬௠	refers	to	the	ߚ coefficient 
associated with the relationship between the intervening construct m	 and endogenous 
construct	 y,	 and	 finally,	 ܵܶܦܧܸ൫ߚ௠௫ ൈ ߚ௬௠൯	 represents the standard deviation of the 
products of		ߚ௠௫	and	ߚ௬௠	for all 5000 bootstrap samples.	Table 5-12	and	Table 5-13	show 
the results of the test and the inferences drawn from the outcomes. 
Table 5-12 : Significance of intervening effects (Iran) 
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Inference 
H5 FC PC CL 0.0627 0.123 1.96 * Yes No Full mediation 
H6 SC PC CL 0.0493 0.132 2.68 ** No No Indirect effect 
H7a2 CL RS PC 0.0470 0.084 1.81 † Yes No Full mediation 
Note 1: PC= Project Control Capability, SC= Social Capital, CL= Collaboration, FC= Formal Contract, 
RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PP= Project (Time&Cost) Performance. 
Note 2: Critical t-values for a two-tailed test are 1.65 † (confidence level = 10%), 1.96 * (confidence level = 
5%), 2.58 ** (confidence level = 1%), and 3.29 *** (confidence level = 0.1%). 
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Table 5-13 : Significance of intervening effects (Australia) 
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Inference 
H5 FC PC CL 0.1661 0.292 1.75 † Yes No Full mediation 
H6 SC PC CL 0.0849 0.177 2.09 * Yes No Full mediation 
H7b2 SC RS CL 0.1161 0.300 2.58 ** No No Indirect effect 
H8b FC RS CL 0.1774 0.417 2.35 * No No Indirect effect 
H9b CL PP PC 0.1388 0.356 2.57 * No  No Indirect effect 
Note 1: PC= Project Control Capability, SC= Social Capital, CL= Collaboration, FC= Formal Contract, 
RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PP= Project (Time&Cost) Performance. 
Note 2: Critical t-values for a two-tailed test are 1.65 † (confidence level = 10%), 1.96 * (confidence level = 
5%), 2.58 ** (confidence level = 1%), and 3.29 *** (confidence level = 0.1%). 
5.6.3 Coefficient of determination (R2 level) 
The R2 value predicts the amount of variance in the outcome variable that can be 
explained by all of the predictor variables linked to it. The R2 value ranges between 0 and 1 
with higher values representing higher levels of predictive accuracy. 
In this study, the R2 values were calculated using SmartPLS software (Ringle et al., 
2005). Following Falk and Miller (1992), an F test was also undertaken to examine the 
significance of the R2 values, by using the following formula: 
ܨ ൌ ܴ
ଶ/݉
ሺ1 െ ܴଶሻ/ሺܰ െ݉ െ 1ሻ 5-20 
Where ܰ is the total number of the sample size, ݉ is the number of predictors of the 
construct, and ܨ is the distribution of R2 values with respect to the degrees of freedom, ݉ and 
ሺܰ െ݉ െ 1ሻ. 
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Table 5-14 : Results of F-test for significance of R2 (Iran) 
   R2 N m F Significance level 
FC 0.009 73 1 0.64 0.425 
CL 0.274 73 2 13.21 0.000 
PC 0.149 73 1 12.42 0.001 
PP 0.107 73 5 1.61 0.171 
RS 0.433 73 6 8.40 0.000 
Note: CL= Collaboration, PC= Project Control Capability, RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PP= Project 
(Time&Cost) Performance. 
Table 5-15 : Results of F-test for significance of R2 (Australia) 
   R2 N m F Significance level 
FC 0.059 38 1 2.26 0.142 
CL 0.534 38 2 20.05 0.000 
PC 0.361 38 1 20.34 0.000 
PP 0.392 38 5 4.13 0.005 
RS 0.614 38 6 8.22 0.000 
Note: CL= Collaboration, PC= Project Control Capability, RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PP= Project 
(Time&Cost) Performance. 
As recommended by Falk and Miller (1992), any R2 values of less than 0.10 are 
problematic, because they indicate that the predictor variables provided almost no information 
about the outcome variable and are therefore meaningless, especially, where there are many 
predictor variables explaining an outcome variable.  
The R2 values and F test results are summarized in Table 5-14 and Table 5-15. The 
results from Iranian data set show that the R2 values for all endogenous constructs were 
substantially significant (p൑0.001), except for FC and PP. It means that SC is not a significant 
predictor for FC and it is also seen that the model cannot significantly predict the changes in 
PP. In other words, there are other factors that are influencing these two constructs that have 
not included in the model. The same inference can be made regarding the strength of 
Australian model in prediction of FC (p>0.1). 
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The R2 values for all other constructs are above 10%, indicating that the model explain 
an acceptable level of variance for all the constructs. In other words, most of the hypothesized 
relationships are apparently informative in the model. PC in the Iranian model is marginally 
above 0.10 (R2 = 0.149), but because this construct is only predicted by one construct (CL), 
no concern is raised about the explanatory power of the model.  
5.7 Chapter summary 
In this chapter the structural and measurement models were developed, tested, modified, 
and validated. When developing the structural model, the main constructs of the research were 
defined and except Social Capital (SC) which was modeled as a second-order construct, the 
other factors such as Formal Contract (FC), Collaboration (CL), Project Control Capability 
(PC), Project Performance (PP), Relationship Performance (RP), and Project Size (PS) were 
designed as single-order constructs. After this, the links between the constructs were 
determined based on the research hypotheses and then the relationships between each 
individual construct and its indicators were examined to determine whether the reflective or 
formative measurement model was better at describing these relationships. Accordingly, the 
reflective measurement model was selected for all constructs to represent their relationships 
with their relevant indicators. Once the structural and measurement models had been 
developed, the data preparation and examination process was undertaken. Through this 
process the outliers and missing data from both data sets were treated and the data was 
prepared for the next stages where the measurement and structural models were being 
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evaluated. Based on outputs drawn from SmartPLS software (Ringle et al., 2005), the 
convergent validity and discriminant validity of the measurement models were examined and 
some indicators were removed from the relevant measurement models. The structural model 
was then evaluated and the hypothesized relationships were tested, and the validated models 
were presented.  
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6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the findings of the research are explained and discussed. Before 
presenting the results, some validating threats that are associated with this type of research are 
carefully examined. Then, all the research hypotheses are examined to see whether they are 
supported or rejected and explanations regarding the findings are presented.   
6.2 Validating threats 
6.2.1 Common method bias 
As mentioned earlier, data collection was based on self-report method and as a result 
the study results may be threaten by method biases, called common method bias. That is, when 
all the dependent and independent variables are measured through the same source, it is more 
likely to have bias in correlations between variables, because any defect in that source may 
contaminate all the measures in the same way, and accordingly, the correlation may not be 
originally based on overlap in variance of the measures themselves. As a result, the correlation 
could inaccurately lead us to infer a substantive relationship (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). 
Therefore, the most critical problem in the use of self-report data is to identify the likely causes 
of false covariance between self-report measures of distinct variables. Generally, there are two 
primary ways to control common method bias: (1) the design of the study’s procedures as ex-
ante remedies; and/or (2) statistical controls as ex-post remedies (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, 
& Podsakoff, 2003).  
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Procedural remedies   
As articulated by Podsakoff et al. (2003), to control the method variance through 
procedural remedies, it is necessary to identify common characteristics of independent and 
dependent variables that are likely to contribute to variance bias and try to eliminate or 
minimize their effects through the design of the study. There are some recognized sources of 
bias, including: (1) the respondent; (2) contextual cues present in the measurement 
environment or within the questionnaire itself; and/or (3) the specific wording and format of 
the questionnaire (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
To address the first issue, it is advised to obtain measures of independent and dependent 
variables from different sources. This procedure makes it impossible for a person to rate the 
measures based on the presumed relationships between variables. In spite of the obvious 
advantages of this approach, it is not feasible to be applied in all types of studies. For example, 
in the case of present study, if I wanted to use this procedure, it was required to find at least 
two persons on each project to link the data obtained from these sources. This method can 
result in the loss of information when only one of the expected respondents participates in the 
survey and as a result, it may have significant effect on response rate. Additionally, it may 
require considerably more time, effort, and/or cost (Podsakoff et al., 2003), especially in a 
multi-national study. Given these disadvantages, this study did not use this procedure. As 
advised by Podsakoff et al. (2003) and Peterson (2000), this study used alternative methods 
such as counterbalanced question order and improved scale items to overcome the threat of 
common method bias. Regarding the former method, the questions related to different 
constructs were randomly ordered in the questionnaire to reduce the effects of question 
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context or item embeddedness on responses. With respect to the latter method, I tried to 
improve the construction of the measures by considering following advices from Podsakoff 
et al. (2003): (1) removing ambiguous or unfamiliar terms; (2) avoiding vague concepts; (3) 
keeping questions simple, specific, and concise; and (4) avoiding double-barreled questions.  
Statistical remedies 
Although using procedural remedies may minimize the probability of common method 
bias, they may not totally eliminate the problem. As a result, it is advised to use one the 
statistical remedies that are available (Podsakoff et al., 2003). One of the most widely used 
statistical techniques is Harman’s single-factor test. In this technique, all of the variables are 
loaded into an exploratory factor analysis and the un-rotated factor solution is examined to 
find the number of factors that are necessary to explain the variance in the variables. If the 
results show that one general factor accounts for the majority of the covariance among the 
measures, it would be the sign of the presence of common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Accordingly, this technique was applied for both Iranian and Australian data sets.  
As shown in Tables 6-1and Table 6-2, the first factor extracted using principal axis 
factoring without rotation, accounts for 21% and 28% of the overall variance in Iranian and 
Australian data sets, respectively, showing that there is no general factor accounting for a 
majority of the variance and it is therefore unlikely that common method variance affects the 
results (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Based on the test results, I conclude that common method 
bias is not a critical issue for this study. 
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Table 6-1 : Total variance explained for Harman’s single factor test (Iran) 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6.578 22.681 22.681 5.993 20.666 20.666 
2 3.685 12.707 35.388    
3 2.630 9.070 44.459    
4 2.021 6.970 51.429    
5 1.948 6.717 58.146    
6 1.357 4.680 62.826    
7 1.223 4.218 67.044    
8 1.119 3.859 70.903    
9 .969 3.341 74.243    
10 .890 3.067 77.311    
11 .792 2.730 80.041    
12 .743 2.562 82.603    
13 .666 2.298 84.902    
14 .621 2.142 87.044    
15 .549 1.894 88.938    
16 .455 1.568 90.505    
17 .389 1.341 91.846    
18 .382 1.316 93.162    
19 .313 1.080 94.242    
20 .304 1.049 95.291    
21 .278 .957 96.249    
22 .243 .838 97.086    
23 .210 .723 97.809    
24 .144 .497 98.306    
25 .138 .477 98.783    
26 .113 .389 99.172    
27 .088 .302 99.474    
28 .082 .283 99.756    
29 .071 .244 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring 
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Table 6-2 : Total variance explained for Harman’s single factor test (Australia) 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.908 29.694 29.694 8.315 27.716 27.716 
2 4.390 14.633 44.327    
3 2.839 9.463 53.790    
4 2.257 7.522 61.312    
5 1.819 6.065 67.377    
6 1.392 4.641 72.018    
7 1.287 4.289 76.308    
8 1.086 3.620 79.927    
9 .814 2.713 82.640    
10 .684 2.281 84.921    
11 .679 2.263 87.184    
12 .532 1.772 88.956    
13 .491 1.635 90.591    
14 .440 1.467 92.058    
15 .397 1.322 93.380    
16 .323 1.078 94.458    
17 .310 1.033 95.492    
18 .254 .848 96.339    
19 .207 .690 97.029    
20 .186 .618 97.648    
21 .158 .528 98.175    
22 .110 .366 98.541    
23 .106 .354 98.894    
24 .101 .337 99.232    
25 .068 .227 99.459    
26 .062 .206 99.665    
27 .053 .176 99.841    
28 .023 .077 99.918    
29 .017 .055 99.973    
30 .008 .027 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring 
6.2.2 Collinearity assessment 
The collinearity problem comes into existence when there is a strong correlation 
between two or more predictors. In extreme conditions in which one predictor is a perfect 
linear combination of other predictor(s), perfect collinearity will be produced. Perfect 
collinearity between two predictors makes it impossible to obtain unique estimates of the 
regression coefficients, because there are infinite numbers of possibilities for combinations of 
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coefficients which work equally well (Field, 2013). Although perfect collinearity is rare in 
real-life data, less than perfect collinearity is virtually inevitable and high level of collinearity 
may bias model estimates (Field, 2013; Hair et al., 2014).  
For evaluating the existence of collinearity in Iranian and Australian structural models, 
variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated using IBM SPSS 21. The VIF indicates the 
strength of one predictor’s linear relationship with the other predictor(s). Tolerance is another 
factor for assessing the collinearity which is VIF’s reciprocal value (1/VIF). As noted by Hair 
et al. (2014), if the largest VIF is greater than 5 (tolerance is below 0.2), then there is a cause 
for concern and some action must be undertaken to treat the problem. There are various 
remedies for eliminating the collinearity concern including: (1) to delete the problematic 
construct, (2) to merge predictors into a single construct, or (3) to create higher order 
constructs.  
As indicated in Tables 6-3 through 6-8, the collinearity assessment was performed for 
those constructs that were simultaneously cooperating with each other to predict another 
construct. For example, in the Iranian structural model, Collaboration (CL) is supposed to be 
predicted by Social Capital (SC) and Formal Contracts (FC). As a result, possibility of 
collinearity between Social Capital (SC) and Formal Contracts (FC) was checked and because 
VIF was less than 5, the probability for collinearity problem was rejected. Similarly, 
collinearity for other constructs was tested. Based on results, the highest VIF in this analysis 
was less than the defined threshold (VIF = 5), and thus, it is unlikely to cause collinearity 
concern. The same procedure was undertaken for Australian structural model and no sign for 
the presence of collinearity was observed.  
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Table 6-3 : Collinearity statistics for FC and SC as predictors of CL (Iran) 
Model Collinearity Statistics Tolerance VIF 
1* CL .869 1.151 SC .869 1.151 
2** CL .889 1.125 FC .889 1.125 
Note: FC= Formal Contracts, SC= Social Capital, CL= Collaboration. 
* Dependent Variable: FC 
** Dependent Variable: SC 
 
Table 6-4 : Collinearity statistics for SC, FC, CL, PC, and PS as predictors of PP (Iran) 
Model Collinearity Statistics Tolerance VIF 
1* 
CL .770 1.299 
FC .870 1.149 
PC .855 1.170 
PP .988 1.012 
PS .931 1.074 
2** 
CL .728 1.373 
PC .870 1.150 
PP .922 1.084 
PS .931 1.074 
SC .806 1.240 
3*** 
PC .912 1.097 
PP .947 1.056 
PS .982 1.019 
SC .914 1.094 
FC .933 1.071 
4**** 
PP .922 1.084 
PS .947 1.056 
SC .807 1.239 
FC .886 1.129 
CL .725 1.379 
5***** 
PP .927 1.078 
SC .803 1.245 
FC .867 1.153 
CL .713 1.402 
PC .866 1.155 
Note: SC= Social Capital, CL= Collaboration, FC= Formal Contract, PC= Project Control capability, PP= 
Project (Time&Cost) Performance, PS= Project Size. 
* Dependent Variable: SC 
** Dependent Variable: FC 
*** Dependent Variable: CL 
**** Dependent Variable: PC 
***** Dependent Variable: PS 
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Table 6-5 : Collinearity statistics for SC, FC, CL, PC, PS, and PP as predictors of RS (Iran) 
Model Collinearity Statistics Tolerance VIF 
1* 
PP .666 1.501 
FC .850 1.177 
CL .694 1.441 
PC .775 1.290 
PS .931 1.074 
RS .566 1.766 
2** 
PP .663 1.507 
CL .699 1.430 
PC .801 1.248 
PS .931 1.074 
RS .549 1.821 
SC .763 1.310 
3*** 
PP .707 1.415 
PC .799 1.252 
PS .980 1.020 
RS .568 1.761 
SC .827 1.210 
FC .927 1.079 
4**** 
PP .675 1.482 
PS .944 1.059 
RS .590 1.694 
SC .763 1.311 
FC .878 1.139 
CL .660 1.516 
5***** 
PP .664 1.506 
RS .538 1.859 
SC .763 1.311 
FC .849 1.178 
CL .675 1.483 
PC .786 1.272 
6****** 
RS .751 1.332 
SC .770 1.299 
FC .853 1.173 
CL .685 1.459 
PC .792 1.262 
PS .936 1.069 
Note: SC= Social Capital, CL= Collaboration, FC= Formal Contract, PC= Project Control capability, PP= 
Project (Time&Cost) Performance, RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PS= Project Size. 
* Dependent Variable: SC 
** Dependent Variable: FC 
*** Dependent Variable: CL 
**** Dependent Variable: PC 
***** Dependent Variable: PS 
****** Dependent Variable: PP 
 
 
Chapter 6: Results and Findings 
 
 
184 
Table 6-6 : Collinearity statistics for FC and SC as predictors of CL (Australia) 
Model Collinearity Statistics Tolerance VIF 
1* CL 0.791 1.264 SC 0.791 1.264 
2** CL 0.696 1.436 FC 0.696 1.436 
Note: FC= Formal Contracts, SC= Social Capital, CL= Collaboration. 
* Dependent Variable: FC 
** Dependent Variable: SC 
 
Table 6-7 : Collinearity statistics for SC, FC, CL, PC, and PS as predictors of PP (Australia) 
Model Collinearity Statistics Tolerance VIF 
1* 
CL .607 1.649 
FC .651 1.537 
PS .805 1.242 
PP .837 1.194 
PC .719 1.390 
2** 
CL .696 1.436 
PS .789 1.268 
PP .837 1.195 
PC .627 1.595 
SC .653 1.531 
3*** 
PS .769 1.300 
PP .841 1.189 
PC .622 1.608 
SC .730 1.370 
FC .835 1.198 
4**** 
PS .818 1.222 
PP .893 1.119 
SC .723 1.383 
FC .628 1.592 
CL .520 1.924 
5***** 
PP .951 1.051 
SC .641 1.560 
FC .626 1.599 
CL .509 1.965 
PC .648 1.543 
Note: SC= Social Capital, CL= Collaboration, FC= Formal Contract, PC= Project Control capability, PP= 
Project (Time&Cost) Performance, PS= Project Size. 
* Dependent Variable: SC 
** Dependent Variable: FC 
*** Dependent Variable: CL 
**** Dependent Variable: PC 
***** Dependent Variable: PS 
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Table 6-8 : Collinearity statistics for SC, FC, CL, PC, PS, and PP as predictors of RS (Australia) 
Model Collinearity Statistics Tolerance VIF 
1* 
PP .769 1.300 
FC .631 1.586 
CL .412 2.426 
PC .698 1.433 
PS .802 1.246 
RS .520 1.922 
2** 
PP .771 1.297 
CL .507 1.974 
PC .618 1.618 
PS .788 1.270 
RS .533 1.874 
SC .649 1.541 
3*** 
PP .803 1.245 
PC .597 1.675 
PS .766 1.305 
RS .716 1.397 
SC .682 1.465 
FC .815 1.227 
4**** 
PP .799 1.252 
PS .810 1.234 
RS .531 1.883 
SC .716 1.397 
FC .616 1.623 
CL .370 2.703 
5***** 
PP .875 1.143 
RS .522 1.917 
SC .640 1.561 
FC .611 1.637 
CL .369 2.707 
PC .630 1.587 
6******* 
RS .566 1.766 
SC .612 1.633 
FC .597 1.676 
CL .386 2.588 
PC .620 1.613 
PS .873 1.146 
Note: SC= Social Capital, CL= Collaboration, FC= Formal Contract, PC= Project Control capability, PP= 
Project (Time&Cost) Performance, RS= Relationship Satisfaction, PS= Project Size. 
* Dependent Variable: SC 
** Dependent Variable: FC 
*** Dependent Variable: CL 
**** Dependent Variable: PC 
***** Dependent Variable: PS 
****** Dependent Variable: PP 
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6.3 Results and findings 
After addressing the validity threats, in this section the research results are discussed 
and the inferences regarding the findings of the research are drawn.  
6.3.1 Interactions between governance mechanisms 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 were related to the relationships between governance 
mechanisms. Based on hypothesis 1, I contended that social capital has negative impact on 
the use of formal contract. Based on the results, no evidence was found for substitutive 
relationship between formal contract and social capital in either context (p>0.1). This result 
contradicts previous findings on substitutive/complementary relationship between prior 
ties/shared norms/trust and formal contract (e.g., Kadefors, 2004; Uzzi, 1997). However, it is 
consistent with recent studies that found non-significant relationship between prior ties and 
formal contract (e.g., Rhee et al., 2014). 
In hypothesis 2, I predicted that formal contract enhances collaborations between project 
partners. The results showed that the impact is positive and significant with p<0.01 for both 
Iranian and Australian cases. Therefore, H2 is supported in both models. The results indicate 
that cultural differences and contract enforceability does not change the significance of 
contract’s impact on collaborations. In other words, contractual arrangements can provide 
institutional framework for cooperation among project partners and promote collaborations, 
even if the institutional environment is different. It can be explained by referring to the nature 
of the construction projects’ activities that are highly team-based and collaboration and 
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communication has widely been accepted as a success factor in this context (Jha & Iyer, 2006; 
S. R. Thomas et al., 1998), and as a result, does not need great pressure to be enforced.  
According to hypothesis 3, I expected that level of social capital contribute to 
collaborations among project partners. As shown in Table 6-9, the impact of social capital on 
collaboration is positive and significant with p<0.001 for Iranian data and p<0.01 for 
Australian data. Thus, H3 is also supported in both Iranian and Australian contexts. This result 
parallels previous findings on the role of social capital (e.g., prior ties, shared norms, trust) in 
promoting social interactions and information exchange among partner (Chua et al., 2012; 
Kirsch et al., 2010). 
Table 6-9 : Hypothesis testing results for H1, H2, and H3 
Hypothesis Path Path coefficient Iran Australia 
H1 SC -> FC 0.093 0.242 
H2 FC -> CL 0.364 ** 0.535 ** 
H3 SC -> CL 0.343 *** 0.385 ** 
6.3.2 The impact of governance mechanisms on project control capability 
Hypotheses 4 through 6 refer to the impact of governance mechanisms on project 
control capability. Based on hypothesis 4, I predicted that collaboration among project 
partners enhances project control capability of the partners. As shown in Table 6-10, the 
impact of collaboration on project control capability is positive and very significant with 
p<0.001 for both Iranian and Australian cases. These results support  L. Liu and Zhu (2007)’s 
proposition about the continuous increase in task programmability and outcome measurability 
throughout the project life cycle. That is, as the project progresses, effective communications 
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among partners promotes clarity in the scope and objectives of the project as well as 
construction processes and leads to more goal congruency. As a result, expected behavior 
become more understandable and observable, and desired outcomes will be more explicit and 
measurable. 
Table 6-10 : Hypothesis testing results for H4  
Hypothesis Path Path coefficient Iran Australia 
H4 CL -> PC 0.386 *** 0.601 *** 
 
In hypothesis 5, I contended that collaboration mediates the positive impact of formal 
contract on project control capability. Consistent with this hypothesis, the results from the 
analysis of Iranian and Australian datasets shows that the relationship between formal contract 
and project control capability is fully mediated by collaboration (Table 6-11). These results 
are consistent with previous findings in construction research which showed that using formal 
contract is not sufficient for exercising control, but the contract provisions should be 
communicated and interpreted through effective information exchange and interactions 
between project managers and project team members (Rahman & Kumaraswamy, 2002). 
Hypothesis 6 predicted the mediation effect of collaboration on the relationship between 
social capital and project control capability. As shown in Table 6-11, the results support the 
full mediation in Australian context, and indirect effect in Iranian projects. These findings 
support previous arguments in the literature about the importance of continuous collaboration 
between partners for maintaining trust and commitment (Adler & Kwon, 2002).  
Prior studies within organizational control domain suggest that control capabilities of 
the partners (e.g., task programmability, outcome measurability) play critical role in the choice 
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of governance mechanisms. Within this tradition, however, the impact of governance 
mechanisms on developing these capabilities was ignored. In this study, I examined this effect 
and the results showed that all the three governance mechanisms (e.g., formal contract, social 
capital, collaborations) significantly contribute to project control capability of the partners. 
Table 6-11 : Hypothesis testing results for H5 and H6 
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Iran Australia Iran Australia 
H5 FC PC CL 1.96 * 1.75 † Full mediation Full mediation 
H6 SC PC CL 2.68 ** 2.09 * Indirect effect Full mediation 
6.3.3 The impact of governance mechanisms on relationship satisfaction 
Hypotheses 7a,b and 8a,b refer to the impact of governance mechanisms on relationship 
satisfaction. In H7a1,2, I expected that in countries with collectivistic culture and low contract 
enforceability, while social capital has direct impact on relationship satisfaction, the impact 
of collaboration on relational satisfaction is mediated by project control capability. As shown 
in Table 5-12 and Table 5-13, these impacts are both significant with p<0.05 and p<0.1; 
therefore H7a1,2 are supported. The results are consistent with the cross-cultural literature that 
showed how collectivists treat differently with out-groups and in-groups (C. C. Chen et al., 
1998; Triandis, 1995). That is, when social capital between partners is high, this strong 
relationship by itself provides satisfaction; but when social capital is low, the partners treat 
each other as out-groups and therefore, their collaboration should be effective in terms of 
increasing their control capability to make them satisfied. 
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In H7b1,2, I predicted that in individualist countries with high contract enforceability, 
collaboration has direct impact on relationship satisfaction and also mediates the relationship 
between social capital and relationship satisfaction. The results supported H7b1 and showed 
that collaboration significantly impacts on relationship satisfaction (p<0.001). It was also 
found that social capital indirectly impacts on relationship satisfaction through collaboration 
(p<0.01). 
These results are consistent with previous cross-cultural research that shows while 
collectivists value trustful and friendly relationships, individualists prefer to have reciprocal 
relationships with their partners. 
 In H8a, I expected to have non-significant relationship between formal contract and 
relationship satisfaction in collectivistic culture with low contract enforceability, and the 
results supported this non-significant relationship (p>0). Consistent with H8b, the results 
showed that in countries with individualistic culture and high contract enforceability, contract 
has indirect effect on relationship satisfaction through collaboration (p<0.05). 
These results are also consistent with cross-cultural literature that regards contract 
enforceability and culture as contingent factors for the efficacy of formal contracts.  
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Table 6-12 : Hypotheses testing results for H7a1, H7b1 and H8a 
Hypothesis Path Path coefficient Iran Australia 
H7a1  SC -> RS 0.236 * - 
H7b1  CL -> RS - 0.780 *** 
H8a FC -> RS -0.176 - 
 
Table 6-13 : Hypotheses testing results for H7a2, H7b2 and H8b 
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) 
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ing
 
co
nst
ruc
t (m
) Bootstrap t-statistic Inference 
Iran Australia Iran Australia 
H7a2 CL RS PC 1.81 † - Full mediation - 
H7b2 SC RS CL - 2.58 ** - Indirect effect 
H8b FC RS CL - 2.35 * - Indirect effect 
 
6.3.4 The impact of governance mechanisms on project (time&cost) 
performance 
Hypotheses 9a,b and 10a,b refer to the impact of governance mechanisms on project 
(time&cost) performance. Based on H9a, I postulated that in collectivistic countries with low 
contract enforceability, social capital has positive impact on project (time&cost) performance. 
As shown in Table 6-14, this hypothesis was supported (p<0.05). The results also supported 
H9b (p<0.05) and showed that in individualistic cultures with high contract enforceability the 
impact of collaboration on project (time&cost) performance is indirect and goes through 
project control capability.  
Based on H10a, formal contract has non-significant impact on project (time&cost) 
performance. The results supported this hypothesis (p>0). In H10b, I postulated that in 
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individualistic cultures with high contract enforceability, formal contract has significant 
impact on project (time&cost) performance. This hypotheses was rejected (p>0). Although 
this finding contradicts some previous research which showed strong association between 
formal contract and exchange performance in countries with high contract enforceability, it 
supports recent research into the construction industry that rejected the direct impact of 
contract on project performance and asserted that collaboration mediates this relationship (L. 
Chen & Manley, 2014). 
Table 6-14 : Hypotheses testing results for H9a, H10a, and H10b 
Hypothesis Path Path coefficient Iran Australia 
H9a  SC -> PP 0.248 * - 
H10a,b FC -> PP 0.142 0.004 
 
Table 6-15 : Hypotheses testing results for H9b  
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nst
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t (m
) Bootstrap t-statistic Inference 
Iran Australia Iran Australia 
H9b CL PP PC - 2.57 * - Indirect effect 
 
6.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter reported the research results and main findings of this thesis. First 
validating threats were examined. As such, common method bias and collinearity problems 
were tested and no sign of concern was found. Then, the results for hypothesis testing were 
presented.  
  
7 CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 Introduction 
 Summary of the findings 
 Theoretical implications 
 Managerial implications 
 Limitations and future research 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws conclusions based on the results of the analyses. It begins with a 
summary of the main findings, discusses implications for theory and practice, highlights the 
limitations of this study, suggests future research directions, and finally ends with drawing 
concluding remarks. 
7.2 Summary of the findings 
The main purpose of this study was to develop the IORs literature on the choice and 
effects of governance mechanisms in the project context. Governance mechanisms are 
necessary tools for regulating the complex transactions between partners to achieve project 
objectives. The efficacy of governance mechanisms—contractual vs. relational 
mechanisms—under different conditions for fulfilling the project objectives has been the 
subject of intense debate over recent decades. However, there are still ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in the literature on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms that need 
further exploration. To fulfill this purpose, an extensive review of literature was undertaken 
and three gaps were identified:  
(1) ambiguous definition of relational governance mechanisms and inconsistent 
findings on the interactions between relational governance and formal contracts in 
explaining exchange performance; 
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(2) how project control capability of partners interacts with governance mechanisms 
and jointly impacts on exchange performance;  
(3) how culture and contract enforceability can influence the choice and effects of 
governance mechanisms in explaining exchange performance. 
Addressing the abovementioned gaps and contributing to the literature, social capital 
(e.g., prior ties, shared norms, trust) as ex-ante relational governance and collaboration (e.g., 
information exchange, joint actions) as ex-post relational governance were differentiated and 
examined under two distinct constructs, a new construct of ‘project control capability’ was 
introduced, and a comparative survey of executive/project managers was conducted in Iran 
and Australia where the context exhibits distinctively contrasting cultural and legal attributes.  
On the interactions between governance mechanisms, no evidence was found for a 
substitutive relationship between formal contract and social capital in either context. This 
result contradicts previous findings on substitutive relationship between prior ties/shared 
norms/trust and formal contract. However, it is consistent with recent studies that found non-
significant relationship between prior ties and formal contract (Rhee et al., 2014). In contrast, 
the results showed that formal contract positively impacts on collaboration that supports the 
complementary relationship. The results also revealed that social capital motivates 
collaboration between partners that is consistent with previous research which showed how 
the facilitating role of social capital promoted cooperation between partners.  
On the impact of governance mechanisms on performance in project context, ‘project 
control capability’ was introduced to explain how the capability of partners in exercising 
governance mechanisms impacts on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms in 
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explaining exchange relationships. With regard to the impact of governance mechanisms on 
relationship satisfaction, the research found that while social capital is the main contributor in 
collectivist cultures, collaboration plays a critical role in individualistic societies. These 
results are consistent with previous cross-cultural research that shows while collectivists value 
trustful and friendly relationships, individualists prefer to have reciprocal relationships with 
their partners. The results also suggested that the impact of collaboration on relationship 
satisfaction is mediated by ‘project control capability’ in collectivistic cultures. This supports 
for the argument from cross-cultural literature that when collectivists work with out-groups, 
they become conservative in their interactions and collaboration with the new partner, unless 
they can control the relationships. It was also found that in individualistic cultures 
collaboration mediates the impact of social capital on relationship satisfaction. In other words, 
individualist partners value trust and friendship, if it leads to reciprocity. Additionally, the 
results showed that formal contract has an indirect effect on relationship satisfaction through 
collaboration in individualistic countries with high contract enforceability. As expected, no 
evidence was found for a relationship between contract and relationship satisfaction in 
collectivistic cultures with low contract enforceability. These results are also consistent with 
cross-cultural literature that regards contract enforceability and culture as contingent factors 
for the efficacy of formal contracts.  
On the impact of governance mechanisms on project (time&cost) performance, the 
results showed that formal contract has no significant impact on project (time&cost) 
performance in any of the two contexts. Although part of this finding contradicts some 
previous research which showed strong association between formal contract and exchange 
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performance in countries with high contract enforceability, it supports recent research into the 
construction industry that rejected the direct impact of contract on project performance and 
asserted that collaboration mediates this relationship. Moreover, the results suggested that 
where in collectivistic countries with low contract enforceability, social capital plays the main 
role in enhancing project (time&cost) performance, in individualistic countries with high 
contract enforceability, collaboration has an indirect impact on project (time&cost) 
performance through project control capability. This finding reveals the important role of 
social capital in countries with a collectivistic culture and low contract enforceability and the 
pivotal role of collaboration in individualistic cultures with high contract enforceability in 
regulating exchange relationships. A summary of the main findings of this thesis are presented 
in table 7-1.  
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Table 7-1 : Summary of the main findings 
Interactions between governance mechanisms 
 In neither collectivistic nor individualistic cultures, social capital has significant impact (positive 
or negative) on formal contract.  
 Formal contract and social capital motivate collaboration. 
The impact of governance mechanisms on project control capability 
 All the three governance mechanisms (e.g., formal contract, social capital, collaboration) 
contribute to the improvement of project control capability. 
 Collaboration plays the primary role and mediates the impact of formal contract and social capital 
on project control capability 
The impact of governance mechanisms on relationship satisfaction 
 While social capital plays the key role in collectivistic cultures, collaboration is the critical 
mechanism in individualistic societies.  
 In countries where the culture is collectivistic, the positive impact of collaboration on relationship 
satisfaction is mediated by project control capability. 
 In countries where the culture is individualistic, social capital has indirect effect on relationship 
satisfaction through collaboration. 
 While formal contract has non-significant impact on relationship performance in countries with 
collectivistic cultures and low contract enforceability, in countries where the culture is 
individualistic and the contract enforceability is high, formal contract has indirect effect on 
relationship satisfaction through collaboration.  
The impact of governance mechanisms on project (time&cost) performance 
 In countries where the culture is collectivistic and the contract enforceability is low,  
o Social capital has positive impact on project (time&cost) performance.  
o Formal contract and collaboration have non-significant impact on project (time&cost) 
performance. 
 In countries where the culture is individualistic and the contract enforceability is high, 
o Collaboration has positive impact on project (time&cost) performance through project 
control capability. 
o Formal contract and social capital have non-significant impact on project (time&cost) 
performance.  
7.3 Theoretical implications  
The findings of this study make multiple contributions to the IORs governance and 
project management literature. First, drawing on social capital and social exchange theories, 
this study differentiated between social capital (e.g., prior ties, shared norms, and trust) as ex-
ante relational governance and collaboration (e.g., information exchange, joint actions) as ex-
post relational governance and investigated the distinct roles of these relational mechanisms 
in regulating exchange relationships. Inconsistencies in the definition and measurement of 
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relational governance mechanisms in previous IORs literature have contributed to inconsistent 
findings on the interactions between contractual and relational governance mechanisms and 
made it difficult to accumulate and develop knowledge based on the previous work. For 
example, Lui and Ngo (2004) considered goodwill trust as a relational governance mechanism 
and their results supported the substitutive effect of relational governance on formal contracts. 
In contrast, Poppo and Zenger (2002) examined the role of relational governance by 
measuring the level of trust and shared goals between partners as well as their joint 
collaborations during the exchange and found that relational mechanisms and formal contacts 
are complementary. One of the main criteria for conceptualizing and measuring relational 
governance mechanisms can be the nature of the mechanisms. As such, differentiating 
between the social bonds, norms and trust developed prior to the collaboration, and 
information exchange, joint actions and social exchanges that take place during the new 
exchange relationships can be helpful. The results confirmed that social capital and 
collaboration act differently in their interactions with formal contract and also in explaining 
project performance. This clarification can provide a basis for future research in IORs 
governance field to distinguish these two relational governance mechanisms regarding 
measurement and examination. This is consistent with the research in sociology and 
psychology that differentiates between trust and social exchanges by referring to the former 
as the main motivator for emergence of the latter (Coleman, 1990; Messick & Brewer, 1983). 
It also provides better understanding of the required conditions for applying each mechanism. 
Where using social capital as a governance mechanism needs social embeddeness, trust and 
strong ties between partners, collaboration requires communication capabilities and joint 
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problem solving, joint decision making, and conflict management competencies (Lee & 
Cavusgil, 2006).  
Second, borrowing from organizational control theory, ‘project control capability’ was 
defined as a new construct to examine the mediating effect of control capability of project 
partners on the efficacy of governance mechanisms in explaining project performance. The 
research findings confirm the importance of project control capability in successful exercise 
of governance mechanisms. Prior studies in organizational control domain suggested that 
control capability of exchange partners is an antecedent for the adoption of different control 
mechanisms (Eisenhardt, 1985; Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Tuuli et al., 2010). The 
results of this study contribute to control theory by showing that control capability not only 
impacts on the efficacy of governance mechanisms, but also is affected and improved by using 
these mechanisms. In other words, there is two-way interaction between control capability 
and governance mechanisms; that is, where having control capabilities facilitates the 
successful exercise of governance mechanisms, applying governance mechanisms can 
promote control capabilities. This result also contributes to IORs governance and project 
management literature by highlighting the pivotal role of project control capability in 
relationship between collaboration and performance. Recent studies in construction industry 
suggested that collaboration mediates the impact of formal contract on project performance 
(e.g., L. Chen & Manley, 2014), however, they failed to differentiate between effective and 
ineffective collaboration. In line with previous research that recognized ineffective 
communications between the project partners as the main obstacle to success (Cheng et al., 
2001; Thamhain, 1992; S. R. Thomas et al., 1998), my findings showed that if collaboration 
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between partners could not enhance project control capability, it would be ineffective. In plain 
words, project control capability mediates the impact of collaboration on project performance. 
Since the establishment and implementation of communication channels incur additional costs 
and require the project team to spend some time for interactions, ignoring these concerns may 
lead to ineffective communications and project failure.  
 Third, this study grounded its theoretical framing on institutional theory and 
Williamson (2000)'s social system model to examine the contingent effect of 
individualistic/collectivistic culture and high/low contract enforceability on the efficacy of 
governance mechanisms in regulating exchange relationships in different contexts. The results 
herein contribute to IORs governance literature and support Williamson (2000)'s assertion that 
the institutional environment—formal and informal institutions—impacts on the comparative 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms. It also extended and enriched TCE by providing 
empirical evidence for the contingent effect of contextual factors such as culture and contract 
enforceability on the efficacy of governance mechanisms. In countries with established formal 
institutions (e.g., rule of law, property rights) contracts are enforceable and can effectively be 
applied to safeguard the relationships against opportunistic behavior. In contrast, in countries 
where these formal constructs are weak, contract enforceability is low and consequently 
contract loses its efficacy in regulating exchange relationships (North, 1990). On the other 
hand, in individualistic cultures the attitudes towards inter-personal and inter-organizational 
relationships are mainly self-serving, so formal contract as a safeguarding tool and 
collaboration as a basis for reciprocity and gaining more resources are valued. On the contrary, 
in collectivistic cultures, loyalty and friendship between group members are prevailed, so 
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social capital is more effective. My results have an additional implication in cultural respect. 
Supporting recent findings in cross-cultural research (Huff & Kelley, 2005; Triandis, 1995), 
the results showed that in collectivistic cultures partners differentiate between in-groups and 
out-groups. While relationships with in-groups are mainly regulated by social capital, 
relationships with out-group members which lack social embeddedness are governed by 
collaboration. However, this collaboration should promote project control capability of the 
partners to lead to relationship satisfaction.   
7.4 Managerial implications  
Good governance of inter-organizational exchanges are critical for ensuring project 
success, so project partners should understand various governance mechanisms, especially the 
factors affecting the efficacy of these mechanisms. Choosing inappropriate governance 
arrangements may incur excessive costs or promote adversarial relationships and 
consequently cause project failure.  
As the findings of this study revealed, formal contracts need to be supported with 
relational governance mechanisms to effectively govern the project. This is especially so with 
complex endeavors such as large construction projects where not only it is impossible to have 
a complete contract, but also it is unreasonable to rely on fixed and inflexible provisions. 
Relational governance mechanisms provide an effective alternative which focus on relational 
norms and joint actions. This study showed that relational governance mechanism is not uni-
dimensional, but social capital as ex-ante relational governance and collaboration as ex-post 
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relational governance have distinctive functions in regulating exchange relationships in 
different contexts.  
The results showed that social capital motivates collaboration between partners. 
Working with trusted partners with embedded relationships and shared norms encourages a 
trustful environment and reduces goal incongruence which balances expectations and 
mitigates the chance of opportunistic behavior, and consequently, encourages collaboration. 
Further, formal contracts require close collaboration to be effective. Drafting a detailed 
contract and leaving it aside without communicating its provisions (e.g., rights and 
responsibilities, project scope, project objectives, rewards and punishments, dispute resolution 
guidelines) does not guarantee its utility. Thus, implementing communications through 
information exchange and social interactions as well as joint actions appears to be a key 
success factor in this respect. However, the study showed that collaboration should be 
effective to impact on performance. As discussed in the literature, effective communication 
in terms of information exchange should be accurate, procedural, understandable, timely, and 
complete. In general, effective collaboration enhances the control capabilities of project 
partners and enables them to control project activities and project team members. Developing 
this capability approach can lead to the definition of core domains of competence for IORs in 
construction projects and the subsequent development of a competency framework that can 
help define pathways for attaining capabilities, and help practitioners outline their learning 
needs.  
Another important implication of this thesis for practitioners is that it provides 
interesting insights into the choice and effects of different governance mechanisms in various 
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cultures and under different legal systems. Based on these findings, if the project context is a 
collectivistic culture with low contract enforceability, since social capital is the key enabler 
of project (time&cost) performance and relationship satisfaction in this context, if the partners 
are new to each other and lack this critical asset, they must focus on effective collaboration 
enabled by ‘project control capability’ to build social capital. In contrast, if the project is in 
an individualistic culture with high contract enforceability, the key governance mechanism 
that should be carefully implemented is collaboration. In this context, effective collaboration 
not only contributes significantly to project (time&cost) performance, but also enables the 
contractual provisions to be successfully implemented. Thus, collaboration is the primary 
contributor to relationship satisfaction by providing opportunities for knowledge 
accessing/acquisition, resource sharing, joint problem solving, and joint decision making.  
Finally, the results may have implications for clients or constructors that are seeking to 
select partners to conduct a large project. In this regard, the findings provide valuable insights 
into the design of partner selection mechanisms in different contexts. For example, in 
countries with a collectivistic culture and low legal enforceability, since social capital is 
critical for success, it can receive more priority and be regarded as a critical factor among 
other criteria for partner selection. In other words, the partners that share a longer history are 
on priority, ceteris paribus, whereas in individualistic cultures with high legal enforceability, 
communication capabilities and contract drafting skills are the most important factors, 
respectively.  
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7.5 Limitations and future research 
There are limitations in this study which suggest opportunities for additional research 
on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms. First, small sample size (specifically in 
Australian data set) is the major limitation of this thesis and makes it difficult to generalize 
the findings of the research. Additionally, caution needs to be exercised when generalizing 
the findings from this study across different types of projects or industries or cultures. These 
findings were based on a relatively small sample in the construction industry in Iran and 
Australia. Further studies are needed to validate the findings in similar contexts. Additionally, 
the cross-sectional nature of the research data limits the extent to which the causing effects in 
the model can be examined. Furthermore, although I did not find any evidence of a response 
bias, the validity of inferences should be considered in light of modest response rate and 
sample size. Future research can examine the validity of these findings by conducting 
longitudinal research or using larger samples to provide stronger claims of causality.  
A further limitation of this study is treating governance mechanisms as static concepts 
that have a constant value throughout the project life cycle, rather than dynamic concepts that 
evolve during the period of collaboration. Past research has suggested that social capital 
evolves over ongoing social interactions among partners, and terms of contract also change. 
It is also expected that the need for reliance on different governance mechanisms would 
change during the project life cycle (Zheng, Roehrich, & Lewis, 2008). Considering the 
evolution of social capital and changes in the need for collaboration and reliance on 
contractual provisions could be a useful extension of this research.  
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Additionally, since the project control capability construct and its indicators were 
primarily borrowed from organizational control literature, it may not precisely reflect the 
specific control capabilities that are required in construction projects. Thus, future research 
can develop a new scale for measuring control capabilities of project partners. Further, it 
would probably be more accurate to consider different control capabilities for different project 
partners (e.g., client, contractor, consultant engineers) based on their role and responsibilities 
in the project.  
Furthermore, although the study reveals the contingent effect of 
individualistic/collectivistic culture and high/low contract enforceability on the choice and 
effects of governance mechanisms, it does not tell the whole story and alternative explanations 
are worth considering. For example, it is plausible that other national institutions such as 
political or economic structures or market conditions influence the efficacy of governance 
mechanisms. Additionally, although the focus of the study was limited to large construction 
projects to control for diversity of the businesses and project size was adopted as control 
variable, controlling for additional variables such as asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty, and buyer switching difficulty would be helpful for exploring alternative 
explanations for the choice and effects of governance mechanisms.  
Finally, although I studied the client-contractor relationships, the data was collected 
from contractors. Although there is evidence about consistency of perceptions across 
exchange partners (e.g., J. C. Anderson & Narus, 1990; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998), 
future research could extend this work by including a wider sample of participants from both 
sides of partnerships. 
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7.6 Conclusions 
This research aimed to add to the long-lasting debate on the choice and effects of 
governance mechanisms in regulating exchange relationships in complex transactions. Since 
exchange relationships in large construction projects are very complex, project partners need 
to utilize various governance mechanisms to safeguard relationships against opportunistic 
behaviors and integrate inter-organizational resources to achieve organizational objectives. 
While the IORs literature suggests to partners to use governance mechanisms (e.g., contractual 
mechanisms, relational mechanisms) to regulate their relationships, the factors that affect the 
choice and effects of these governance mechanisms have not been fully understood. As such, 
this research was conducted to fill three gaps in IORs governance literature by investigating 
(1) the distinctive role of social capital (e.g., prior ties, shared norms, trust) as ex-ante 
relational governance and collaboration (e.g., information exchange, joint actions) as ex-post 
relational governance in explaining project performance; (2) the impact of ‘project control 
capability’ on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms; and (3) the contingent effect 
of culture and contract enforceability on the choice and effects of governance mechanisms.  
The results showed that there is no substitutive relationship between formal contract and 
ex-ante and ex-post relational governance mechanisms, but they are complementary. It was 
also found that in collectivistic cultures with low contract enforceability: firstly, social capital 
is a key enabler of project (time&cost) performance and relationship satisfaction; and 
secondly, effective collaboration impacts indirectly on relationship satisfaction enabled by 
‘project control capability’. In contrast, in individualistic cultures with high conreact 
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enforceability: firstly, effective collaboration is the linchpin between social capital, formal 
contract, and project (time&cost) performance enabled by ‘project control capability’; 
secondly, working with trusted partners motivates collaboration which in turn leads to 
relationship satisfaction; and thirdly, formal contract impacts indirectly on relationship 
satisfaction enabled by collaboration.  
The findings of this thesis provide important implications for IORs governance and 
project management literature and pave the way for further research into the choice and effects 
of governance mechanisms in construction projects. 
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Table B-1 : Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical studies for measuring contractual mechanisms 
No. Study Constructs and indicators Measurement source 
1 Cannon et al. 
(2000)  
Legal bonds (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85): 
1- We have specific, well-detailed agreements with this vendor.  
2- We have formal agreements that detail the obligations of both parties.  
3- We have detailed contractual agreements with this supplier. 
- 
2 Jap and 
Ganesan (2000) 
Explicit contract (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.57): 
1- Our relationship with X is governed primarily by written contracts. 
2- The only way we seem to communicate effectively with X is when everything is spelled out in detail. 
3- Over time we have developed ways of doing things with X that never need to be expressed formally. (R) 
- 
3 Poppo and 
Zenger (2002) 
Contractual complexity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.65): 
1- The formal contract is highly customized and required considerable legal work.  
2- The length of the contract (in pages). 
 
- 
(Macneil, 1978) 
4 Luo (2002) Contract 
Term specificity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71): 
- The degree to which an IJV contract (i.e., original main body and appendices as well as renewal supplements, 
if any) specifies relevant terms and clauses concerning the following:  
1- How to set up the joint venture;  
2- How to operate and manage the joint venture;  
3- How to cooperate and resolve conflict between partners;   
4- How to terminate the joint venture. 
Contingency adaptability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.65): 
- The extent to which: 
1- Term specification is adaptive for issues that are particularly vulnerable to an uncertain environment or 
resource availability; 
2- The contract has specified major principles or guidelines for handling unanticipated contingencies as they 
arise;  
3- The contract has provided alternative solutions for responding to various contingencies that are likely to arise. 
- 
5 Lui and Ngo 
(2004) 
Contractual safeguards: 
1- A Standard Form of Building Contract for Hong Kong (or the Hong Kong Government Building Contract); 
2- The right to examine and audit all relevant records through a quantity surveyor; 
3- The designation of certain information as confidential and subject to proprietary provisions of the contract;  
4- A lawsuit clause;  
5- A majority of the standard provisions of the Extension of Time Claim;  
6- Loss and expense standard contractual claims. 
(Parkhe, 1993) 
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Table B-1 : Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical studies for measuring contractual mechanisms (Cont.) 
No. Study Constructs and indicators Measurement source 
6 Wuyts and Geyskens 
(2005) 
Detailed contract drafting (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86): 
1- In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely defines the role of each partner.  
2- In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely defines the responsibilities of each partner.  
3- In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely states how each party is to perform.  
4- In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely states what will happen in the case of 
events occurring that were not planned. 
(Lusch & Brown, 1996) 
7 Ferguson et al. 
(2005) 
Contractual governance (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74): 
1- Relationship governed by rules and regulations of contract; 
2- We would find satisfactory solution to disagreement, whether it is based on the agreement or 
not; 
3- Contract adapted to company's specific needs; 
4- Contract changes as client's business changes. 
- 
8 Lee and Cavusgil 
(2006) 
Contractual-based governance: 
- The extent to which formalized, legally binding agreement or a contract were used to govern the 
inter-firm partnership. 
(Roath, Miller, & Cavusgil, 
2002) 
9 Yu et al. (2006) Formal governance: 
- the degree to which the governance mechanisms are used with suppliers are:  
1- the manufacturing firm needs to guarantee the purchasing quantity; 
2- the manufacturing firm needs to guarantee the purchasing price; 
3- the manufacturing firm needs to pay part of the investment in the molds; and  
4- the manufacturing firm pays for the mold investment beforehand and the supplier will 
reimburse the investments to the manufacturing firm only once the purchase-quantity has reached 
a certain level
- 
10 Carson et al. (2006) Governance regime:  
- Fixed price contract; 
- Negotiable price contract 
- 
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Table B-1 : Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical studies for measuring contractual mechanisms (Cont.) 
No. Study Constructs and indicators Measurement source 
11 Mellewigt et 
al. (2007) 
Contractual complexity: 
1- Periodic written reports of all relevant transactions. 
2- Prompt written notice of any departures from the agreement. 
3- The right to examine and audit all relevant records through a firm of CPAs. 
4- Designation of certain information as proprietary and subject to confidentiality provisions of the contract. 
5- Non-use of proprietary information even after termination of agreement. 
6- Termination of agreement.  
7- Arbitration clauses.  
8- Lawsuit provisions.  
9- Detailed provisions about the subject and scope of the partnership. 
10- Clauses of liability in case of breach of contract.  
11- Penalties in case of default of payment and default in delivery. 
(Parkhe, 1993; 
Reuer & Ariño, 
2002)  
12 Y. Chen and 
Bharadwaj 
(2009) 
Monitoring (The levels of contractual monitoring):  
- the sum of the contract clauses specifying monitoring mechanisms; 
Property rights protection (The levels of property rights protection): 
- the number of property rights protections; 
Dispute resolution (The number of choices of dispute resolution mechanisms): 
- the number of dispute resolution methods; 
Contingency (The number of contingency mechanisms): 
- the total number of contract contingency and adjustment methods; 
Contract extensiveness (Overall measure of the use of different provisions): 
- the total number of clauses in the above four categories. 
- 
13 Şengün and 
Wasti 
(2009) 
Output control (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70): 
1- Significant effort was required to gather the information necessary to outline the working relationship with 
wholesaler X. 
2- There were many unspecified terms which had to be worked out as the relationship with wholesaler X developed. 
3- It takes significant effort to detect whether or not wholesaler X conforms to pre-specified conditions. 
4- Accurately evaluating wholesaler X requires a lot of effort. 
(Grover & 
Malhotra, 2003; 
Möllering, 2003) 
14 Lui (2009) Formal contract: 
1- We do not have specific, well-detailed agreements with this vendor. (R)  
2- We have formal agreements that detail the obligations of both parties.  
3- Our relationship with this supplier is governed primarily by written contract.  
4- We have a detailed contract.  
(Cannon & 
Perreault, 1999)  
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15 Zhang et al. 
(2009) 
Formal contract (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78): 
1- There are prescribed, detailed rules in the contract in order to constrain each partner’s behavior. 
2- Each partner has already considered the contingencies that might emerge in the future at its best and has made 
an exhaustive explanation in the contract. 
3- Cooperation will not be set up unless all details about cooperation have passed the regulations in the contract. 
4- There are explicitly prescribed institutions and measures to resolve the disputes and conflicts between partners. 
5- There are well-specified responsibilities and rights for each partner. 
(Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Jap & 
Ganesan, 2000)  
16 Hoetker and 
Mellewigt 
(2009) 
Formal governance: 
1- Business plans;  
2- Balance sheets;  
3- Performance indices;  
4- Profit and loss accounts;  
5- Internal prices;  
6- Economic efficiency calculations;   
7- Reports;   
8- Service level agreements. 
(Tarun K Das & 
Teng, 1998; 
Makhija & 
Ganesh, 1997; 
Martinez & 
Jarillo, 1989; 
Sitkin & 
Weingart, 1995)  
17 D. Chen et al. 
(2009) 
Formal control  
Output control (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.70): 
1- Overall goal setting; 
2- Venture performance evaluation; 
3- Executive rewards and recognition. 
Process control (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.70): 
1- Functional control; 
2- Rules and regulations; 
3- Organizational structure; 
4- Job description; 
5- Reporting systems. 
- 
18 Y. Liu et al. 
(2009) 
Contract (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77): 
1- Our relationship with this supplier (buyer) is governed primarily by written contracts. 
2- We have formal agreements that detail the obligations and rights of both parties. 
3- Over time we have developed ways of doing things with this supplier (buyer) that never need to be expressed 
contractually or formally (Reverse coded). 
(Cannon et al., 
2000; Jap & 
Ganesan, 2000) 
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19 Zhou and 
Poppo 
(2010) 
Explicit contracts:  
In dealing with this supplier, our contracts precisely defines  
1- the role of each party.  
2- the responsibilities of each party.  
3- how each party is to perform.  
4- what will happen in the case of event occurring unplanned.  
5- how disagreements will be resolved. 
(Lusch & Brown, 
1996) 
20 J. J. Li et al. 
(2010) 
Formal contract (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89): 
1- We have specific, well-detailed agreements with this supplier. 
2- We have customized agreements that detail the obligations of both parties. 
3- We have detailed contractual agreements specifically designed with this supplier. 
(Cannon & 
Perreault, 1999) 
21 Y. Li et al. 
(2010) 
Formal control (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.75): 
1- The contract precisely defines the role/responsibilities of the partner and our firm. 
2- The contract precisely states how each party is to perform in cooperation.  
3- Generally, the contract is a primary mechanism to regulate the behavior of the partner in cooperation. 
(Fryxell et al., 
2002; Jap & 
Ganesan, 2000)  
22 Zhao and 
Wang 
(2011) 
Formal contract (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.725): 
1- Our relationship with this channel member is governed primarily by written contracts; 
2- We have formal agreements that detail the obligations and rights of both parties; 
3- Over time we have developed ways of doing things with this member that never need to be expressed 
contractually or formally (R). 
(Y. Liu et al., 
2009) 
23 Yang et al. 
(2011) 
Formal control: 
1- We design specific, well-designed agreements with this supplier  
2- We have formal agreements that specify in detail the obligations of both parties. 
3- We have detailed a contractual agreement particular to this supplier. 
(Cannon & 
Perreault, 1999) 
24 L. Wang et 
al. (2011) 
Contract (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76):  
1- A detailed contract is the most important way to guarantee cooperation success. 
2- In general, contract is the most important way to manage supplier’s behavior. 
3- Both parties would like to have details of cooperation fully listed in contract. 
(Jap & Ganesan, 
2000) 
25 Arranz and 
Arroyabe 
(2012) 
Formal contract (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70 for exploration projects and 0.73 for exploitation projects) 
1- Our relationship with partners is governed primarily by written contracts. 
2- We have formal agreements that specify the obligations and rights of both parties. 
3- Over time we have developed ways of doing things with these partners that never need to be expressed 
contractually or formally (R). 
(Cannon et al., 
2000; Jap & 
Ganesan, 2000; 
Poppo & Zenger, 
2002) 
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26 Wallenburg and 
Schäffler (2014) 
Output control (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85): 
1- The alliance partners have established clear goals for this alliance.  
2- Our alliance partners monitor the extent to which our company attains its agreed upon performance goals. 
3- If our performance goals were not met, we would have to explain ourselves to the alliance partners. 
4- We receive feedback from our alliance partners based on the extent to which we achieve our goals. 
5- The distribution of alliance gains among the alliance members is based upon the accomplishment of 
predefined goals (eliminated). 
Process control (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85):  
1- Our alliance partners monitor the extent to which we follow established procedures. 
2- Our alliance partners evaluate the procedures we use to accomplish our alliance goals. 
3- Our alliance partners give advice on improving our procedures when established goals are not achieved.  
4- Our alliance partners give us feedback based on the extent to which we accomplish our performance 
goals (eliminated). 
(Jaworski & 
MacInnis, 1989) 
27 Rhee et al. (2014) Formal control (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87) 
Transactional provision (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83): 
1- Concerning the two companies' responsibilities and roles in the transaction, our contract is quite 
explicit/specific. 
2- Concerning the criteria and process for monitoring products or service quality, our contract is quite 
explicit/specific. 
3- Concerning the compensation/incentive method, our contract is quite explicit/specific. 
4- Concerning the enforceability of the contract, such as the legal liability for a contract breach, our contract 
is quite explicit/specific 
Relational provision (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78): 
1- Concerning the duties and rights of the two companies resulting from future uncertainty, our contract is 
quite explicit/specific. 
2- Concerning the method/process of contract modification (renegotiation), our contract is quite 
explicit/specific. 
- 
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28 L. Chen 
and Manley 
(2014) 
Formal mechanisms 
Risk and reward sharing regime:  
1- Any profit due to cost underruns that was allocated to the key service providers was shared fairly between the key 
service providers 
2- Any share of loss due to cost overruns that was allocated to the key service providers was shared fairly between 
the key service providers 
3- The client and key service providers shared equal proportions of profit due to cost underruns. 
4- The client and key service providers shared equal proportions of loss due to project overruns. 
5- Each key service provider’s overall downside risk was capped at the loss of its fee.  
6- A single agreement was developed to acknowledge that the parties would collectively share project risk. 
7- There were incentive mechanisms to meet project goals. 
Collective cost estimation: 
1- The client selected only one service provider to participate in the pricing stage. 
2- The client and the key service providers collectively estimated the expected project cost. 
Risk sharing of service providers: 
1- The key service providers paid a penalty if completion dates were not met. 
2- The key service providers solely carried the risk of rising costs. 
- 
29 Ping et al. 
(2014) 
Contractual governance 
Fundamental elements (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88): 
1- Our relationship with the other parties is governed primarily by written contracts.  
2- The contract has detailed the obligations and rights of every party. 
3- The contract has a clear statement of the time, place and the way of project fulfillment. 
4- The contract has described the safety management requirements, quality standards, contract price and its payment 
to manage the agreements among parties. 
Change elements (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.75): 
1- The contract has specified major principles or guidelines for handling unanticipated contingencies as they arise. 
2- The contract has provided alternative solutions for responding to various contingencies that are likely to arise. 
3- The contract has allowed us to respond quickly to match evolving client requirements. 
Governance elements (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88): 
1- We have a clear expression of the default definitions and formula. 
2- The contract has a detailed description of conditions under which termination may occur. 
3- The contract has specified the procedures and methods for disputes. 
 
(Goo, Kishore, 
Rao, & Nam, 
2009; Luo, 2002) 
 
 
 
(Goo et al., 2009; 
Luo, 2002) 
 
 
(Goo et al., 2009) 
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30 Abdi and 
Aulakh 
(2014) 
Contractual governance (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74): 
1- Most aspects of our relationship with this foreign partner are guided by formal written rules;  
2- Most aspects of our agreement with this foreign partner are clearly specified in the contract;  
3- If our foreign partner firm fails to achieve the specified targets specified in the contract, we penalize it. 
(Mayer, 2006) 
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No. Study Constructs and indicators Measurement source 
1 Cannon et al. 
(2000)  
Cooperative norms (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81): 
1- We must work together to be successful. 
2- Both sides are concerned about the other's profitability.  
3- Both sides are willing to make cooperative changes. 
4- One party will not take advantage of a strong bargaining position.  
5- We do not mind owing each other favors. 
6- No matter who is at fault, problems are joint responsibilities. 
New scale 
2 Jap and Ganesan 
(2000) 
Relational norms  
Information exchange (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71): 
1- In this relationship, it is expected that any information that might help the other party will be provided 
to them. 
2- Information is informally exchanged in this relationship. 
3- It is expected that we keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other party. 
4- Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently. 
5- It is expected that the parties will provide proprietary information if it can help the other party. 
Solidarity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79): 
1- Problems that arise in the course of this relationship are treated by my firm and X as joint rather than 
individual responsibilities. 
2- Both firms are committed to improvements that may benefit the relationship as a whole and not only 
the individual parties. 
3- The firms do not mind owing each other favors 
Participation (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73): 
1- X plays an active role in the decisions we make regarding the retailing of its products. 
2- We consult X concerning inventory decisions.  
3- Our ideas for selling and servicing are welcomed by X. 
4- X regularly asks our opinions and suggestions for improving its products and services. 
(Dwyer & Oh, 1988; 
Heide & John, 1992) 
 
3 Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) 
Relational governance (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78): 
1- The buyer has an extremely collaborative relationship with the vendor.  
2- Both parties share long- and short-term goals and plans.  
3- The buyer can rely on the vendor to keep promises. 
(J. C. Anderson & 
Narus, 1990; Joskow, 
1988; Macneil, 1978) 
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Table B-2 : Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical studies for measuring relational mechanisms (Cont.) 
No. Study Factors and indicators Measurement source 
4 Luo (2002) Cooperation (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.69): 
- The degree of interparty cooperation in the following nine areas:  
1- Cooperation in deciding strategic objectives and goals for the IJV;  
2- Being ready to give in on an issue to enable the IJV to achieve its goals, as stated in the contract; 
3- Reaching a consensus in making strategic decisions;  
4- Cooperation in distribution and execution of authority; 
5- Cooperation in establishing managerial rules and policies for IJV activities;  
6- Mutual consultation concerning strategic issues under uncertain conditions; 
7- Cooperation in functional domains such as production, research and development, purchasing, 
marketing, human resources, and budgeting;  
8- Cooperation in selecting the senior management of the IJV;  
9- Cooperation in implementing new plans for the production mix, R&D, or new market entry. 
- 
5 Lui and Ngo 
(2004) 
Trust  
Goodwill trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86): 
1- Whether the contact person of the contractor had been fair in negotiations, 
2- Whether the contact person was trustworthy,  
3- Whether the contact person could be counted on to act as expected, and  
4- Whether the architect had faith in the contact person. 
Competence trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81): 
1- To what extent the contractor had been chosen for the project because of  a good reputation and rich 
resources of capital and labor? 
 
(Zaheer et al., 1998) 
 
 
 
(Reuer & Ariño, 2002) 
6 Wuyts and 
Geyskens (2005) 
Close partner selection (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.94): 
1- Before our firm selected this supplier for this purchasing agreement,  
2- Our firm worked very intensively with this supplier. 
3- Our firm had a very close relationship with this supplier. 
4- Our firm's relationship with this supplier was like an arm's length delivery of the components. 
5- Our firm and this supplier had a very collaborative relationship, like a real team. 
(Marsden & Campbell, 
1984; Mathews, White, 
Long, Soper, & 
BERGEN, 1998) 
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7 Ferguson et al. 
(2005) 
Relational governance (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83): 
1- Disagreements with bank are solved as they occur. 
2- Bank will work with company to prevent problems. 
3- Bank committed to help in company's success. 
4- Bank helps company improve its performance. 
5- Business with bank based on mutual benefit and trust. 
6- When faced with adversity, company can rely on bank. 
7- Bank will expend effort to keep unsatisfied company. 
8- Bank adapts to company's needs. 
9- Bank will negotiate adjustments in service fees. 
10- Bank provides timely and accurate information. 
11- Bank informs us of new products or modifications. 
(Brown, Dev, & Lee, 
2000; Cannon et al., 
2000; Paulin, Perrien, 
& Ferguson, 1997) 
8 Lee and Cavusgil 
(2006) 
Relational-based governance: 
- The extent to which the following relational tools were used in governance process: 
1- mutual trust;  
2- commitment;  
3- relational capital. 
(Roath et al., 2002) 
9 Yu et al. (2006) Trust  
Calculative trust:  
1- The manufacturing firms will continue to do business with the supplier. 
2- The manufacturing firm has a big buyer to support his business. 
3- The manufacturing firm can introduce other customers to the supplier. 
Benevolent trust (the length of a relationship):  
The length of a relationship is measured by the number of years that the supplier and the manufacturing 
firm have been working with one another.  
Benevolent trust (assistance-giving routines): 
1- The extent to which the manufacturing firm provides assistance in solving the supplierTs technical 
problems. 
2- The extent to which the manufacturing firm provides assistance in helping the supplier reduce 
manufacturing costs. 
3- The extent to which the manufacturing firm provides assistance to help the supplier improve 
inventory management
(Dyer & Chu, 2000; 
Holm, Eriksson, & 
Johanson, 1996) 
 
 
- 
 
 
(Dyer & Chu, 2000) 
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10 Carson et al. 
(2006) 
Reputation: 
1- It was easy to learn about how contractors behaved in their previous relationships with other firms. 
2- If the contractor was less than cooperative in our relationship, it would greatly damage its reputation with other 
firms. 
3- In our industry, it is widely known which contractors are the best in terms of performance and collaboration. 
4- Contractors in our industry watch their reputations closely. 
Continuity: 
1- The parties expect to work together on future projects.  
2- The parties were expected to focus on long-term goals in the relationship.  
3- Our involvement with this contractor is open ended.  
4- We expect this contractor to grow into a lifelong partner. 
Trust:  
1- The parties held mutual expectations about the con tractor's responsibilities that went beyond what was specified 
in our formal agreements.  
2- The parties expected that conflicts would be re solved fairly, even if no guidelines were given by our formal 
agreements.  
3- There were performance goals for the contractor's work that were understood and accepted by the parties even 
though not written in our formal agreements. 
4- When an unexpected situation arose, the parties had a mutual understanding that a win-win solution would be 
found, even if it contradicted our formal agreements. 
5- Both parties were expected to share helpful information to an extent beyond that required by our formal 
agreements. 
6- The parties held mutual expectations that each would be flexible and responsive to requests by the other, even if 
not obliged by our formal agreements.  
7- Both parties understood that problems arising during the relationship would be solved jointly through 
communication and cooperation rather than 'just reference to our formal agreements. 
8- Both parties understood that each would adjust to changing circumstances, even if not bound to change by formal 
agreements. 
History of relationships:  
- The total number of projects on which the client had employed the supplier in the past, not including the present 
project. 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
(Heide & Miner, 
1992) 
 
 
 
(Noordewier, 
John, & Nevin, 
1990; Zaheer et 
al., 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  
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11 Mellewigt et al. (2007) Trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80): 
1- We worked together with the outside vendor in the past very often. 
2- We will work together with the outside vendor in the future. 
- 
12 Y. Chen and 
Bharadwaj (2009) 
Prior interaction:  
- The parties were involved in any business interaction including: 
(a) equity interest relationship: subsidiary/spin-off; (b) common board membership; (c) other lines of 
business. 
- 
13 Şengün and Wasti 
(2009) 
Trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85): 
1- Wholesaler X tries to help our pharmacy achieve its goals. 
2- Wholesaler X tells both the advantages and disadvantages of its services.  
3- Wholesaler X has always been evenhanded in its negotiations with us.  
4- Wholesaler X is consistent in its applications.  
5- Wholesaler X is an excellent source of accurate information.  
6- Wholesaler X is very reliable.  
7- The employees of Wholesaler X really know their business. 
Social control (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.68): 
1- Wholesaler X has a good reputation in the industry. 
2- Legal disputes with wholesaler X are unlikely. 
3- Disagreements with wholesaler X are solved by working together. 
4- We both cooperate to solve disagreements. 
(Doucette, 1993; 
Zaheer et al., 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Doucette, 1993) 
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14 Lui (2009) Competence trust: 
- How much do the following factors affect your choice of this supplier? 
1- Reputation of being capable.  
2- Production skill and expertise. 
Time horizon 
History of relationships: 
a) Exploration phase: We are learning about each other, seeing if we can get along and meet each other’s 
needs, meet our obligations to the other, and whether we might be able to work together more in the future. 
b) Buildup phase: Both of us are getting increasing benefits from our relationship. We have begun to build up 
trust and understanding between us, and we are satisfied so far, and see potential for a long term relationship. 
c) Maturity phase: Both of us see the relationship as ongoing and satisfactory, and both are receiving what we 
want and need by working together. 
d) Decline phase: One or both of us are becoming less satisfied with the relationship and may decide to end 
the relationship and/or search for alternative partners. 
e) Deterioration phase: We have begun to negotiate terms for ending our relationship or are in the process of 
dissolving the relationship. 
Expected future: 
Does your company plan to increase business with this supplier in the foreseeable future? 
a) Yes; b) No; c) Undecided. 
(Lui & Ngo, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
(Jap & Ganesan, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
15 Zhang et al. 
(2009) 
Informal contract (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78): 
1- Partners will communicate with each other about events and changes that will affect collaboration effects. 
2- Each partner has devoted itself to mutually beneficial improvements, not only to its personal benefit. 
3- The advice proposed by my organization in cooperation is always supported by the other partner. 
Shared values (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86): 
1- Before this project, my partner had frequent contact with us. 
2- It has always been pleasant during the cooperative history between us.  
3- My partner is familiar with my prior cooperative experience.  
Prior ties (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73): 
1- My partner and I both have reached a consensus on industrial development. 
2- My partner and I both have common intentions pertaining to this cooperation. 
3- Even though there exists some inconsistency about short-term goals between us, it will not cause a big 
conflict. 
4. My partner and I are both prepared to find common ground in the cooperation.
(Tsai & Ghoshal, 
1998; Uzzi, 1997) 
 
 
(Morgan & Hunt, 
1994; Young-Ybarra 
& Wiersema, 1999) 
 
(E. Anderson & Weitz, 
1989; Gulati, 1995) 
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16 Hoetker and 
Mellewigt (2009) 
Relational governance: 
1- Steering committees; 
2- Project groups; 
3- Expert committees; 
4- Cooperation managers;  
5- Face-to-face meetings at the top management level;  
6- Filling of key positions. 
(Kale, Singh, & 
Perlmutter, 2000; 
Makhija & Ganesh, 
1997; Martinez & 
Jarillo, 1989) 
17 D. Chen et al. 
(2009) 
Social control (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.70): 
1- Training and seminars 
2- Collaborative task forces 
3- Socialization with IJV managers 
- 
18 Y. Liu et al. 
(2009) 
Relational mechanisms 
Relational norms (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77): 
1- In this relationship, both parties expect that any information that may help the other party will be 
provided to that party. 
2- In this relationship, ideas or initiatives of both sides are widely shared and welcomed via open 
communication. 
3- In this relationship, problems or conflicts are expected by both parties to be solved through joint 
consultations and discussions. 
4- In this relationship, both parties play a healthy role in the other party’s decisions via mutual 
understanding and socialization. 
Trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79): 
1- We believe in the supplier (buyer) because it is sincere. 
2- Though the circumstances change, we believe that the supplier (buyer) will be ready and willing to 
offer us assistance and support. 
3- When making important decisions, the supplier (buyer) is concerned about our welfare or interests. 
4- We can count that the supplier (buyer)’s future decisions and actions will not adversely affect us. 
5- When it comes to things that are important to us, we can depend on the supplier’s (buyer’s) support. 
 
(Jap & Ganesan, 2000)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Kumar et al., 1995)  
 
19 Zhou and Poppo 
(2010) 
Relational reliability:  
1- This supplier is trustworthy.  
2- This supplier has always been evenhanded in its negotiation with us.  
3- This supplier never uses opportunities that arise to profit at our expense.  
4- We are not hesitant to transact with this supplier when the specifications are vague. 
(Zaheer et al., 1998) 
Appendix B: Constructs Used in Prior Studies to Measure Governance Mechanisms 
 
 
243 
Table B-2 : Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical studies for measuring relational mechanisms (Cont.) 
No. Study Factors and indicators Measurement source 
20 J. J. Li et al. 
(2010) 
Relational mechanisms  
Brokered access (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73): 
1- We have gotten new supplier contacts through this supplier. 
2- This supplier has ‘opened the doors’ to other suppliers for us.  
Shared goals (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76): 
1- Both parties in this relationship are enthusiastic about pursuing the collective goals.  
2- Both parties are committed to improvements that may benefit the relationship as a whole, and not only 
the individual parties. 
3- The parties share the same ambition and vision. 
4- In most aspects of the relationship the parties are jointly responsible for getting things done. 
Trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86): 
1- This supplier is trustworthy.  
2- This supplier has always been evenhanded in its negotiations with us. 
3- This supplier never uses opportunities that arise to profit at our expense.  
4- We are not hesitant to transact with this supplier when the specifications are vague. 
 
(Yli-Renko, Sapienza, 
& Hay, 2001) 
 
(Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
(Zaheer et al., 1998) 
 
21 Y. Li et al. (2010) Social control (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.75): 
Please indicate whether control was currently exercised through: 
1- Reliance on the partner to keep promises; 
2- Participatory decision-making; 
3- Joint problem solving; 
4- Fine-grained information exchange. 
Length of cooperation:  
- The buyer-supplier relation has been in place for: (years) 
Institutionalization (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.75): 
1- Whether a comprehensive set of norms of action has been well developed in the cooperation. 
2- Whether a binding set of rules for both firms has been created. 
3- Whether both firms have a mutual understanding of each other’s organizational culture, values, and 
operations. 
4- Whether both firms share a common vision and ambition for the cooperative venture. 
(Fryxell et al., 2002; 
Jap & Ganesan, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
(Boddy, Macbeth, & 
Wagner, 2000; Ingram 
& Inman, 1996) 
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Table B-2 : Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical studies for measuring relational mechanisms (Cont.) 
No. Study Factors and indicators Measurement source 
22 Zhao and Wang 
(2011) 
Relational trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.701): 
1- This channel member keeps promises made to our firm. 
2- When it comes to things that are important to us, we can depend on the member’s support. 
3- When making important decisions, the member is concerned about our welfare or interests. 
4- This channel member is trustworthy. 
Relational learning (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.881): 
1- We exchange information on successful and unsuccessful experiences with products exchanged in the 
relationship. 
2- We exchange information related to changes in end-user needs, preferences, and behavior.  
3- We exchange information as soon as possible of any unexpected problems. 
4- We exchange information on changes related to our two organizations’ strategies and policies. 
5- We exchange information that is sensitive for both parties, such as financial performance and 
company know-how. 
(Y. Liu et al., 2009) 
 
 
 
 
(Selnes & Sallis, 2003) 
 
23 Yang et al. (2011) Trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.840): 
1- The parties feel comfortable to let the other party make decisions. 
2- The parties can effectively do things for each other. 
3- The parties are confident that the interests will be ensured because both are thought to belong to “one 
family”. 
 
Social ties: 
1- Our firm has a close relationship with this supplier. 
2- We feel that this supplier and our firm are in the same boat. 
3- Our firm and this supplier site visit each other frequently 
4- Our firm and the supplier frequently organize social activities. 
5- The relationship between our firm and this supplier is reciprocal. 
6- Our firm has a good relationship with this supplier. 
(Lewicki & Bunker, 
1995; Lewicki, 
McAllister, & Bies, 
1998; Maguire, 
Phillips, & Hardy, 
2001)  
(Rowley, Behrens, & 
Krackhardt, 2000; Uzzi, 
1999; Wegener, 1991) 
24 L. Wang et al. 
(2011) 
Trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92):  
1- Our partners are dependable. 
2- Our partners always keep their word. 
3- We are confident of the capability of our partners. 
4- Without monitoring, our partners will try to fulfill his obligations. 
(Jap & Ganesan, 2000; 
Zaheer et al., 1998) 
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Table B-2 : Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical studies for measuring relational mechanisms (Cont.) 
No. Study Factors and indicators Measurement source 
25 Arranz and 
Arroyabe (2012) 
Transactional mechanisms (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81 for exploration projects and 0.79 for 
exploitation projects) 
Relational norms:  
1- We expected open communication and sharing of information, ideas or initiatives from other 
partners. 
2- Partners had extremely collaborative relationships. 
3- Partners shared long- and short-term goals and plans. 
4- Problems and conflicts were solved through joint consultations and discussions. 
Trust: 
1- We believed in the honesty of actions from other partners. 
2- In decision-making, partners were concerned about interests of other partners. 
(Jap & Ganesan, 2000; 
Kumar et al., 1995; Y. Liu 
et al., 2009; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002) 
26 Wallenburg and 
Schäffler (2014) 
Joint action in ex ante performance measurement process (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93): 
1- We involve all key alliance partners in defining performance measures. 
2- All of our key alliance partners have a major influence on selecting performance measures. 
3- All key alliance partners are intensely involved in setting targets for decision-relevant metrics. 
4- All our key alliance partners have a strong influence on setting (performance) targets for decision-
relevant (performance) metrics. 
Joint action in ex post performance measurement process (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93): 
1- We involve all key alliance partners in measuring the operational performance of the alliance. 
2- All of our key alliance partners have a major part in the operational performance measurement of 
the alliance performance. 
3- We involve all key alliance partners in analyzing the alliance performance results. 
4- All of our key alliance partners have a major part in analyzing the alliance performance results. 
(I. J. Chen & Paulraj, 
2004; Forslund & 
Jonsson, 2009)  
 
 
 
(I. J. Chen & Paulraj, 
2004; Forslund & 
Jonsson, 2009) 
27 Rhee et al. (2014) Social control (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) 
1- We rely on each other to keep promises. 
2- We share information on plans and schedules frequently. 
3- We keep our major supplier informed about events or changes that may affect them. 
4- We share the problems that arise and attempt to resolve them together. 
5- When an unexpected situation arises, we prefer to work out a new deal as opposed to holding each 
other to the original agreement. 
Prior ties  
- The number of years that the two firms have been engaged. 
(Fryxell et al., 2002; Jap 
& Ganesan, 2000; Y. Li et 
al., 2010) 
 
 
 
 
(Joshi & Campbell, 2003; 
Reuer & Ariño, 2007) 
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Table B-2 : Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical studies for measuring relational mechanisms (Cont.) 
No. Study Factors and indicators Measurement source 
28 L. Chen and Manley 
(2014) 
Informal mechanisms  
Leadership: 
1- The project leaders had strong communication skills.  
2- The project leaders had strong logistical skill. 
3- The project leaders made decisions on a best-for-project basis. 
4- The project leaders encouraged cooperation between parties. 
5- The project leaders sought consensus across the supply chain in decision making. 
6- The project leaders effectively engaged with community stakeholders. 
Team workshops: 
1- Where appropriate, workshops involved all levels of seniority. 
2- Where appropriate, workshops involved a broad range of participant types. 
3- Workshops were used for post-review assessment. 
4- Workshops were used for innovation development. 
5- Workshops were used for integration of key service providers. 
6- Workshops were run by an independent facilitator. 
Relationship manager: 
1- There was a relationship manager to maintain cooperation over the life of the project. 
2- There was a relationship manager to build cooperation in the early stages of the project. 
Communication systems: 
1- An integrated web-based IT system was established, including building information modeling 
(BIM).  
2-Communication tools (such as an expectation matrix) were developed to allow participant 
organizations to align their commitments to each other. 
Design integration: 
1- Construction subcontractors were involved in design. 
2- Suppliers were involved in design. 
3- The main contractor was involved in design 
- 
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Table B-2 : Constructs, indicators, and measurement sources used in selected empirical studies for measuring relational mechanisms (Cont.) 
No. Study Factors and indicators Measurement source 
29 Ping et al. (2014) Relational governance 
Trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.882): 
1- We believe the other party can keep their word throughout the life of the project. 
2- We feel confident that the other parties have high levels of integrity and honest. 
3- We believe the project engineers and other technical people are competent at what they are doing. 
4- We trust that the project participants are able to fulfill contractual agreements. 
5- We are certain that the other parties have the ability to perform their tasks. 
6- We believe that the other parties could meet the requirements of the project in technology and 
management. 
Relational norms  
Information exchange (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.822): 
1- Exchange of information among the parties takes place frequently. 
2- We keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other parties. 
3- The parties established a good contact with each other, avoiding the possible misunderstandings. 
Solidarity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.825): 
1- The parties are consistent with the expectations of this project. 
2- The project overall plan and the implementation scheme are shared by every party. 
3- Parties involved in this project regard each other as major partners. 
Flexibility (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.731) 
1- We believed that the parties were willing to cooperate to work out solutions if some unexpected 
situations arise. 
2- The parties expected to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship to cope with changing 
circumstances. 
 
(Chow, Cheung, & 
Chan, 2012; Pinto, 
Slevin, & English, 
2009)  
 
 
 
 
(Griffith & Myers, 
2005) 
 
30 Abdi and Aulakh 
(2014) 
Relational governance (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77): 
1- Our business relationship with this partner is characterized by high levels of trust.  
2- In this partnership, our firm and our foreign partner expect to be able to make adjustments in the 
ongoing relationship to cope with changing circumstances.  
3- Over the years, our relationship with this partner is more and more guided by informal rules and 
procedures. 
4- Our firm and the foreign partner are very committed to each other. 
(Aulakh, Kotabe, & 
Sahay, 1996; Heide & 
John, 1992) 
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C. APPENDIX C: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Participation Information Statement  
Dear Sir/Madam 
You are kindly invited to participate in a study of "Governance Mechanisms in Large Construction Projects”.  
What is the study about? 
The main objective of this research is to validate a framework predicting the effects of various project governance mechanisms such as 
formal contracts, relational contracting, etc on the performance of the large construction project. 
Who is carrying out the study? 
The study is being conducted by Seyed Banihashemi and will form the basis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University 
of Sydney under the supervision of Dr. Li Liu, Senior Lecturer. 
What does the study involve? 
The questionnaire asks questions about governance mechanisms and project context in relation to the respondents most recently 
completed project.  
How much time will the questionnaire take? 
It will take around 20 minutes to complete this questionnaire.  
Can I withdraw from the study? 
Being in this study is completely voluntary. You are not under any obligation to consent and if you do consent you can withdraw at 
any time without affecting your relationship with The University of Sydney. Also you can withdraw if you submitted your survey by 
informing Seyed Banihashemi by e-mail within three months. If you want to find more about the study, please do not hesitate to 
contact Seyed Banihashemi. 
Will anyone else know the results? 
All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers will have access to information on 
participants, unless otherwise required by law. Therefore, the likely outcome from this study is publications in academic conferences, 
journals and/or books but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report.  
Will the study benefit me? 
The validated framework from the study will help construction companies to better understand how various governance mechanisms 
impact on project performance and assist in the design of effective project governance system. The research is expected to conclude 
by mid 2014, and consequently participants in the study will receive a summary of findings.  
Can I tell other people about the study? 
Please feel free to inform your fellow project managers about the study and they are welcome to participate.  
What if I require further information about the study or my involvement in it? 
If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Seyed Banihashemi, PhD Candidate, School of Civil 
Engineering, Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology, The University of Sydney. 
Email: seyed.banihashemi@sydney.edu.au. 
Mob: +61 4 5097 9794 
Fax: +61 2 9351 3343 
What if I have a complaint or any concerns? 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact The Manager, Human Ethics 
Administration, The University of Sydney. 
Email: ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au 
Tel: +61 (2) 8627-8176 
Fax: +61 (2) 8627-8177 
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Questionnaire Guideline 
Below are some guidelines for completing the questionnaire: 
1. This study defines a ‘Large Construction Project’ as a project with a total contract value of more than AUD5 M (in the case of a 
sub-contractor, total sub-contract value of more than $5 M), hereinafter referred to as ‘project’.  
2. Please respond in relation to one of your most recently completed projects (completed during last 3 years or has had at least 80% 
progress till now).  
3. The word ‘organisation’ refers to the parent organisation for which you have been working during the project. 
4. The word ‘partner’ refers to:  
a. The ‘client’, if your organisation has been in a contractual relationship with them as the ‘contractor’ or as a ‘sub-contractor’ 
of the project. 
b. The ‘general contractor’, if your organisation has been in a contractual relationship with them as a ‘sub-contractor’ of the 
project.  
c. The ‘sub-contractor’, if your organisation has been in a contractual relationship with them as the ‘general contractor’ of the 
project.  
5. The word ‘project organisation’ refers to a temporary organisation composed of representative project team members from 
different parent organisations whose articles of association are the contract.  
6. You have to be one of the senior managers in the project or in one of the parent organisations (e.g. contractor, sub-contractor). 
You should have enough information about the history of collaboration between the organisation and the partner as well as the 
details of formal and informal contracts in this project. 
 
Participant Consent Form 
* I agree to give consent to my participation in the research project entitled: "Governance Mechanisms in Large Construction 
Projects". 
□ Accept 
 
* In giving my consent I acknowledge that: 
1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to me, and any questions I have about the 
project have been answered to my satisfaction. 
2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the opportunity to discuss the information and my 
involvement in the project with the researcher/s. 
3. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not under any obligation to consent. 
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential. I understand that any research data gathered from the results of the study 
may be published however no information about me will be used in any way that is identifiable. 
5. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my relationship with the researcher(s) or the 
University of Sydney now or in the future. 
 
* I consent to receive feedback: 
□ Yes   □ No  
 
* Please provide your details below: 
Name:   
Email: 
Company:  
 
Signature ............................................................................    Date ........................................... 
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Part 1: Project-specific Characteristics 
1. Within which of the following fields would you classify the project? 
□ Building (e.g. educational, commercial, residential, administrative, public, recreational, hospital, industrial plant) 
□ Water (e.g. dam, sewage plant, pipeline, water tank) 
□ Transportation (e.g. airport, port, bridge, road, tunnel) 
□ Power (e.g. power plant, distribution network) 
□ Oil & Gas (e.g. off-shore platform, drilling, pipeline, refinery, petrochemical plant) 
□ Other (please specify)  
2. What was the size of the project in terms of total planned budget? (specified in your organisation's contract with your 
partner) 
 5-10 10-50 50-100 100-500 500-1000 More than 1000 
Total planned budget (Millon AUD) □  □  □  □  □  □ 
3. What was the size of the project in terms of total planned duration? (specified in your organisation's contract with your 
partner) 
 Less than 12 12-18 18-24 24-36 36-48 
More than 
48 
Total planned duration (Months) □  □  □  □  □  □ 
4. To what extent do you agree with the following statements, comparing this project to other construction projects in 
Australia in the same field?  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
1        2 
 
 
3         4        5 
Strongly 
agree 
6        7 
 
N/A 
 
PC1. It was possible to check the project team’s progress towards project goals through 
formal reviews and reports. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
PC2. It was possible to monitor how well the project team was meeting project goals. □ □  □  □  □ □ □ □ 
PC3. It was possible for us to determine whether the project team built a product (or 
deliverable) that satisfied the users’ requirements. □ □  □  □  □ □ □ □ 
PC4. There were quantifiable measures of the extent to which project cost targets were 
achieved. □ □  □  □  □ □ □ □ 
PC5. It was possible for us to determine whether the project team completed the project 
work on time. □ □  □  □  □ □ □ □ 
PC6. There was a well understood way to carry out project tasks. □ □  □  □  □ □ □ □ 
PC7. The project team had substantive experience with this type of project. □ □  □  □  □ □ □ □ 
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Part 2: Ex-ante Governance Mechanisms 
5. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the relationships between your organisation and your 
partner, before the start of this project?  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
1        2 
 
 
3         4        5 
Strongly 
agree 
6        7 
 
N/A 
 
PT1. Before this project, we had extensive collaboration with this partner on other projects. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
PT2. It has always been pleasant during our collaboration. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
SN1. Both organisations had a mutual understanding of each other’s organisational culture, 
values, and operations. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
SN2. Both organisations had a common vision and ambition for the cooperative venture. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
SN3. A comprehensive set of norms of action was well developed in the cooperation. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
TR1. During our previous collaborations, this partner has been evenhanded in its 
negotiations with us. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
TR2. During our previous collaborations, this partner has been an excellent source of 
accurate information. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
TR3. During our previous collaborations, this partner has been reliable. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Part 3: Ex-post Governance Mechanisms 
6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the relationship between your organisation and your 
partner, during the project?  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
1        2 
 
 
3         4        5 
Strongly 
agree 
6        7 
 
N/A 
 
CL1. The two sides exchanged information on changes related to organisations’ strategies 
and policies. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
CL2. The two sides exchanged information on successful and unsuccessful experiences. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
CL3. The two sides have been communicating with each other via frequent interaction and 
informal socialization. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
CL4. The two sides agreed to effectively do things for each other. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
CL5. The two sides agreed to work together to resolve the problems caused by whichever 
party. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
CL6. The two sides have been communicating with each other about events and changes 
that would affect collaboration. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
FC1. Generally, the contract was the primary mechanism to regulate the behavior of the 
partner in cooperation. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
FC2. In our contract with our partner we defined project targets in detail. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
FC3. There were well-specified responsibilities and rights for each partner. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
FC4. There were explicitly prescribed institutions and measures to resolve the disputes and 
conflicts between partners. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
FC5. Each partner considered the contingencies that might emerge in the future at its best 
and made an exhaustive explanation in the contract. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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Part 4: Performance 
7. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the relationship performance on this project between your 
organisation and your partner? 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1           2 
 
 
3          4           5 
Strongly 
Agree 
6          7 
RS1. This cooperation contributed to our core competencies and competitive advantage. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
RS2. This cooperation realised the objectives we set out to achieve. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
RS3. This cooperation improved our relationship and increased the likelihood of working 
together in the future. □  □  □  □  □  □  □ 
RS4. Overall, we were satisfied with the performance of this cooperation. □  □  □  □  □  □  □ 
8. How do you rate the project performance on fulfilling each of the following objectives comparing to similar projects in the 
field? 
 
 
Very poor 
1           2 
 
 
3          4           5 
 
Excellent 
6          7 
PP1. Time performance  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
PP2. Cost performance  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
9. In answering the following questions, if project schedule was adjusted during the course of the project by agreement with 
the partner, please use those adjusted targets. Otherwise, please use the initial project schedule. 
 Behind 
Schedule 
(+100%) 
Behind 
Schedule 
(50%-
100%) 
Behind 
Schedule 
(25%-50%) 
Behind 
Schedule 
(0-25%) 
On 
Schedule 
Ahead of 
Schedule 
(0-25%) 
Ahead of 
Schedule 
(25%-50%) 
Ahead of 
Schedule 
(50%-
100%) 
Ahead of 
Schedule 
(+100%) 
Project time 
performance □  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  □ 
10. In answering the following questions, if project budget was adjusted during the course of the project by agreement with the 
partner, please use those adjusted budget. Otherwise, please use the initial project budget. 
 Above the 
Budget 
(+100%) 
Above the 
Budget 
(50%-
100%) 
Above the 
Budget 
(25%-50%) 
Above the 
Budget    
(0-25%) 
On Budget 
Below the 
Budget    
(0-25%) 
Below the 
Budget 
(25%-50%) 
Below the 
Budget 
(50%-
100%) 
Below the 
Budget 
(+100%) 
Project cost 
performance □  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  □ 
 
Part 5: Background information 
11. Age of organisation (in years):  
□ Less than 5  □ 5-10  □ 10-15  □ 15-20  □ More than 20 
12. What was your designation/job title in the project/parent organisation at the time you were working at the project?  
 
13. How many years have you practised in the construction industry?  
□ Less than 5  □ 5-10  □ 10-20  □ 20-30  □ More than 30 
14. What is your age?   
□ 25-30  □ 30-40 □ 40-50  □ 50-60  □ 60 or older 
15. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
□ High school  □ Diploma □ Bachelor □ Masters Degree/Honors  □ PhD 
* Comments: 
   ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎناﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﻣﻮرد ﻧﻴﺎز 
 
  ﺑﺴﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻲ
 ﺑﺎ ﺳﻼم؛
  .ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻴﺪ "ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺰﻣﻬﺎي ﻛﻨﺘﺮﻟﻲ در ﭘﺮوژه ﻫﺎي ﺑﺰرگ اﺣﺪاث"اﺣﺘﺮاﻣﺎ، از ﺷﻤﺎ دﻋﻮت ﻣﻲ ﺷﻮد در اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﺑﺎ ﻧﺎم 
   ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﭼﻴﺴﺖ؟
ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺰﻣﻬﺎي ﻛﻨﺘﺮﻟﻲ ﻫﻤﭽﻮن ﻗﺮاردادﻫﺎي رﺳﻤﻲ و ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻼت ﻏﻴﺮرﺳﻤﻲ، ﺑﺮ ﻋﻤﻠﻜﺮد ﻫﺪف اﺻﻠﻲ اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﻃﺮاﺣﻲ و اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﺳﻨﺠﻲ ﻣﺪﻟﻲ ﺑﺮاي ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ اﻧﻮاع 
  .ﭘﺮوژه ﻫﺎي ﺑﺰرگ اﺣﺪاث ﻣﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ
   ﭼﻪ ﻛﺴﻲ اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ را اﻧﺠﺎم ﻣﻲ دﻫﺪ؟
  .اﻳﻦ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﻪ، ﻣﺒﻨﺎي رﺳﺎﻟﺔ دﻛﺘﺮي ﺳﻴﺪ ﻳﺎﺳﺮ ﺑﻨﻲ ﻫﺎﺷﻤﻲ ﻣﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ در داﻧﺸﮕﺎه ﺳﻴﺪﻧﻲ و ﺑﺎ راﻫﻨﻤﺎﻳﻲ دﻛﺘﺮ ﻟﻴﻮ اﻧﺠﺎم ﻣﻲ ﮔﻴﺮد
  ﭘﺮﺳﺸﻨﺎﻣﻪ ﭼﻪ ﻣﻮاردي را ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻲ ﺷﻮد؟
ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻦ ﻳﻜﻲ از ﭘﺮوژه اﻳﻦ ﭘﺮﺳﺸﻨﺎﻣﻪ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﺳﺆاﻻﺗﻲ در ﻣﻮرد ﻣﺸﺨﺼﺎت ﭘﺮوژه و ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺰﻣﻬﺎي ﻛﻨﺘﺮﻟﻲ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﺷﺪه در ﭘﺮوژه ﻣﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻛﻪ ﻓﺮد ﭘﺎﺳﺦ دﻫﻨﺪه ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﺎ در 
  .ﻫﺎﻳﻲ ﻛﻪ اﺧﻴﺮا اﻧﺠﺎم داده اﺳﺖ ﺑﻪ اﻳﻦ ﺳﺆاﻻت ﭘﺎﺳﺦ ﮔﻮﻳﺪ
  ﻪ ﭼﻘﺪر زﻣﺎن ﻻزم دارد؟ﭘﺎﺳﺨﮕﻮﻳﻲ ﺑﻪ ﭘﺮﺳﺸﻨﺎﻣ
  دﻗﻴﻘﻪ زﻣﺎن ﻻزم ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ داﺷﺖ.  02 ﺎﺳﺨﮕﻮﻳﻲ ﺑﻪ اﻳﻦ ﭘﺮﺳﺸﻨﺎﻣﻪ در ﺣﺪودﭘ
  آﻳﺎ ﻣﻲ ﺗﻮان از ﺷﺮﻛﺖ در ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ اﻧﺼﺮاف داد؟
ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ، ﺷﻤﺎ ﻗﺎدر ﺷﺮﻛﺖ در اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﻛﺎﻣﻼ اﺧﺘﻴﺎري ﺑﻮده و ﺷﻤﺎ ﻫﻴﭽﮕﻮﻧﻪ اﺟﺒﺎري ﺑﺮاي اﻳﻦ ﻛﺎر ﻧﺨﻮاﻫﻴﺪ داﺷﺖ. ﺣﺘﻲ در ﺻﻮرت ﻣﻮاﻓﻘﺖ اوﻟﻴﻪ ﺟﻬﺖ ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ در 
ﭘﺲ از ﭘﺮ ﻛﺮدن و  ﺧﻮاﻫﻴﺪ ﺑﻮد ﺑﺪون ﻫﻴﭽﮕﻮﻧﻪ ﭘﻴﺎﻣﺪي، در ﻫﺮ زﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻻزم ﺑﺪاﻧﻴﺪ از ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ در اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ اﻧﺼﺮاف دﻫﻴﺪ. ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ ﺷﻤﺎ ﻣﻲ ﺗﻮاﻧﻴﺪ ﺗﺎ ﺳﻪ ﻣﺎه
  .ارﺳﺎل ﭘﺮﺳﺸﻨﺎﻣﻪ، ﺑﺎ ارﺳﺎل اﻳﻤﻴﻞ ﺑﻪ ﺳﻴﺪ ﻳﺎﺳﺮ ﺑﻨﻲ ﻫﺎﺷﻤﻲ اﻧﺼﺮاف ﺧﻮد را اﻋﻼم ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻴﺪ
  آوري ﺷﺪه در اﺧﺘﻴﺎر دﻳﮕﺮان ﻗﺮار داده ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ ﺷﺪ؟آﻳﺎ ﭘﺎﺳﺨﻬﺎي ﺟﻤﻊ 
ﺳﻲ ﺧﻮاﻫﻨﺪ داﺷﺖ. ﺗﻤﺎﻣﻲ اﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﺟﻤﻊ آوري ﺷﺪه در اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ، از ﺟﻤﻠﻪ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ آن، ﺑﺼﻮرت ﻛﺎﻣﻼ ﻣﺤﺮﻣﺎﻧﻪ ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ ﺑﻮد و ﺗﻨﻬﺎ ﺗﻴﻢ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﺑﻪ اﻳﻦ اﻃﻼﻋﺎت دﺳﺘﺮ
ﻳﺎ ﻛﺘﺎﺑﻬﺎ اراﺋﻪ ﮔﺮدﻧﺪ، ﻛﻠﻴﺔ اﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎن در اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﻣﺨﻔﻲ ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮاﻳﻦ در ﺻﻮرﺗﻴﻜﻪ ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎت در ﻛﻨﻔﺮاﻧﺴﻬﺎي ﻋﻠﻤﻲ، ﻣﺠﻼت ﭘﮋوﻫﺸﻲ و 
  .ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ ﻣﺎﻧﺪ
  آﻳﺎ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ در اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﻓﺎﻳﺪه اي ﺑﺮاي ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪه ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ داﺷﺖ؟
ﺷﺪ درك ﺑﻬﺘﺮي از ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ  ﺷﺮﻛﺘﻬﺎ و اﻓﺮاد ﻓﻌﺎل در ﺻﻨﻌﺖ اﺣﺪاث ﻣﻲ ﺗﻮاﻧﻨﺪ ﺑﺎ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده از ﻣﺪﻟﻲ ﻛﻪ در ﻧﻬﺎﻳﺖ ﺑﻌﻨﻮان ﺧﺮوﺟﻲ اﻳﻦ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ اراﺋﻪ ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ
ﺮوژه ﻫﺎي آﺗﻲ ﻳﺎري ﻧﻤﺎﻳﺪ. ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺰﻣﻬﺎي ﻛﻨﺘﺮﻟﻲ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺑﺮ ﻋﻤﻠﻜﺮد ﭘﺮوژه ﻫﺎ داﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ و اﻳﻦ اﻣﺮ ﻣﻲ ﺗﻮاﻧﺪ آﻧﻬﺎ را در ﻃﺮاﺣﻲ ﻳﻚ ﺳﻴﺴﺘﻢ ﻛﻨﺘﺮﻟﻲ ﻣﺆﺛﺮ و ﻛﺎرآ ﺑﺮاي ﭘ
  .اي از ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ آن در اﺧﺘﻴﺎر ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎن ﻋﺰﻳﺰ ﻗﺮار ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ ﮔﺮﻓﺖ ﺷﻤﺴﻲ ﺧﺎﺗﻤﻪ ﻳﺎﺑﺪ ﻛﻪ در ﭘﺎﻳﺎن ﺧﻼﺻﻪ 3931ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﻣﻲ ﺷﻮد اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﺗﺎ ﻧﻴﻤﺔ ﺳﺎل 
  آﻳﺎ ﻣﻲ ﺗﻮان دﻳﮕﺮان را از اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﻣﻄﻠﻊ ﺳﺎﺧﺖ؟
  .ﺷﻤﺎ ﻣﻲ ﺗﻮاﻧﻴﺪ در ﻣﻮرد اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﺑﺎ دوﺳﺘﺎن و ﻫﻤﻜﺎران ﺧﻮد ﮔﻔﺘﮕﻮ ﻛﻨﻴﺪ و در ﺻﻮرت ﺗﻤﺎﻳﻞ، آﻧﻬﺎ را ﺑﻪ ﺷﺮﻛﺖ در اﻳﻦ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ دﻋﻮت ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻴﺪ
  ﺎت ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ در ﻣﻮرد اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ و ﻳﺎ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﻲ ﭘﺎﺳﺦ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺆاﻻت ﭼﻪ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﻛﺮد؟در ﺻﻮرت ﻧﻴﺎز ﺑﻪ اﻃﻼﻋ
داﻧﺸﮕﺎه  ﺧﻮاﻫﺸﻤﻨﺪ اﺳﺖ در ﻫﺮ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ از ﻫﻤﻜﺎري، ﺟﻬﺖ درﻳﺎﻓﺖ اﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﺗﻜﻤﻴﻠﻲ، ﺑﺎ ﺳﻴﺪ ﻳﺎﺳﺮ ﺑﻨﻲ ﻫﺎﺷﻤﻲ، داﻧﺸﺠﻮي دﻛﺘﺮي ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺖ ﺳﺎﺧﺖ داﻧﺸﻜﺪة ﻋﻤﺮان
   ua.ude.yendys@imehsahinab.deyes: آدرس اﻳﻤﻴﻞ .ﺳﻴﺪﻧﻲ ﺗﻤﺎس ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻴﺪ
 3433 1539 2 16+(: ﺷﻤﺎره دورﻧﮕﺎر )اﺳﺘﺮاﻟﻴﺎ؛  4979 7905 4 16+(: ﺷﻤﺎره ﺗﻠﻔﻦ ﻫﻤﺮاه )اﺳﺘﺮاﻟﻴﺎ
 در ﺻﻮرت ﺑﺮوز ﻧﮕﺮاﻧﻲ و ﻳﺎ ﺷﻜﺎﻳﺖ در ﻣﻮرد اﻳﻦ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﭼﻪ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﻛﺮد؟
 .ﻧﮕﺮاﻧﻲ و ﻳﺎ ﺷﻜﺎﻳﺖ در ﻣﻮرد اﻧﺠﺎم اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ، ﻣﻲ ﺗﻮاﻧﻴﺪ ﺑﺎ ﻣﺪﻳﺮ ادارة ﺣﻘﻮق ﻓﺮدي داﻧﺸﮕﺎه ﺳﻴﺪﻧﻲ ﺗﻤﺎس ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﻳﻴﺪ در ﺻﻮرت ﺑﺮوز ﻫﺮﮔﻮﻧﻪ
  7718 7268 2 16+ﺷﻤﺎره دورﻧﮕﺎر )اﺳﺘﺮاﻟﻴﺎ(: ؛  8 2 16+6718 726(: ﺷﻤﺎره ﺗﻠﻔﻦ )اﺳﺘﺮاﻟﻴﺎ؛  ua.ude.yendys@scihtenamuh.or: آدرس اﻳﻤﻴﻞ
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  راﻫﻨﻤﺎي ﭘﺎﺳﺨﮕﻮﻳﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺆاﻻت
 ﭘﺎﺳﺨﮕﻮي ﮔﺮاﻣﻲ؛
 :ﺧﻮاﻫﺸﻤﻨﺪ اﺳﺖ ﺑﻨﺪﻫﺎي زﻳﺮ را ﻛﻪ ﺣﺎوي ﻧﻜﺎت ﻣﻬﻤﻲ درﺑﺎرة ﺑﺮﺧﻲ ﻣﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﺷﺪه در ﭘﺮﺳﺸﻨﺎﻣﻪ ﻣﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ، ﺑﺎ دﻗﺖ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﻪ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﻳﻴﺪ
ﺑﺎﺷﺪ )در ﻣﻮرد ﭘﻴﻤﺎﻧﻜﺎر ﺟﺰء، ﻣﺒﻠﻎ ﻗﺮارداد ﭘﻴﻤﺎﻧﻜﺎر  ﻣﻴﻠﻴﺎرد ﺗﻮﻣﺎن 5ﺑﻴﺶ از  ﻣﻲ ﺷﻮد ﻛﻪ ﻣﺒﻠﻎ ﻛﻠﻲ ﻗﺮارداد آنﺑﻪ ﭘﺮوژه اي ﮔﻔﺘﻪ  "ﭘﺮوژة ﺑﺰرگ اﺣﺪاث" در اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ، .1
 .اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﺧﻮاﻫﻴﻢ ﻛﺮد "ﭘﺮوژه" از ﻟﻔﻆ "ﭘﺮوژه ﺑﺰرگ اﺣﺪاث"ﻣﻴﻠﻴﺎرد ﺗﻮﻣﺎن ﺑﺎﺷﺪ(. از اﻳﻦ ﭘﺲ ﺑﺠﺎي  5ﺟﺰء ﺑﺎﻳﺪ ﺑﻴﺶ از 
ﭘﻴﺸﺮﻓﺖ  %08ﺳﺎل ﮔﺬﺷﺘﻪ ﺗﻤﺎم ﺷﺪه ﺑﺎﺷﺪ و ﻳﺎ در ﺣﺎل ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﺑﻴﺶ از  3را ﻛﻪ اﺧﻴﺮا اﻧﺠﺎم داده اﻳﺪ )در ﻃﻮل  ﭘﺮوژهﻚ ﻳ ﻬﺖ ﭘﺎﺳﺨﮕﻮﻳﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺆاﻻت اﻳﻦ ﭘﺮﺳﺸﻨﺎﻣﻪ، ﻟﻄﻔﺎﺟ .2
 .ﻓﻴﺰﻳﻜﻲ داﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ( اﻧﺘﺨﺎب ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻴﺪ
 .در اﻳﻦ ﭘﺮﺳﺸﻨﺎﻣﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻌﻨﺎي ﺳﺎزﻣﺎﻧﻲ اﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ در ﻃﻮل ﭘﺮوژه، ﺷﻤﺎ در اﺳﺘﺨﺪام آن ﺑﻮده اﻳﺪ "ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن" ﻟﻔﻆ .3
 :ﭘﺮﺳﺸﻨﺎﻣﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎﻧﻲ اﻃﻼق ﻣﻲ ﺷﻮد ﻛﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻳﻜﻲ از روﺷﻬﺎي زﻳﺮ در ﭘﺮوژه ﺑﺎ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺷﻤﺎ ﻫﻤﻜﺎري داﺷﺘﻪ اﺳﺖدر اﻳﻦ  "ﻫﻤﻜﺎر" ﻟﻔﻆ .4
 .در ﺻﻮرﺗﻴﻜﻪ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺷﻤﺎ ﺑﻌﻨﻮان ﭘﻴﻤﺎﻧﻜﺎر اﺻﻠﻲ و ﻳﺎ ﻳﻜﻲ از ﭘﻴﻤﺎﻧﻜﺎران ﺟﺰء ﭘﺮوژه ﺑﺎ آن ﻗﺮارداد داﺷﺘﻪ اﺳﺖ ﻛﺎرﻓﺮﻣﺎ؛ - 
 .ﭘﻴﻤﺎﻧﻜﺎر ﺟﺰء ﺑﺎ آن ﻗﺮارداد داﺷﺘﻪ اﺳﺖدر ﺻﻮرﺗﻴﻜﻪ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺷﻤﺎ ﺑﻌﻨﻮان  ﻴﻤﺎﻧﻜﺎر اﺻﻠﻲ؛ﭘ - 
 .در ﺻﻮرﺗﻴﻜﻪ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺷﻤﺎ ﺑﻌﻨﻮان ﭘﻴﻤﺎﻧﻜﺎر اﺻﻠﻲ ﭘﺮوژه ﺑﺎ آن ﻗﺮارداد داﺷﺘﻪ اﺳﺖ ﻴﻤﺎﻧﻜﺎر ﺟﺰء؛ﭘ - 
ﻛﻪ ﺣﻠﻘﺔ اﺗﺼﺎل آﻧﻬﺎ در اﻳﻦ ﭘﺮﺳﺸﻨﺎﻣﻪ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻣﻮﻗﺘﻲ اﻃﻼق ﻣﻲ ﺷﻮد ﻛﻪ از ﻣﺠﻤﻮع ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻨﺪﮔﺎن ﺳﺎزﻣﺎﻧﻬﺎي ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪه در ﭘﺮوژه )ﺗﻴﻢ ﭘﺮوژه( " ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﭘﺮوژه" ﻟﻔﻆ .5
 .ﻗﺮاردادﻫﺎي ﭘﺮوژه اﺳﺖ، ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻞ ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ اﺳﺖ
ﭘﻴﻤﺎﻧﻜﺎري، و ﻳﺎ ﭘﻴﻤﺎﻧﻜﺎر ﺟﺰء ﭘﺮوژه ﺑﺎﺷﺪ، ﺑﻄﻮري ﻛﻪ از ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﻫﻤﻜﺎري ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺧﻮد ﺑﺎ  ﺷﺮﻛﺖﺟﺎﻳﮕﺎه ﺷﻤﺎ ﺑﺎﻳﺪ در ﻧﻘﺶ ﻳﻜﻲ از ﻣﺪﻳﺮان ارﺷﺪ ﭘﺮوژه و ﻳﺎ ﻳﻜﻲ از ﻣﺪﻳﺮان ارﺷﺪ  .6
 .ﭘﺮوژة ﻣﺬﻛﻮر اﻃﻼع ﻛﺎﻓﻲ داﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﻴﺪ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر و ﻧﻴﺰ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎت ﻗﺮارداد آﻧﻬﺎ در
 
  ﻓﺮم رﺿﺎﻳﺖ ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎن
  .اﻋﻼم ﻣﻲ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻢ "ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺰﻣﻬﺎي ﻛﻨﺘﺮﻟﻲ در ﭘﺮوژه ﻫﺎي ﺑﺰرگ اﺣﺪاث"اﻳﻨﺠﺎﻧﺐ ﺑﺪﻳﻨﻮﺳﻴﻠﻪ رﺿﺎﻳﺖ ﺧﻮد را ﺑﺮاي ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ در ﭘﺮوژة ﭘﮋوﻫﺸﻲ ﺑﺎ ﻧﺎم * 
 ﻗﺒﻮل  □
 :ﺿﻤﻦ اﻋﻼم رﺿﺎﻳﺖ ﺧﻮد، ﻣﻮارد زﻳﺮ را ﺗﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﻣﻲ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻢ* 
 .ﻫﻤﻜﺎري در اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ و زﻣﺎن ﻣﻮرد ﻧﻴﺎز ﺑﺮاي ﻣﻦ ﺷﺮح داده ﺷﺪه و ﺑﻪ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﻲ ﺳﺆاﻻت ﻣﻦ در اﻳﻦ ﺑﺎره ﭘﺎﺳﺦ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ داده ﺷﺪه اﺳﺖ روش .1
ﮋوﻫﺶ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻴﻢ را ﺧﻮاﻧﺪه ام و ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻳﻦ ﻓﺮﺻﺖ داده ﺷﺪه اﺳﺖ ﺗﺎ درﺑﺎرة اﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﻣﻮرد ﻧﻴﺎز در ﺧﺼﻮص ﻧﺤﻮة ﻫﻤﻜﺎري در اﻳﻦ ﭘ "اﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﻣﻮرد ﻧﻴﺎز ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ ﻛﻨﻨﺪﮔﺎن"ﺻﻔﺤﺔ  .2
 .ﭘﮋوﻫﺸﻲ ﮔﻔﺘﮕﻮ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻢ
 .ﺮار ﻧﺪارماﻳﻨﺠﺎﻧﺐ آﮔﺎﻫﻲ ﻛﺎﻣﻞ دارم ﻛﻪ ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ ﻣﻦ در اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﻛﺎﻣﻼ اﺧﺘﻴﺎري اﺳﺖ و اذﻋﺎن دارم ﻛﻪ ﺗﺤﺖ ﻫﻴﭽﮕﻮﻧﻪ ﻓﺸﺎري ﺑﺮاي ﭘﺬﻳﺮش اﻳﻦ ﻫﻤﻜﺎري ﻗ .3
ﻪ ﻛﻠﻴﺔ اﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﺟﻤﻊ آوري ﺷﺪه از ﻧﺘﺎﻳﺞ اﻳﻦ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ اﻣﻜﺎن اﻧﺘﺸﺎر دارد، اﻳﻨﺠﺎﻧﺐ آﮔﺎﻫﻲ ﻛﺎﻣﻞ دارم ﻛﻪ ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺖ ﻣﻦ در اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﻛﺎﻣﻼ ﻣﺤﺮﻣﺎﻧﻪ اﺳﺖ. ﻫﻤﭽﻨﻴﻦ اﻃﻼع دارم ﻛ .4
 .ﮔﺮﭼﻪ ﻫﻴﭽﮕﻮﻧﻪ اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﻲ در ﻣﻮرد اﻳﻨﺠﺎﻧﺐ ﺑﺼﻮرﺗﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺷﻨﺎﺳﺎﻳﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﺪ ﻣﻮرد اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﻗﺮار ﻧﺨﻮاﻫﺪ ﮔﺮﻓﺖ
در زﻣﺎن ﺣﺎل و ﻳﺎ در آﻳﻨﺪه، ﺗﺤﺖ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻗﺮار ﺑﮕﻴﺮد، ﻗﺎدر ﺑﻪ ﻓﺴﺦ ﻫﻤﻜﺎري اﻳﻨﺠﺎﻧﺐ آﮔﺎﻫﻲ ﻛﺎﻣﻞ دارم ﻛﻪ در ﻫﺮ زﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﺑﺪون اﻳﻨﻜﻪ راﺑﻄﻪ ام ﺑﺎ ﺗﻴﻢ ﭘﮋوﻫﺸﻲ و ﻳﺎ داﻧﺸﮕﺎه ﺳﻴﺪﻧﻲ،  .5
 .ﻣﻲ ﺑﺎﺷﻢ
  :ﻣﺎﻳﻞ ﻫﺴﺘﻢ ﮔﺰارش ﻧﻬﺎﻳﻲ اﻳﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ را درﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻢ* 
  ﺧﻴﺮ  □    ﺑﻠﻲ □
  :ﺪﻴﻣﺜﺒﺖ ﺑﻮده اﺳﺖ، ﻣﺸﺨﺼﺎت ﺧﻮد را اﻋﻼم ﻓﺮﻣﺎﻳ "درﻳﺎﻓﺖ ﮔﺰارش ﻧﻬﺎﻳﻲ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ"ﻄﻔﺎ در ﺻﻮرﺗﻴﻜﻪ ﺟﻮاب ﺷﻤﺎ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺆال ﻟ* 
  و ﻧﺎم ﺧﺎﻧﻮادﮔﻲ ﻧﺎم
  آدرس اﻳﻤﻴﻞ
  ﻧﺎم ﺷﺮﻛﺖ 
  
  ...................................................اﻣﻀﺎء: .......................................................................................... ﺗﺎرﻳﺦ: ....................
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 : ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎت ﭘﺮوژهاولﺑﺨﺶ 
  ﭘﺮوژه در ﻛﺪاﻣﻴﻚ از ﺷﺎﺧﻪ ﻫﺎي زﻳﺮ ﻗﺮار ﻣﻲ ﮔﻴﺮد؟اﻳﻦ  .1
  )آﻣﻮزﺷﻲ، ﺗﺠﺎري، ﻣﺴﻜﻮﻧﻲ، اداري، ﻋﻤﻮﻣﻲ، ﺗﻔﺮﻳﺤﻲ، ﺑﻴﻤﺎرﺳﺘﺎن، ﻛﺎرﺧﺎﻧﺔ ﺻﻨﻌﺘﻲ، ...( اﺑﻨﻴﻪ و ﺳﺎﺧﺘﻤﺎن □
  )ﺳﺪﺳﺎزي، ﺗﺼﻔﻴﻪ ﺧﺎﻧﻪ، ﻣﺨﺎزن آب، ﺧﻄﻮط اﻧﺘﻘﺎل آب و ﻓﺎﺿﻼب، ...( آب □
  )ﻓﺮودﮔﺎه، ﺑﻨﺪر، ﭘﻠﺴﺎزي، راﻫﺴﺎزي، ﺗﻮﻧﻞ ﺳﺎزي، ...( راه و ﺗﺮاﺑﺮي □
  )ﻧﻴﺮوﮔﺎه، ﺧﻄﻮط اﻧﺘﻘﺎل و ﺗﻮزﻳﻊ، ...( ﻧﻴﺮو □
  )ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺴﺎت درﻳﺎﻳﻲ، ﺣﻔﺎري، ﺧﻄﻮط اﻧﺘﻘﺎل ﻧﻔﺖ و ﮔﺎز، ﭘﺎﻻﻳﺸﮕﺎه، واﺣﺪ ﭘﺘﺮوﺷﻴﻤﻲ، ...( ﻧﻔﺖ و ﮔﺎز □
  )ﻟﻄﻔﺎ ﺗﻌﻴﻴﻦ ﻛﻨﻴﺪ(  ﺳﺎﻳﺮ ﻣﻮارد □
  :، ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻗﺮارداد ﻓﻴﻤﺎﺑﻴﻦ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺷﻤﺎ و ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر ﻣﺸﺨﺺ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻴﺪﻗﺮاردادﻣﺒﻠﻎ ﻟﻄﻔﺎ اﻧﺪازة ﭘﺮوژه را از ﻟﺤﺎظ  .2
  0001ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ از  0001-005  001-005  05-001  01-05  5-01  
 □ □ □□□□  ﻣﺒﻠﻎ اوﻟﻴﻪ ﻗﺮارداد ﺑﻪ ﻣﻴﻠﻴﺎرد ﺗﻮﻣﺎن
  :ﺷﻤﺎ و ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر ﻣﺸﺨﺺ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻴﺪ، ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻗﺮارداد ﻓﻴﻤﺎﺑﻴﻦ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻗﺮارداد ﻣﺪتﻟﻄﻔﺎ اﻧﺪازة ﭘﺮوژه را از ﻟﺤﺎظ  .3
  84ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ از   63-84  42-63  81-42  21-81  21ﻛﻤﺘﺮ از   
 □ □ □□□□  ﻣﺪت اوﻟﻴﻪ ﻗﺮارداد ﺑﻪ ﻣﺎه
 در ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﺔ ﭘﺮوژة ﻣﻮرد ﻧﻈﺮ ﺑﺎ ﺳﺎﻳﺮ ﭘﺮوژه ﻫﺎي ﻛﺸﻮر در ﻫﻤﻴﻦ رﺷﺘﻪ، ﺗﺎ ﭼﻪ اﻧﺪازه ﺑﺎ ﻋﺒﺎرﺗﻬﺎي زﻳﺮ درﺑﺎرة اﻳﻦ ﭘﺮوژه ﻣﻮاﻓﻘﻴﺪ؟ .4
ﻛﺎﻣﻼ   
  ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﻢ
  
  ﺑﻴﻄﺮف
ﻛﺎﻣﻼ   
  ﻣﻮاﻓﻘﻢ
ﻛﺎرﺑﺮدي 
  ﻧﺪارد
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  .اﻣﻜﺎن ﻧﻈﺎرت ﺑﺮ ﭘﻴﺸﺮﻓﺖ ﺗﻴﻢ ﭘﺮوژه از ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﺑﺮرﺳﻴﻬﺎ و ﮔﺰارﺷﻬﺎي رﺳﻤﻲ وﺟﻮد داﺷﺖ: 1CP
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  اﻣﻜﺎن ﻧﻈﺎرت ﺑﺮ ﺗﻴﻢ ﭘﺮوژه و ﺳﻨﺠﺶ ﻧﺤﻮة ﺣﺮﻛﺖ آﻧﻬﺎ ﺑﻪ ﺳﻤﺖ اﻫﺪاف ﭘﺮوژه وﺟﻮد داﺷﺖ.: 2CP
آﻳﺎ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺖ ﻣﺤﺼﻮﻻت ﺧﺮوﺟﻲ ﭘﺮوژه ﺑﺎ ﺧﻮاﺳﺘﻪ ﻫﺎي ﻣﺸﺘﺮي ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﺖاﻣﻜﺎن ﺳﻨﺠﺶ اﻳﻨﻜﻪ :3CP
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  داﺷﺘﻪ اﺳﺖ، وﺟﻮد داﺷﺖ.
ﺑﺨﺎﻃﺮ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﺳﻨﺠﻪ ﻫﺎي ﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ اﻧﺪازه ﮔﻴﺮي، اﻣﻜﺎن ﺳﻨﺠﺶ اﻳﻨﻜﻪ آﻳﺎ اﻫﺪاف ﻫﺰﻳﻨﻪ:4CP
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  اي ﭘﺮوژه ﺗﺤﻘﻖ ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ اﺳﺖ، وﺟﻮد داﺷﺖ.
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  آﻳﺎ ﺗﻴﻢ ﭘﺮوژه ﻛﺎر ﭘﺮوژه را ﺑﻪ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﺗﻤﺎم ﻛﺮده اﺳﺖ، وﺟﻮد داﺷﺖ.اﻣﻜﺎن ﺳﻨﺠﺶ اﻳﻨﻜﻪ  : 5CP
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  روش اﻧﺠﺎم ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺘﻬﺎي ﭘﺮوژه ﻛﺎﻣﻼ ﺷﻨﺎﺧﺘﻪ ﺷﺪه ﺑﻮد.: 6CP
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﺗﻴﻢ ﭘﺮوژه داﻧﺶ ﻛﺎﻓﻲ ﺑﺮاي اﻧﺠﺎم ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺘﻬﺎي ﭘﺮوژه را دارا ﺑﻮد.: 7CP
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  ﻛﻨﺘﺮﻟﻲ ﭘﻴﺶ زﻣﻴﻨﻪ ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺰﻣﻬﺎيوم: دﺑﺨﺶ 
  ، ﺑﻪ ﭼﻪ ﻣﻴﺰان ﺑﺎ ﻋﺒﺎرﺗﻬﺎي زﻳﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﻫﺴﺘﻴﺪ؟ﭘﻴﺶ از آﻏﺎز اﻳﻦ ﭘﺮوژه در ﻣﻮرد ﺳﻮاﺑﻖ ﻫﻤﻜﺎري ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺧﻮد و ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر، .5
ﻛﺎﻣﻼ   
  ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﻢ
  
  ﺑﻴﻄﺮف
ﻛﺎﻣﻼ   
 ﻣﻮاﻓﻘﻢ
 ﻛﺎرﺑﺮدي
 ﻧﺪارد
ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻣﺎ وﭘﻴﺶ از آﻏﺎز اﻳﻦ ﭘﺮوژه، ﻫﻤﻜﺎرﻳﻬﺎي وﺳﻴﻌﻲ در ﻗﺎﻟﺐ ﭘﺮوژه ﻫﺎي دﻳﮕﺮ ﺑﻴﻦ:1TP
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  .ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر وﺟﻮد داﺷﺘﻪ اﺳﺖ
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  در ﻃﻮل ﻣﺪت ﻫﻤﻜﺎري، ﻫﻤﻮاره اﻳﻦ ﻫﻤﻜﺎرﻳﻬﺎ ﻣﻄﻠﻮب و دﻟﭙﺬﻳﺮ ﺑﻮده اﺳﺖ. : TP2
در اﺛﺮ ﻫﻤﻜﺎرﻳﻬﺎي ﮔﺬﺷﺘﻪ، ﻫﺮ دو ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن درك ﻣﺸﺘﺮﻛﻲ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ ﻓﺮﻫﻨﮓ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎﻧﻲ و:1NS
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  .آورده اﻧﺪ ارزﺷﻬﺎ و رواﻟﻬﺎي ﻛﺎري ﻳﻜﺪﻳﮕﺮ ﺑﺪﺳﺖ
ﺗﺤﺖ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻫﻤﻜﺎرﻳﻬﺎي ﮔﺬﺷﺘﻪ، ﻫﺮ دو ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺑﻪ ﭼﺸﻢ اﻧﺪاز ﻣﺸﺘﺮﻛﻲ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﻪ:2NS
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  .ﻫﻤﻜﺎرﻳﻬﺎي ﻣﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ دﺳﺖ ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ اﻧﺪ
در اﺛﺮ ﻫﻤﻜﺎرﻳﻬﺎي ﮔﺬﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻣﺎ و ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر، ﻧُﺮﻣﻬﺎي رﻓﺘﺎري ﻣﺸﺘﺮك ﺑﻪ:3NS
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﻳﺎﻓﺘﻪ اﻧﺪ.ﻣﻴﺰان ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﻮﺟﻬﻲ ﮔﺴﺘﺮش 
در ﻃﻮل ﻫﻤﻜﺎرﻳﻬﺎي ﮔﺬﺷﺘﻪ، ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر ﻫﻤﻮاره ﻣﻨﺒﻊ ﺑﺴﻴﺎر ﺧﻮﺑﻲ ﺑﺮاي درﻳﺎﻓﺖ:1RT
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  اﻃﻼﻋﺎت دﻗﻴﻖ ﺑﻮده اﺳﺖ.
در ﻃﻮل ﻫﻤﻜﺎرﻳﻬﺎي ﮔﺬﺷﺘﻪ، ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر ﻫﻤﻮاره در ﻣﺬاﻛﺮات ﺑﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻋﺎدﻻﻧﻪ رﻓﺘﺎر ﻛﺮده:RT2
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  اﺳﺖ.
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  در ﻃﻮل ﻫﻤﻜﺎرﻳﻬﺎي ﮔﺬﺷﺘﻪ، ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر ﻫﻤﻮاره ﻗﺎﺑﻞ اﺗﻜﺎ ﺑﻮده اﺳﺖ.: 3RT
 
 : ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺰﻣﻬﺎي ﻛﻨﺘﺮﻟﻲ ﭘﺮوژهﺳﻮمﺑﺨﺶ 
  ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﻫﺴﺘﻴﺪ؟ ﺗﺎ ﭼﻪ ﻣﻴﺰان ﺑﺎ ﻋﺒﺎرﺗﻬﺎي زﻳﺮ در ﺗﻮﺻﻴﻒ راﺑﻄﺔ ﻣﻴﺎن ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺧﻮد و ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر در ﻃﻮل ﭘﺮوژه .6
ﻛﺎﻣﻼ   
  ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﻢ
  
  ﺑﻴﻄﺮف
ﻛﺎﻣﻼ   
 ﻣﻮاﻓﻘﻢ
 ﻛﺎرﺑﺮدي
 ﻧﺪارد
ﻫﺮ دو ﻃﺮف در ﻣﻮرد ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮات در اﺳﺘﺮاﺗﮋﻳﻬﺎ و ﺧﻂ ﻣﺸﻲ ﻫﺎي ﺳﺎزﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﺧﻮد ﺑﺎ ﻫﻢ ﺗﺒﺎدل:LC1
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  اﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﻣﻲ ﻛﺮدﻧﺪ.
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﻫﺮ دو ﻃﺮف ﺗﺠﺮﺑﻴﺎت ﻣﻮﻓﻖ و ﻧﺎﻣﻮﻓﻖ ﺧﻮد را در اﺧﺘﻴﺎر ﻳﻜﺪﻳﮕﺮ ﻗﺮار ﻣﻲ دادﻧﺪ.: LC2
ﻣﺮاودة ﻣﺴﺘﻤﺮ و ﺑﺮﻗﺮاري ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻼت اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻏﻴﺮرﺳﻤﻲ، ﺑﺎ ﻳﻜﺪﻳﮕﺮﻫﺮ دو ﻃﺮف از ﻃﺮﻳﻖ :3LC
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  .در ارﺗﺒﺎط ﺑﻮدﻧﺪ
ﻫﺮ دو ﻃﺮف ﺗﻮاﻧﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﺑﻄﻮر ﻣﺆﺛﺮ و ﺷﺎﻳﺴﺘﻪ اي ﺑﺮاي ﻳﻜﺪﻳﮕﺮ ﻛﺎرﻫﺎﻳﻲ اﻧﺠﺎم دﻫﻨﺪ و ﺑﻪ ﻫﻢ:4LC
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  .ﻛﻤﻚ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻨﺪ
از اﻳﻨﻜﻪ ﻣﺴﺒﺐ آن ﭼﻪ ﻛﺴﻲ ﺑﻮدهﻃﺮﻓﻴﻦ ﺳﻌﻲ ﻣﻲ ﻛﺮدﻧﺪ ﻣﺸﻜﻼت ﺑﻮﺟﻮد آﻣﺪه را ﻓﺎرغ:LC5
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  اﺳﺖ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﺎ ﻫﻢ ﺣﻞ ﻧﻤﺎﻳﻨﺪ.
ﻫﺮ دو ﻃﺮف در ﻣﻮرد اﺗﻔﺎﻗﺎت و ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮاﺗﻲ ﻛﻪ ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ﺑﻮد ﻫﻤﻜﺎري آﻧﻬﺎ را ﺗﺤﺖ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻗﺮار:6LC
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  دﻫﺪ ﺑﺎ ﻳﻜﺪﻳﮕﺮ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻲ ﻛﺮدﻧﺪ.
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﺑﺮ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻞ و ﻫﻤﻜﺎري ﻃﺮﻓﻴﻦ ﺑﻮد. ﻗﺮارداد، ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺰم اﺻﻠﻲ ﺣﺎﻛﻢ: 1GC
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  اﻫﺪاف ﭘﺮوژه ﺑﻄﻮر دﻗﻴﻖ در ﻗﺮارداد ﻓﻴﻤﺎﺑﻴﻦ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﺷﺪه ﺑﻮد.: 2GC
ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺘﻬﺎ، اﺧﺘﻴﺎرات و ﺣﻘﻮق ﻃﺮﻓﻴﻦ ﻗﺮارداد ﺑﻄﻮر ﻛﺎﻣﻼ دﻗﻴﻖ و ﻣﺸﺨﺺ در ﻗﺮارداد:3GC
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  .ذﻛﺮ ﺷﺪه ﺑﻮد
ﻫﺎي ﻣﺸﺨﺺ و ﺷﻔﺎﻓﻲ ﺟﻬﺖ ﺣﻞ اﺧﺘﻼﻓﺎت اﺣﺘﻤﺎﻟﻲ ﻣﻴﺎن ﻃﺮﻓﻴﻦﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺰﻣﻬﺎ و ﺳﻨﺠﻪ:4GC
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﻗﺮارداد ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺷﺪه ﺑﻮد.
ﻫﺮ ﻳﻚ از ﻃﺮﻓﻴﻦ ﻗﺮارداد ﺗﻤﺎم ﺗﻼش ﺧﻮد را ﻛﺮده ﺑﻮد ﺗﺎ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﻲ ﻣﻮاردي را ﻛﻪ ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ﺑﻮد:5GC
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  .در آﻳﻨﺪه رخ دﻫﺪ ﺑﺎ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎت ﻛﺎﻓﻲ در ﻗﺮارداد ﺑﮕﻨﺠﺎﻧﺪ
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 : ﻋﻤﻠﻜﺮدﭼﻬﺎرمﺑﺨﺶ 
  ؟ﻫﻤﻜﺎري ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺧﻮد ﺑﺎ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر در اﻳﻦ ﭘﺮوژه را در ﻣﻮارد زﻳﺮ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﻪ ارزﻳﺎﺑﻲ ﻣﻲ ﻛﻨﻴﺪ .7
ﻛﺎﻣﻼ   
 ﺨﺎﻟﻔﻢﻣ
ﻛﺎﻣﻼ   ﺑﻴﻄﺮف 
 ﻮاﻓﻘﻢﻣ
اﻳﻦ ﻫﻤﻜﺎري ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﻣﻬﺎرﺗﻬﺎي ﻛﻠﻴﺪي و ﻣﺰﻳﺖ رﻗﺎﺑﺘﻲ در ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻣﺎ:RS1
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﺷﺪ.
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﻛﻪ ﺑﺮاﻳﺶ در ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺑﻮدﻳﻢ رﺳﻴﺪ. اﻳﻦ ﻫﻤﻜﺎري ﺑﻪ اﻫﺪاﻓﻲ: RS2
اﻳﻦ ﻫﻤﻜﺎري ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺑﻬﺒﻮد رواﺑﻂ دو ﻃﺮف و اﻓﺰاﻳﺶ اﺣﺘﻤﺎل ﻫﻤﻜﺎرﻳﻬﺎي آﺗﻲ:RS3
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﮔﺮدﻳﺪ.
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﺑﻄﻮر ﻛﻠﻲ، ﻣﺎ از اﻳﻦ ﻫﻤﻜﺎري راﺿﻲ ﺑﻮدﻳﻢ. : RS4
  ﻣﻮارد زﻳﺮ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﻪ ارزﻳﺎﺑﻲ ﻣﻲ ﻛﻨﻴﺪ؟ﻋﻤﻠﻜﺮد ﭘﺮوژه را در ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪ ﺑﺎ ﭘﺮوژه ﻫﺎي ﻣﺸﺎﺑﻪ، در  .8
ﺑﺴﻴﺎر   
 ﺿﻌﻴﻒ
 ﺑﺴﻴﺎر ﻋﺎﻟﻲ  ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻂ 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﻋﻤﻠﻜﺮد زﻣﺎﻧﻲ: 1PP
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﻋﻤﻠﻜﺮد ﻫﺰﻳﻨﻪ اي: 2PP
ﺑﺎ ﻫﻤﺎﻫﻨﮕﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻛﺮده اﺳﺖ، ﻟﻄﻔﺎ در ﭘﺎﺳﺨﮕﻮﻳﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺆال زﻳﺮ زﻣﺎن ﺑﻨﺪي ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﭘﺮوژه را  ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺔ زﻣﺎن ﺑﻨﺪي ﭘﺮوژهدر ﺻﻮرﺗﻴﻜﻪ در ﻃﻮل ﭘﺮوژه  .9
  .ﻣﺒﻨﺎ ﻗﺮار دﻫﻴﺪ، در ﻏﻴﺮ اﻳﻨﺼﻮرت ﺧﻮاﻫﺸﻤﻨﺪ اﺳﺖ ﺑﺮاﺳﺎس ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺔ اوﻟﻴﺔ ﭘﺮوژه ﭘﺎﺳﺦ دﻫﻴﺪ
  
  دﻳﺮﺗﺮ از ﻣﻮﻋﺪ
 001)ﺑﻴﺶ از 
  درﺻﺪ(
  دﻳﺮﺗﺮ از ﻣﻮﻋﺪ
 05-001)
  درﺻﺪ(
  دﻳﺮﺗﺮ از ﻣﻮﻋﺪ
 52-05)
  درﺻﺪ(
  دﻳﺮﺗﺮ از ﻣﻮﻋﺪ
  ﻃﺒﻖ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ  درﺻﺪ( 0-52)
  زودﺗﺮ از ﻣﻮﻋﺪ
  درﺻﺪ( 0-52)
  زودﺗﺮ از ﻣﻮﻋﺪ
 52-05)
  درﺻﺪ(
  زودﺗﺮ از ﻣﻮﻋﺪ
 05-001)
  درﺻﺪ(
  زودﺗﺮ از ﻣﻮﻋﺪ
 001)ﺑﻴﺶ از 
  درﺻﺪ(
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﻋﻤﻠﻜﺮد زﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﭘﺮوژه
ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﭘﺮوژه را ﻣﺒﻨﺎ ﻗﺮار  ﺑﻮدﺟﻪ ﺑﻨﺪيﺑﺎ ﻫﻤﺎﻫﻨﮕﻲ ﺑﺎ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﻫﻤﻜﺎر ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻛﺮده اﺳﺖ، ﻟﻄﻔﺎ در ﭘﺎﺳﺨﮕﻮﻳﻲ ﺑﻪ ﺳﺆال زﻳﺮ  ﭘﺮوژه ﺑﻮدﺟﺔدر ﺻﻮرﺗﻴﻜﻪ در ﻃﻮل ﭘﺮوژه  .01
  .دﻫﻴﺪ، در ﻏﻴﺮ اﻳﻨﺼﻮرت ﺧﻮاﻫﺸﻤﻨﺪ اﺳﺖ ﺑﺮاﺳﺎس ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺔ اوﻟﻴﺔ ﭘﺮوژه ﭘﺎﺳﺦ دﻫﻴﺪ
  
ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ از ﺑﻮدﺟﺔ 
  ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺷﺪه
 001)ﺑﻴﺶ از 
  درﺻﺪ(
ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ از ﺑﻮدﺟﺔ 
  ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺷﺪه
 05-001)
  درﺻﺪ(
ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ از ﺑﻮدﺟﺔ 
  ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺷﺪه
 52-05)
  درﺻﺪ(
ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ از ﺑﻮدﺟﺔ 
  ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺷﺪه
  درﺻﺪ( 0-52)
  ﻃﺒﻖ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ
ﻛﻤﺘﺮ از ﺑﻮدﺟﺔ 
  ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺷﺪه
  درﺻﺪ( 0-52)
ﻛﻤﺘﺮ از ﺑﻮدﺟﺔ 
  ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺷﺪه
 52-05)
  درﺻﺪ(
ﻛﻤﺘﺮ از ﺑﻮدﺟﺔ 
  ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺷﺪه
 05-001)
  درﺻﺪ(
ﻛﻤﺘﺮ از ﺑﻮدﺟﺔ 
  ﭘﻴﺶ ﺑﻴﻨﻲ ﺷﺪه
 001ﺶ از )ﺑﻴ
  درﺻﺪ(
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  ﭘﺮوژه ﻫﺰﻳﻨﺔ واﻗﻌﻲ
  
 اﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﭘﻨﺠﻢ:ﺑﺨﺶ 
  ﻋﻤﺮ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﺑﻪ ﺳﺎل .11
  ﺳﺎل 02ﺑﻴﺶ از  □   02-51 □   01- 51 □      5- 01 □    ﺳﺎل 5ﻛﻤﺘﺮ از  □
    ﺳِﻤَﺖ ﺷﻤﺎ در ﭘﺮوژه و ﻳﺎ ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن ﭼﻪ ﺑﻮد؟. 21
  ﭼﻨﺪ ﺳﺎل در ﺻﻨﻌﺖ اﺣﺪاث ﻣﺸﻐﻮل ﺑﻪ ﻛﺎر ﺑﻮده اﻳﺪ؟ .31
  ﺳﺎل 03ﺑﻴﺶ از  □   02- 03 □   01- 02 □      5- 01 □    ﺳﺎل 5ﻛﻤﺘﺮ از  □
  ﭼﻨﺪ ﺳﺎل ﺳﻦ دارﻳﺪ؟ .41
  ﻳﺎ ﺑﻴﺸﺘﺮ 06 □   05- 06 □   04- 05 □     03- 04 □     52- 03 □
  آﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﺪرك ﺗﺤﺼﻴﻠﻲ ﺷﻤﺎ ﭼﻪ ﺑﻮده اﺳﺖ؟ .51
  دﻛﺘﺮا □  ﻓﻮق ﻟﻴﺴﺎﻧﺲ □   ﻟﻴﺴﺎﻧﺲ □    ﻓﻮق دﻳﭙﻠﻢ □      دﻳﭙﻠﻢ □
  ﻧﻈﺮات و ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎدات:* 
  
 
